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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues to be resolved by this appeal are: 
1. Did the District Court err, under State law, in 
not staying the State Court proceeding pending arbitration 
and in not ordering that all disputes and claims between the 
parties, as set forth in the State Court Complaint, arise 
under a certain Dealership Agreement between Dick Brady 
Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "Systems"), Richard Brady 
(hereinafter "Brady") and Docutel-Olivetti Corporation 
(hereinafter "Docutel-Olivetti") and/or pertain in some 
manner to the dealership created by the Dealership Agreement 
and, therefore, must be resolved by arbitration, as required 
by the Dealership Agreement? 
2. Did the District Court err, under State and 
Federal law, in ordering the disputes of the State Court 
Complaint to be resolved by litigation, and not by 
arbitration, contrary to the Dealership Agreement? 
3. Did the District Court err, contrary to Federal 
law, in not deferring to the Federal Court for an indepen-
dent determination under 9 U.S.C. 4 as to which claims 
between the parties are arbitrable and which, if any, are 
non-arbitrable? 
4. Did the District Court err in failing to rule that 
paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement is subject to the 
arbitration provision [paragraph 12] of the Dealership 
Agreement? 
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5. Did the District Court err in failing to resolve 
contract ambiguities against Docutel-Olivetti, Docutel-
Olivetti being the party which wrote the Dealership 
Agreement? 
6. Did the District Court err in subjectively 
interpreting the Dealership Agreement as providing for 
litigation of all issues of the State Court Complaint, given 
the fact that there is no express exclusion, in the 
Agreement, of arbitration as to any specific issue, and 
controlling Federal policy requires such an express 
exclusion? 
7. Did the District Court err in refusing to follow 
existing Federal policy and case law requiring that stays be 
issued, under 9 U.S.C. 3, by state courts as to all issues 
in state litigation which are determined by a Federal 
District Court to be arbitrable under an arbitration 
agreement? 
8. Did the District Court err, under State law, in 
denying the Motion for Dismissal or Stay Pending Arbitration 
filed by Systems and Brady? 
9. Did the District Court err in not making findings 
of fact and in not drawing adequate conclusions of law in 
respect to its Orders forming the subject matter of this 
appeal, i.e. the anti-arbitration Orders dated June 10, 1985 
and July 19, 1985? 
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10. Did the District Court err in not sustaining the 
Objection to Proposed Order and Motion to Clarify, filed by 
Systems and Brady, in respect to the June 10, 1985 Order? 
11. Did the District Court err in not approving the 
Statement of Proceedings .submitted by Systems and Brady? 
12. Is Brady entitled to the benefit of the 
arbitration provisions of the Dealership Agreement, under 
state law, either as a beneficiary or because Docutel-
Olivetti alleged that he was, in effect, an actual signatory 
of the Dealership Agreement? 
13. Does the requirement of the 1985 Utah Arbitration 
Act, U.C.A. 78-31(a)-1, that issues be submitted to 
arbitration, require an analysis by issue rather than by 
party? 
14. Did the Third Judicial District Court err in 
refusing to stay the issues involved in Docutel-Olivetti's 
Complaint and order arbitration thereof, without first 
determining that such issues were severable from the issues 
raised by the counterclaims, set-offs, and defenses of 
Systems and Brady, which issues are subject to and have been 
placed in arbitration? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Statutes, the interpretation of which is or may be 
determinative, are summarized below and reproduced verbatim 
in the Appendix (A. 72-92): 
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1. The 1985 Utah Arbitration Act [U.C.A. 78-31a-1, et 
seq.]. (A. 72-78; R. 74-83). 
2. The preamble to the enrolled bill which, upon 
passage, became the 1985 Utah Arbitration Act. (A. 79; 
R. 74). 
3. The pre-1985 Utah Arbitration Act [U.C.A. 78-31-1, 
et seq.], now superceded. (A. 80-91). 
4. The Federal Arbitration Act §§ 3, 4 [9 U.S.C. §§ 
3, 4]. (A. 92). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On January 24, 1985, Docutel-Olivetti, a foreign 
corporation, filed a so-called collection claim in the Third 
Judicial District Court against Systems, a Utah Corporation, 
and Brady, a Utah resident. (R. 2-13). 
The Complaint, in each of the four causes of action 
thereof, cites as an alleged basis for relief a certain 
Dealership Agreement, authored by Docutel-Olivetti and 
entered into on or about February 17, 1982. (R. 3,7; 
A. 105). 
The business transactions, placed in issue by filing 
the Complaint, relate to and grow out of performance under 
the Dealership Agreement and embrace business in interstate 
commerce. (R. 3,15,85-89). Thus, while the 1985 Utah 
Arbitration Act (UAA) applies, the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) §§ 3 and 4 is overriding. 
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The Dealership Agreement requires arbitration of "all 
disputes11 related to the Dealership Agreement or pertaining 
to the dealership thereby created. (R. 8; A. 106). Thus, the 
filing of the Complaint by Docutel-Olivetti breached the 
Dealership Agreement in that it violated the mentioned 
arbitration provision. 
Course of Proceedings 
Following filing of the State Court Complaint [in 
contravention of the arbitration provision of the Dealership 
Agreement], Systems and Brady demanded in writing on 
successive occasions that all of the claims of Docutel-
Olivetti be placed in arbitration, including, but not 
limited to the claims contained within the State Court 
Complaint. (R. 15,24,44,45,58-60; A. 37-39). To the surprise 
of Systems and Brady, Docutel-Olivetti, in a continuous 
breach of the Agreement, has on all occasions refused, 
absolutely, to arbitrate its claims, notwithstanding the 
fact that Systems and Brady have placed their defenses, 
set-offs and counterclaims in arbitration, in full 
compliance with the Dealership Agreement. (R. 30-38,63,64). 
Upon learning, for the first time, that Docutel-
Olivetti would not voluntarily place its claims in 
arbitration, Systems and Brady, to avoid default, filed, but 
did not notice for hearing, a Motion to Dismiss or Stay 
Pending Arbitration in the State Court matter. (R. 26-27; A. 
14,47). The Motion was accompanied by a Memorandum in 
support thereof and an Affidavit of Brady, both of which 
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notified Docutel-Olivetti and the State Court that Systems 
and Brady were contemporaneously proceeding to file a 
Petition in the Utah Federal District Court, under §4 FAA, 
consistent with the Moses H. Cone decision, infra, asking 
that Docutel-Olivetti be compelled to arbitrate its claims 
against Systems and Brady. (R. 15,24). Docutel-Olivetti 
submitted itself to and availed itself of the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Court in respect to the Petition, requesting 
in its own right affirmative relief from the Honorable J. 
Thomas Greene. (A. 2,3,51,52). 
The State Motion to Dismiss or .Stay Pending Arbitra-
tion has been heard at the request of the Honorable Bruce S. 
Jenkins, before the Federal Petition was reassigned to Judge 
Greene. (A. 4,7). The Federal Petition to Compel Arbitration 
has been heard by Judge Greene. (A. 21,45-50). 
Disposition Below 
This appeal is from an anti-arbitration Order dated 
June 10, 1985 of the Third Judicial District Court [the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson] denying the Motion of Systems 
and Brady to Dismiss or Stay Pending Arbitration under 
U.C.A. 78-31(a)-1, et seq., the 1985 Utah Arbitration Act, 
wherein the trial court stated that Plaintiff Docutel-
Olivetti is not required to submit the claims of its 
Complaint to arbitration and that Systems and Brady must 
answer the Complaint, notwithstanding the fact that Systems 
and Brady had placed their defenses, set-offs and counter-
claims in arbitration, in compliance with the controlling 
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arbitration [Dealership] Agreement. (R. 63,64,108,109; 
A. 100,101). This appeal is also from a companion anti-
arbitration Order dated July 19, 1985 regarding the 
Objection of Systems and Brady to the June 10, 1985 Order. 
(R. 199,200; A. 102,103) . 
The Federal Petition to Compel Arbitration resulted in 
an arbitration Order from the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, 
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §4, compelling arbitration of all of 
Docutel-Olivettifs claims, including those of the State 
Court Complaint, which arise under the Dealership Agreement 
and/or pertaining in any manner to the dealership thereby 
created. (R. 232-248). While the theoretical right to 
litigate claims under any separate credit agreement 
continues under Judge Greenefs arbitration Order, the 
absence of any separate credit agreement between the parties 
means that all of Docutel-Olivettifs existing claims are 
arbitrable. (R. 235,344,345; A. 68-70). The Federal decision 
is now res judicata as to the parties, given the dismissal 
of the Federal appeal and the Federal cross-appeal by the 
Tenth Circuit. (A. 65-67). 
The defenses, set-offs and counterclaims of Systems 
and Brady remain in arbitration, before the American 
Arbitration Association, although nothing substantive has 
happened there, and likely will not until the question of 
which claims are arbitrable and which, if any, are not is 
resolved by the courts. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Olivetti Corporation and Systems entered into a 
certain Dealership Agreement dated February 17, 1982. 
(R. 7,8; A. 105,106). All disputes which exist between the 
parties are subsequent to the effective date of the 
Dealership Agreement. (R. 63,64). 
2. Docutel-Olivetti is the successor and assignee of 
the position of Olivetti Corporation under the Dealership 
Agreement. (R. 2). 
3. The relevant aspects of the Dealership Agreement 
are: 
(a) The Dealership Agreement was written, drafted 
and authored by Olivetti. (R. 7,851 A.105). 
(b) Paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement 
mentions certain U.C.C. remedies, provided one or more 
separate credit agreements exist between the parties. (R. 8; 
A. 106). Systems and Brady have always understood said legal 
remedies provision [paragraph 10 of the Dealership 
Agreement] to be subject to the absolute arbitration 
provision of paragraph 12 of the Agreement, mentioned below. 
(R. 89). 
(c) Paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement 
reads: 
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All disputes arising under this Agreement or 
pertaining in any manner to the dealership created by 
this Agreement shall be resolved by arbitration.... 
(Emphasis supplied.) (R. 8; A.106). 
(d) Paragraph 10 [i.e., the U.C.C. remedies] is 
not an express exception to and contradiction of the 
mandatory arbitration requirement of paragraph 12. (R. 8; A. 106). 
(e) Paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement 
makes the end result of any legal remedy obtained subser-
vient to the results of arbitration. (R. 8; A. 106). 
(f) Paragraph 15, states that the Agreement " ... 
[shall] inure to the benefit of ... [the] beneficiaries...." 
Brady understood he was such a beneficiary. (R. 8,62; A. 106). 
4. There are no on-going or presently active separate 
or ancillary credit agreements between the parties falling 
under paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement. (R. 344,345; 
A. 68,69). 
5. Further, Docutel-Olivetti is not a secured 
creditor of Systems. (A. 70). 
6. Therefore, none of the claims between the parties 
are litigatable and all claims between the parties are 
abtitrable under paragraph 12 of the Agreement. (R. 62,345). 
7. Contrary to the obligation to arbitrate, Docutel-
Olivetti filed a Third Judicial District suit [C85-506] on 
dealership claims. (R. 2-13). 
8. Docutel-Olivetti alleges in its suit that Brady 
and Systems are one and the same and, therefore, Brady is a 
party to the Dealership Agreement. (R. 4,9). 
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9. Brady and Systems have always understood that the 
Dealership Agreement requires resolution in arbitration of 
all disputes, especially, here, because all presently 
existing disputes between the parties relate and pertain to 
the dealership and the Dealership Agreement, (R. 85,89). 
10. When advised of the state suit [C85-506], Systems 
and Brady promptly and timely in writing demanded arbitra-
tion of all claims contained within suit. (R. 15,24,44,45). 
11. Docutel-Olivetti refused, absolutely, to 
arbitrate any and all of the claims forming the State 
action. (R. 30-38). 
12. Later, Systems and Brady, in writing, demanded 
arbitration of all of Docutel-Olivettifs claims, disputes 
and issues. (R. 58-60; A. 37-39). Docutel-Olivetti again 
refused, absolutely, to arbitrate. 
13. All four causes of action of the State Complaint 
arise under and pertain to the Dealership Agreement, by 
admission of Docutel-Olivetti in paragraph 8 and 9 of the 
first cause of action and incorporated by reference into the 
other three causes of action. (R. 2,3). 
14. Doctuel-Olivetti admits that the four causes of 
action asserted only one claim. (A. 46; see also A. 58,59). 
15. To prevent default in the State action, Systems 
and Brady on February 12, 1985 filed a Motion for Dismissal 
or Stay Pending Arbitration. (A. 14,47; R. 74-83). 
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16. In the State Court Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Dismissal or Stay [pending arbitration] and in 
Brady's Affidavit, both of February 12, 1985, Systems and 
Brady notified the State Court and Docutel-Olivetti that a 
Petition to Compel Arbitration under the FAA, e.g.: 
Defendants [Systems and Brady] represent to the 
Court that they are in fact promptly and diligently 
seeking to commence arbitration in accordance with the 
terms of the Agreement and are contemporaneously 
filing a Petition to Compel Arbitration in the United 
States District for the Central District of Utah, as 
they are required to do by Federal Statute. (Emphasis 
supplied.) (R. 24). 
17. Systems and Brady did not voluntarily notice 
their Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings Pending 
Arbitration in the State Court, nor did Docutel-Olivetti. 
18. To the contrary, Systems and Brady understood on 
and before February 12, 1985 that the FAA controlled and 
that, under the Moses H. Cone, U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
infra, Systems and Brady properly could and should proceed 
to the Utah Federal District Court for a determination of 
arbitrability of the claims of the parties under the FAA §4. 
(R. 15,24). 
19. Shortly thereafter, Systems and Brady filed, on 
March 8, 1985, in Federal Court their Petition to Compel 
Arbitration under §4 of the FAA [9 U.S.C. 4] and caused said 
Petition to be noticed for hearing before the Honorable 
Bruce S. Jenkins, the Utah Federal District Judge initially 
assigned to the Federal Petition. (R. 54-57; A. 4,5). The 
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filing of the Federal Petition to Compel Arbitration was, 
therefore, contemporaneous with the avoidance by the 
Defendants Systems and Brady of default in State Court via 
their Motion to Dismiss or Stay Pending Arbitration 
Proceedings. 
20. On April 5, 1985, following service of the 
Federal Petition, Docutel-Olivetti filed its Reply to 
Petition to Compel Arbitration. Among other things, in said 
reply, Docutel-Olivetti admitted and submitted itself to and 
availed itself of the jurisdiction of the Utah Federal 
District Court by requesting certain affirmative relief. (A. 
2,3). 
21. The first effort to obtain substantive relief in 
the form of arbitration, therefore, consisted of a hearing, 
sought and obtained by Systems and Brady, before the 
Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins in Federal Court on May 2, 1985. 
(A. 4,5). 
22. Judge Jenkins chose not to hear the Federal 
Petition to Compel Arbitration on May 2, 1985, but rather 
continued the hearing and asked that the State Court Motion 
to Dismiss or Stay Pending Arbitration be noticed and heard 
first, after which a hearing on the merits of the Federal 
Petition to Compel Arbitration would take place. Specific-
ally, Judge Jenkins stated: 
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THE COURT: Call it up for hearing [the Motion in 
State Court] and come back and see me in three weeks. 
I111 continue the matter for three weeks. Call it up 
for hearing before that state judge. I don't want to 
do his work for him, and I don't want to interfere 
with what he has to do. Let me give you a date and 
I'll continue it. Why don't we look at it on the 31st 
of May at 1:30. I'm simply (sic) I'll simply continue 
this matter for further consideration. (Emphasis 
added.) (A. 7). 
23. Only because of the above-quoted statement of 
Judge Jenkins, Systems and Brady noticed their Motion to 
Dismiss or Stay Pending Arbitration for hearing in State 
Court. (R. 28f29). That hearing took place on May 24, 1985 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
24. It was not until May 16, 1985 that Docutel-
Olivetti served its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion 
for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration, 
thereby further evidencing the understanding of Docutel-
Olivetti that the matter should be determined in the Federal 
Court under the FAA §4. (R. 30-38). 
25. Brady and Systems deny that any money is owed 
Docutel-Olivetti. (R. 62). 
26. The defenses, set-offs and counterclaims of 
Systems and Brady [consistent with the requirement of the 
Dealership Agreement] had been placed in arbitration. (R. 
63,64). 
27. Brady and Systems have always understood 
paragraph 12 requires arbitration of all dealership disputes 
between the parties, including disputes under paragraph 10 
of the Dealership Agreement. (R. 89). 
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28. On May 24, 1985, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson refused 
to enforce the right of Systems and Brady to arbitrate the 
issues contained within Docutel-Olivettifs State Court 
Complaint. Judge Wilkinson, in his anti-arbitration ruling, 
also refused to stay the action or dismiss the Complaint and 
required Systems and Brady to answer the Complaint even 
though Systems and Brady had already placed their defenses, 
set-offs and counterclaims in arbitration. (R. 108,109; 
A. 100,101). 
29. At the State Court hearing on May 24, 1985, 
Systems and Brady informed Judge Wilkinson that a Petition 
to Compel Arbitration had been earlier filed in Federal 
Court and that the Federal arbitration issues would be 
presented to and resolved by the Federal Court. 
(R. 265,267,269,271; A. 40-44). 
30. Judge Wilkinson's decision was based upon the 
1985 UAA, which is procedural and became retroactively 
effective before the May 24, 1985 State Court hearing. 
(R. 271). This is admitted by counsel for Docutel-Olivetti. 
(A. 16). 
31. Docutel-Olivetti sent to Judge Wilkinson a 
proposed Order respecting the hearing on May 24, 1985. 
(A. 12). 
32. Systems and Brady timely objected to the proposed 
Order and moved to clarify the decision. The Objections and 
Motion to Clarify were heard on June 21, 1985. (R. 100-107). 
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33. Judge Wilkinson prematurely and incorrectly 
signed the anti-arbitration Order proposed by Docutel-
Olivetti on June 10, 1985. (R. 108,109; A. 100,101). 
34. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Judge Wilkinson 
heard the Objections and Motion to Clarify of Systems and 
Brady on June 21, 1985. (R. 100,101,161). 
35. The June 21, 1985 hearing resulted in a July 19, 
1985 Order from Judge Wilkinson, which intentionally made no 
findings of fact, denied the objection to the June 10, 1985 
Order and Motion to Clarify and made no ruling as to any of 
the defenses, set-offs and counterclaims of Systems and 
Brady, earlier placed in arbitration. (R. 199,200; A. 102,103). 
36. Judge Wilkinson, on June 21, 1985, did clarify 
his earlier ruling of May 24, 1985 by stating that his 
ruling was based upon a reading of the Dealership Agreement 
and the application of state law. (A.42f43). 
37. This was also admitted by Docutel-Olivetti in the 
May 30, 1985 Federal hearing. (A. 16). 
38. Thereafter, the June 10, 1985 anti-arbitration 
Order of Judge Wilkinson and portions of his July 19, 1985 
Order were timely appealed. (R. 208,209). 
39. Pursuant to the requirement, albeit erroneous, of 
the State Trial Court in this matter, Systems and Brady have 
filed an Answer to the Complaint of Olivetti, while 
maintaining their right to arbitrate the issues of the 
Complaint. (R. 124-132). 
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40. Systems, prior to its Notice of Appeal, 
unsucessfully sought approval of the trial court of a 
proposed Statement of Proceedings because of the unavail-
ability of hearing transcripts. (R. 142-160). 
41. After the timely filing of the Notice of Appeal, 
the trial court again refused to approve a proposed 
Statement of Proceedings covering the hearings held on May 
24 and June 21, 1985, respectively. (R. 264-311,357). 
However, the presentment in question was made pursuant to an 
uncontroverted Affidavit of John Merkling dated August 20, 
1985, which Affidavit is properly of record before the Utah 
Supreme Court. (R. 264-309). 
42. On May 25, 1985, Systems and Brady received 
notice that their Federal Petition to Compel Arbitration had 
been re-assigned to the Honorable J. Thomas Greene. (A. 10). 
43. A Status and Scheduling Conference regarding the 
Federal Petition was conducted on May 30, 1985. (A. 11). 
44. At the May 30, 1985 Status and Scheduling 
Conference, Judge Greene ordered the Federal Petition to 
Compel Arbitration heard on June 27, 1985. (A. 17,21). 
45. Judge Greene ruled on the Petition to Compel 
Arbitration from the bench at the end of the hearing on June 
27, 1985, after the matter had been fully briefed, argued 
and submitted. (A. 48,49). 
46. The ultimate written Order of Judge Greene and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and 
entered on August 8, 1985. (R. 232-248). 
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47. In the Findings, Judge Greene acknowledged the 
existence of the State Court Complaint, the demand by 
Systems and Brady for arbitration with the American 
Arbitration Association, found Docutel-Olivetti had refused 
and failed to arbitrate its arbitrable claims [as required 
by the Dealership Agreement] and acknowledged that Judge 
Wilkinson on May 24, 1985, refused to dismiss the State 
Court Complaint and to enjoin its prosecution pending 
arbitration. (R. 237-329). 
48. Judge Greene, being fully informed of Judge 
Wilkinson's order, had earlier stated: 
THE COURT: .... But I can see what has happened 
before Judge Wilkinson is very pertinent. (A. 19). 
49. The Conclusions of Law reached by Judge Greene 
are equally enlightening. (R. 239-241). 
50. In his August 8, 1985 arbitration Order, Judge 
Greene stated: 
1. Docutel-Olivetti Corporation, Dick Brady 
Systems, Inc. and Richard Brady, their agents, 
employees, successors, assigns and attorneys are 
hereby restrained and enjoined from proceeding in 
litigation in either Federal or State Courts as to any 
and all disputes between the parties arising under the 
Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to 
the dealership created thereby.... 
2. The parties, including Richard Brady, are 
ordered to proceed to arbitration as to all disputes 
and claims arising under the Dealership Agreement or 
pertaining in any manner to the dealership created by 
the Dealership Agreement.... 
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3. ... it is ordered that hearings and proceed-
ings between the parties in arbitration as to the 
disputes and claims arising under or pertaining in any 
manner to the dealership created by the Dealership 
Agreement as set forth at paragraph 12 therein, shall 
be held and take place within the District of Utah. 
(R. 234-236). 
51. Docutel-Olivetti has conceded that the Federal 
Court had the right and authority under the FAA to compel 
arbitration. (A. 15). 
52. In his Conclusions and Order, Judge Greene 
allowed for litigation if, and only if, there exists a 
currently non-fulfilled on-going "separate" credit agreement 
between the parties. (R. 235). This is, of course, of no 
concern since Docutel-Olivetti has submitted no evidence of 
any separate credit agreement and Brady, for himself and 
Systems, has, without controversion, filed a verified 
statement to the contrary. (A. 69,70). 
53. Docutel-Olivetti has had its day in Federal Court 
in regard to whether or not the FAA §4 issue was properly 
before Judge Greene at the time of the June 27, 1985 hearing 
on the Petition, resulting in the Federal Order of August 8, 
1985, arguing extensively, though unsuccessfully, that the 
State Court had before it both the Federal and State Court 
questions of arbitrability of Docutel-Olivettifs claims. 
(A. 31,32,60,61). 
54. In respect to Judge Greene's August 8, 1985 
Order, Docutel-Olivetti filed a Rule 59 Motion to Amend or 
Alter the Judgment. The Court denied the Rule 59 Motion from 
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the bench and by written order. (A. 62,63). 
55. The Tenth Circuit Appeal filed by Docutel-
Olivetti has been dismissed. Therefore, the ruling of Judge 
Greene to the effect that the FAA §4 issue had been 
preserved by Systems and Brady for a ruling by the Federal 
Court is now res judicata and absolutely binding upon the 
parties. (A. 65-67). 
56. The claims of Docutel-Olivetti, wrongfully 
pending in State Court, and the defenses, counterclaims and 
set-offs of Systems and Brady, pending arbitration, are 
intricately and inextricably interconnected, involving 
common sets of facts, including but not limited to, the 
representations of agents and employees of Docutel-Olivetti 
and involving common witnesses, and cannot be separated from 
the issues of fact related to Docutel-Olivetti!s claim. 
(R. 63,64,86-88). 
57. Docutel-Olivetti, contrary to law, attempted to 
engage extensively in discovery and sought sanctions while 
this matter has been on appeal. (R. 170-177, 210-230). Judge 
Wilkinson denied discovery, sanctions and other things to 
Docutel-Olivetti. (R. 312,358,359) . 
58. Docutel-Olivetti has acknowledged in Federal 
Court that Judge Wilkinson could [and should] have issued a 
stay in this matter under 9 U.S.C. 3 [based upon the 
existence of the Petition to Compel Arbitration under 9 
U.S.C. 4 in Federal Court]. (A. 55,57). 
-19-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Federal and state arbitration policies strongly favor 
and require, under the facts of the present matter, 
arbitration of "all disputes" as provided for in the 
arbitration [Dealership] Agreement. 
Also, the §4 FAA Petition to Compel Arbitration was 
properly placed and retained in Federal Court because under 
the Cone decision, infra, the Federal Petition to Compel 
Arbitration was filed soon after Docutel-Olivetti filed its 
State Court Complaint and refused to arbitrate, because 
Systems and Brady did not waive their Cone right to a 
federal decision of the §4 issue and because the Federal 
Court can not [and did not] defer the §4 issue to State 
Court. 
The State court reversibly erred in not granting a §3 
FAA stay to thereby defer to the Federal Court on the §4 FAA 
issue, as required by the Southland decision, infra. If, as 
Docutel-Olivetti contends, the State Court had a duty to 
apply §4 FAA, the State Court erred because it applied only 
State law. 
The State Court erred reversibly in misapprehending 
and erroneously applying State law, superimposed as required 
upon Federal policy, in that both State law and Federal 
policy require, under the Dealership Agreement, arbitration 
of "all disputes" between the parties. 
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In addition, the State Court erred in intentionally 
not providing findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
respect to its final anti-arbitration Order of June 10, 1985 
as required by U.C.A. 78-31a-4, Rule 52(a), U.R.Civ.P. and 
Bushell, infra. It follows that the State Trial Court should 
have sustained the Objection to and Motion to Clarify the 
June 10, 1985 anti-arbitration Order. 
Since Rule 11(g) U.R.A.P. is mandatory, the State 
Trial Court erred in not meritoriously considering and 
approving the Statement of Proceedings submitted by Systems 
and Brady. 
Under the facts of this case wherein Brady is a 
beneficiary of the Agreement and a signatory in his own 
right [according to Docutel-Olivetti], Brady himself is also 
entitled to arbitration. This is also true because the 1985 
UAA requires an "issue" analysis, as opposed to a party 
analysis. State and Federal arbitration policy and standards 
require consolidation of Docutel-Olivettifs claims, now in 
State Court, and the defenses, set-offs and counterclaims of 
Systems and Brady, now in arbitration, into single 
arbitration forum for resolution. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES STRONGLY FAVOR 
ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN OPPOSING ARBITRATION. 
An issue of monumental importance in this case 
concerns the policy of the State of Utah to promote 
arbitration of disputes, when also considering the Federal 
policy [which applies in this interstate matter.] This Court 
has clearly and unequivocally declared its strong and 
unequivocal policy favoring arbitration in the case of 
Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah, 1981)'. The Utah legislature has similarly indicated 
its unfettered support of arbitration in adopting the 1985 
UAA. These policies are entirely consistent with the liberal 
and crystal clear policy of the federal courts under the FAA 
in promoting arbitration. 
Because the trial court in this case ignored both 
state and federal policy heavily favoring arbitration and 
narrowly construed Docutel-Olivetti's arbitration clause 
contrary to Utah and federal law, this case has become a 
quagmire of extensive and inordinately expensive delays by 
Docutel-Olivetti superimposed upon procedural issues. This 
case clearly establishes why this Court, the Utah legis-
lature, the Federal legislature, and the federal court 
system have all unanimously held that an arbitration clause 
in a contract should be broadly construed in favor of 
arbitration. Only if an arbitration clause is not suscep-
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tible to any interpretation that covers an asserted dispute, 
will that dispute be exluded from arbitration. 
The strong policy of this Court was established in 
Lindon City, supra, wherein this Court said: 
... [Arbitration] is a remedy freely bargained for 
by the parties, and "provides a means of giving effect 
to the intention of the parties, easing court 
congestion, and providing a method more expeditious 
and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpret-
ed when the issue contested is the scope of the 
clause. If the scope of an arbitration clause is 
debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause should be 
construed in favor of arbitration unless it can be 
said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute. ... (Citations 
omitted.) 
In the face of this clear policy, Docutel-Olivetti 
maintains that its complaint is merely a collection matter 
involving the U.C.C, and therefore should be resolved in 
court, notwithstanding the clear language of the Agreement 
that "all disputes" are to be arbitrated. Docutel-Olivetti 
apparently contends that arbitrators, who may use the U.C.C. 
daily in their businesses and professional work, are 
incompetent to apply the U.C.C. in the resolution of a 
dispute. On the contrary, arbitrators are as able to apply 
statutory remedies as they are to interpret contracts as 
declared by this Court in Lindon City, supra. The Court said 
at page 1073: 
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There is no reason, however, why an arbiter 
appointed and authorized consensually by the parties 
cannot examine such instruments for the same reasons 
[as a court would], as a condition precedent to a 
formal law suit. ... 
The trend towards such inter se agreements without 
resort to litigation, reflects a good, practical way 
to resolve disputes. This very case appears to be a 
typical example of such attempted avoidance of the 
cost and protraction this case itself already has 
engendered. (Emphasis added.) 
This Courtfs condemnation of protracted, costly 
proceedings in an attempt to avoid arbitration is clearly 
applicable to the case at bar. 
The policy of the State of Utah, as set forth in 
Lindon City, supra, is nearly a mirror image of federal 
policy, which also strongly favors arbitration. For example, 
the United States Supreme Court said in United Steel Workers 
of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 
574, 582-583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1409 (1960): 
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance 
should not be denied unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor 
of coverage. (Emphasis added.) 
The kind of proof needed to establish "positive 
assurance" has been mentioned in Stateside Machinery 
Company, Ltd. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234 (C.A. 3, 1979): 
However, under the Arbitration Act, there is a 
"liberal policy of promoting arbitration." ... Because 
of that policy, it has been held that there is a 
"federal rule that seemingly requires a clearly 
expressed intent NOT to arbitrate an issue before such 
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issue can be ruled one for judicial determination; 
and, further, that if the issue is a doubtful one, the 
doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) 
Federal policy, therefore, requires a clear and 
expressed intent not to arbitrate. Such language cannot be 
found in the Agreement between the parties in this case. In fact, 
the Agreement provides that a judicial remedy, if any, is 
provisional only and subservient to arbitration. (R. 8; A. 106). 
State and federal policy, therefore, clearly coincide 
and unquestionably favor arbitration. The Agreement between 
the parties, prepared by Docutel-Olivetti, also favors and 
clearly provides for arbitration. (R. 8; A. 106). Docutel-
Olivetti 's attempt to carve out a U.C.C. exception to the 
policy favoring arbitration of this state and the federal 
system is not justified and is transparently flawed. 
Arbitrators, just as much as courts, can offer relief under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, if such relief is justified and 
usually can do so more rapidly than courts and with less 
expense. The arbitrators' decision can then be recorded in 
the appropriate courts, as provided by the UAA. 
This Court should sustain the strongly pro-arbitration 
policy it adopted in Lindon City, the federal policy of the 
FAA and the policy advanced by the Utah legislature in 
adopting the 1985 UAA. The decision of the trial court 
should be reversed, all issues and disputes between the 
parties should be ordered immediately to arbitration and the 
state action should be stayed pending arbitration. 
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II. THE ARBITRATION ISSUES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRA-
TION ACT §4 (9 U.S.C. §4) WERE PROPERLY PLACED AND 
RETAINED IN THE FEDERAL COURT FOR DECISION, OLIVETTI 
AVAILED ITSELF OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION, AND THE PARTIES 
ARE BOUND BY THE NOW FINAL FEDERAL DECISION. 
A. Systems and Brady Presented Federal Arbitration Act §4 
Issue to the Federal Court. 
Under the facts of this case, in view of the Cone 
decision, infra, the arbitration issue under §4 FAA were 
properly presented to the Federal Court for a decision. 
Formal proceedings in this dispute were commenced by 
Docutel-Olivetti filing a Complaint in State Court. 
(R. 2-13). Systems and Brady promptly demanded arbitration 
of all disputes. (R. 15,24,44,45). To prevent entry of 
default in the State action, Systems and Brady filed a 
Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings Pending 
Arbitration [hereinafter "Motion for Stay"]. (R. 26,27). In 
conjunction with the Motion for Stay, Systems and Brady 
unequivocally informed the Court and Docutel-Olivetti that 
they were contemporaneously filing a Petition to Compel 
Arbitration in Federal Court under 9 U.S.C. §4. (R. 15,24). 
Neither Systems and Brady nor Docutel-Olivetti noticed the 
Motion for Stay for hearing before proceeding on the merits 
in Federal Court. Instead, the Federal Petition to Compel 
Arbitration was noticed for hearing on May 2, 1985. 
(A. 4,5). 
Under these circumstances, Systems and Brady clearly 
established and preserved their right to have the §4 issues 
resolved in Federal Court, in accordance with Moses H. Cone 
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Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 
U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed. 2d, 765 (1983). 
Cone and the present case are factually substantially 
identical. In Cone, a breach of contract complaint was filed 
in state court and, soon afterwards, the defendant filed a 
contemporaneous federal diversity-of-citizenship petition to 
compel arbitration under §4 FAA. The federal district court 
erroneously deferred to the state court by staying the 
action before it pending resolution of the state court suit 
[on the ground that the two suits involved the identical 
issue of the arbitrability of respondent's claims.] 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the District Court's stay order and 
remanded with instructions to enter an order to arbitrate, 
notwithstanding the concurrent state court proceeding. The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the 
Court of Appeals, determining that a federal district court 
may not decline to exercise its jurisdiction because of 
parallel state court litigation, unless extraordinary and 
exceptional circumstances exist. Exceptional circumstances 
were not found in Cone, nor do they exist in the present 
case. The Supreme Court, in Cone, at 460 U.S. 15, ruled: 
...
 fl[T]he pendancy of an action in the state 
court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same 
matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction," and 
that the federal courts have a "virtually unflagging 
obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them." [Quoting Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 47 L.Ed. 2d 
483, 96 S.Ct. 1236 (1976), also quoting McClellan v. 
Carland, 217 U.S. 
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268, 54 L.Ed. 762, 30 S.Ct. 501 (1910).] 
The Supreme Court, in Cone, found that there was no 
basis upon which the federal petition for arbitration could 
be stayed or dismissed in deference to the state court. 
Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court, at 406 U.S. 22, held: 
This refusal to proceed [to decide the federal 
petition to compel arbitration] was plainly erroneous 
in view of Congress1 clear intent, in the Arbitration 
Act, to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out 
of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as 
possible. 
The Supreme Court, therefore, has clearly declared 
that it is the responsibility of federal district courts to 
uphold and rule under §4 FAA, especially where, as here, the 
petition is filed shortly after a state court complaint has 
been filed. A federal court may not defer a state court 
under the circumstances of the present case. 
Under Cone, Systems and Brady, therefore, timely and 
properly invoked the jurisdiction of and placed and retained 
the issue of arbitration under §4 FAA before the Utah 
Federal District Court for a federal decision. 
B. The Federal Requirement That State Law Issues be Decided 
First by the State Court Did Not Defer the 9 U.S.C. 4 
Federal Issue to State Court and Did Not Deprive the Federal 
Court of Jurisdiction. 
In this matter, Systems and Brady timely and properly 
brought the 9 U.S.C. §4 issue before the Federal Court for a 
meritorious decision. Judge Jenkins, however, continued the 
Federal hearing and required the resolution of the State 
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issues prior to the determination of Systems' and Brady's 
Federal claims. (A. 7). Systems and Brady informed the State 
Court of the Federal claim under 9 U.S.C. §4 and did not 
submit the 9 U.S.C. §4 claim to the State Court. (R. 15,24, 
269,292; A. 42). The 9 U.S.C. §4 issue was reserved for 
determination by the Federal Court. (R. 15,24,269,292; A. 
42). In this situation, Systems and Brady preserved and did 
not waive their Cone right to return to the Federal Court 
and be meritoriously heard on the 9 U.S.C. §4 issue. 
Furthermore, under Cone, Judge Jenkins could not [and 
did not] defer the 9 U.S.C. §4 issue to the State Court for 
decision. In fact, Judge Jenkins, realizing that the 
Dealership Agreement requires that "all disputes" be 
arbitrated, felt that a State Court ruling on the state 
issues might result in an order from State Court compelling 
arbitration and, if so, that might make it unnecessary for 
him to rule on the 9 U.S.C. §4 arbitration issue before him. 
This procedure is clearly within the rule of England 
v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 
11 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1964), wherein Justice Douglas, in his 
concurring opinion, stated most forcefully, at 375 U.S. 429: 
... [H]e who is required to go the state courts 
and does what we require him to do when he gets there, 
is not there voluntarily and does not forsake his 
federal suit, unless he does something in the state 
courts that he is not required to do, and that evinces 
an election to litigate the matter finally and not 
preliminarily in the state courts. (Emphasis by the 
Court.) 
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The procedure implemented by Judge Jenkins is also 
consistent with Cone, where, at 460 U.S.10, the Supreme 
Court said: 
A [federal] district court stay pursuant to 
Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation 
that the federal litigation will resume in the event 
that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state 
court on state-law grounds. (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Jenkins appropriately ordered a continuance in 
this matter, as opposed to a stay, and directed the parties 
to a hearing before the State Court on state issues prior to 
a further hearing in the Federal Court on the federal 
issues. This was clearly a Pullman abstention entered with 
the expectation that the federal litigation would resume in 
the event that the Petitioner did "not obtain relief in 
State Court on state-law grounds." Consequently, the Federal 
District Court had continuing jurisdiction over the 9 U.S.C. 
§4 issue. 
C. The Southland Case Does Not Alter the Application of 
Cone Here. 
While it can be argued that under the U.S. Supreme 
Court Southland decision, infra, a 9 U.S.C. §4 issue could 
be presented to a State Court [although Southland did not 
decide that issue], the argument does not apply, as here, 
where the aggrieved party [Systems and Brady] went to 
Federal Court, under Cone, with the §4 issue soon after 
being informed of the other party's [Docutel-Olivettifs] 
State Court Complaint and refusal to arbitrate. 
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P. The Federal Court Decision is Res Judicata as to Federal 
Issues. 
When Systems and Brady filed their Federal Petition to 
Compel Arbitration, Docutel-Olivetti filed a Reply to the 
Petition and sought affirmative relief. Thus, Docutel-
Olivetti submitted itself to and availed itself of the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Court. (A.2,3). The Order of 
Judge Greene compelling arbitration was entered August 8, 
1985. (R. 232-248). Docutel-Olivetti filed a Rule 59 
F.R.Civ.P. Motion for Relief from the August 8, 1985 Order, 
which was denied by the Federal Court. (A. 63). Olivetti 
filed an Appeal. Olivetti's Appeal has been dismissed. (A. 
65-67). The §4 FAA question, therefore, stands resolved and 
the August 8, 1985 Federal Arbitration Order is binding on 
the parties, in the absence of any reinstatement of Appeal 
by the Tenth Circuit. Only the state law issues remain for 
resolution by this Court, but those issues must be 
superimposed upon the back drop of not only the properly 
issued Federal Arbitration Order but existing Federal policy 
as well. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT GRANTING A STAY PURSUANT TO 9 U.S.C. 3 PRIOR 
TO AND, THEREAFTER, CONSISTENT WITH THE FEDERAL COURT'S 
ORDER AND IN NOT APPLYING FEDERAL STAY STANDARDS. 
Contrary to the truth of the matter, Docutel-Olivetti 
has argued that Judge Wilkinson's ruling must, by strained 
inference, be viewed as embracing §4 FAA. Earlier, 
Docutel-Olivetti spoke the truth, i.e. "... Judge Wilkinson 
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ruled, as a matter of state court law...." (A. 16). It, 
nevertheless, is clear that Judge Wilkinson ruled as a 
matter of state law. (R. 271). 
However, Judge Wilkinson erred by failing to consider 
and apply 9 U.S.C. 3, which requires a state court to grant 
a stay under federal standards, where a 9 U.S.C. 4 Petition 
is before the federal court. 
This is clear from Cone, supra. The Cone Court said at 
460 U.S. 26: 
... state courts, as much as federal courts, are 
obliged to grant stays of litigation under §3 of the 
Arbitration Act. 
Judge Wilkinson, under Cone, was obligated but failed 
to apply 9 U.S.C. §3 standards to the Motion for Stay. 
(R. 271). This alone is reversible error. Furthermore, Judge 
Wilkinson committed reversible error in not stating the 
legal basis for his June 10, 1985 anti-arbitration order. 
(R. 108,109; A. 100,101). 
From Cone, it is clear that, in a limited way, Federal 
and State jurisdiction under the FAA may concurrently exist, 
but are not coextensively concurrent. The U.S. Supreme Court 
said in Cone at 460 U.S. 26, 27: 
... it is less clear, however, whether the same is 
true of an order to compel arbitration under §4 of the 
Act. ... there was, at a minimum, substantial room for 
doubt that Mercury could obtain from the state court 
an order compelling the Hospital to arbitrate. In many 
cases, no doubt, a §3 stay is quite adequate to 
protect the right to arbitration. But in a case such 
as this ... a stay of litigation alone is not enough. 
-32-
... Mercury would have no sure way to proceed with its 
claims except to return to federal court to obtain a 
§4 order—a pointless and wasteful burden on the 
supposedly summary and speedy procedures prescribed by 
the [Federal] Arbitration Act. (Emphasis provided.) 
In Southland Corporation v. Keating, U.S. , 
104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared that the FAA was substantive Federal law and, under 
the supremacy clause, to be superimposed upon and allowed to 
control over conflicting state common or statutory law even 
when decided by state courts. The Court, at 104 S.Ct. 858, 
said: 
In enacting §2 of the federal Act, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and 
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial 
forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contacting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. 
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements. 
Judge Wilkinson did not apply §3 FAA (R. 271) and, 
therefore, did not apply it correctly. Contrary to Judge 
Wilkinson!s anti-arbitration order, Federal law strongly 
favors arbitration and the granting of stays under §3 FAA as 
to attempted litigation of arbitrable issues. See Point I, 
above. 
The Federal rule of law has broadly interpreted 
language requiring that "all disputes" be submitted to 
arbitration and has held that such language does not limit 
arbitrable issues to only certain contract provisions. 
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Aberthaw Construction Company v. Center County Hospital, 366 
F. Supp. 513 (D.C. Pa., 1973), affirmed without opinion at 
503 F.2d 1398 (C.A. 3). Accordingly, if Federal standards 
had been applied, Judge Wilkinson should and would have 
granted the Motion to Stay under §3 FAA prior to and after 
the August 8, 1985 Federal arbitration Order of Judge 
Greene. 
Moreover, to deny the Motion to Stay under Federal 
standards, the evidence must establish that the necessary 
intent not to arbitrate is clearly expressed in the 
agreement itself. If the issue is doubtful, all doubt is to 
be resolved in favor of a stay, superimposed upon an order 
of arbitration. Nuclear Installation Services Company v. 
Nuclear Service Company, 468 F.Supp. 1187 (E.D.Pa. 1979). 
Here, the Dealership Agreement contains no statement 
expressly negating arbitration as to any particular claim or 
issue. Instead, paragraph 12 of the Agreement unequivocally 
expresses the contrary intent, i.e. that "all disputes" are 
to be arbitrated. Therefore, Judge Wilkinson clearly erred 
reversibly, under 9 U.S.C. 3, in not granting a stay in 
state court, pursuant to Federal requirements. On this 
ground alone, remand coupled with an order that §3 FAA be 
applied and that arbitration of "all disputes" is to occur 
is mandated. 
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IV. IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD A DUTY TO APPLY §4 OF 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, IT ERRED REVERSIBLY 
IN APPLYING ONLY STATE LAW. 
Cone, supra, suggested that state courts may be unable 
to order affirmative relief compelling arbitration under §4 
FAA. On the other hand, Southland, supra, [in the absence of 
a federal petition under §4] has broadly extended enforce-
ability of the FAA to state courts. Judge Wilkinson based 
his ruling on the Agreement and on the 1985 UAA. (R. 271). 
It follows that, if Judge Wilkinson had a duty to apply §4 
FAA [as is argued by Docutel-Olivetti], he erred reversibly 
in applying only state law. For an analysis of the 
application of §4 FAA, see the attached Addendum. (A. 
93-99) . 
V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS 
APPLICATION OF STATE LAW TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
While the FAA is controlling law under the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution, Utah law also 
strongly favors arbitration. Actually, Utah law meets and 
exceeds the Federal requirements [without conflicting 
therewith] by providing additional rights (such as 
arbitration discovery procedures). Just as Judge Wilkinson 
erred in failing to consider and apply §3 FAA, he also erred 
in the application of state law to the present case. 
Paragraph 12 of the Agreement between Olivetti and 
Systems mandates arbitration. (R. 8; A. 106). That provision 
states, in part: 
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All disputes arising under this Agreement or 
pertaining in any manner to the dealership created by 
this Agreement shall be resolved by arbitration.... 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In addition, paragraph 12 provides that the findings 
in arbitration prevail over and are to control any judgment 
in related litigation. (R. 8; A. 106). 
Before the Motion for Stay filed by Systems and Brady 
was heard, the 1985 UAA [U.C.A. 78-31a-1] became retroactive-
ly effective. The enrolled copy of Senate Bill 62 [which 
became the 1985 UAA] declares it to be "An Act Relating to 
the Judicial Code; Providing a Revised Procedure for the 
Enforcement of Written Arbitration Agreements." (Emphasis 
provided.) (A. 79). It is well established in Utah that 
procedural statutes, such as the 1985 UAA, have retroactive 
effect. 
For example, in Pilcher v. Department of Social 
Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah, 1983), the Court pointed out 
that retrospective application of a statute is favored: 
... where a statute changes only procedural law by 
providing a different mode or form of procedure for 
enforcing substantive rights. Such remedial statutes 
are generally applied retrospectively to accrued or 
pending actions to further the Legislature's remedial 
purpose. 
Under the 1985 UAA, the trial court has the responsi-
bility to stay its litigation and order arbitration. U.C.A. 
78-31a-4 states, in part: 
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The court, upon motion of any party showing the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the 
parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning 
the existance of an arbitration agreement or the scope 
of matters covered by the agreement, the court shall 
determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
To justify its breach in refusing to arbitrate "all 
disputes", Docutel-Olivetti has raised several arguments, 
both here and in Federal Court. Systems and Brady will now 
deal with those arguments and show that they are without 
merit. 
First, Docutel-Olivetti claims that there is no 
"dispute" concerning the Dealership Agreement. Olivetti 
attempts to divide the issues, separating out their 
so-called collection claim on an open account for goods, 
delivery of which is admitted by Docutel-Olivetti as having 
been made only because of System's status as dealer. Since 
the Dealership Agreement requires arbitration of "all 
disputes arising under this Agreement, or pertaining in any 
manner to the dealership created by this Agreement," and in 
view of Docutel-Olivetti's admission that its collection 
claim pertains, in some manner, to the dealership, 
litigation of the collection claims is improper and a breach 
of the Agreement. 
Systems and Brady dispute that they owe any monies to 
Olivetti. (R. 62). In fact, Docutel-Olivetti may be liable 
to Systems and Brady. The merits of that claim, however, are 
not to be evaluated by this or any other court as required 
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by U.C.A. 78-31a-4(4): 
Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be 
grounded on a claim that an issue subject to 
arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for 
the claim have not been shown. 
Therefore, no Utah state court should not concern 
itself with the merits of Docutel-Olivetti's claim or 
Systems1 and Brady's defenses, set-offs and counterclaims. A 
dispute exists and an arbitration agreement concerning that 
dispute exists. Under the UAA, arbitration should have been 
ordered. 
Docutel-Olivetti also argues in another collateral 
attack on its own Dealership Agreement, that it is somehow 
permitted to elect between litigation and arbitration [and 
ignore the mandatory provisions of paragraph 12, that "all 
disputes" shall be resolved by arbitration]. Docutel-
Olivetti relies upon paragraph 10 of the Agreement for 
support, which states: 
If an event of default by Dealer occurs in any 
credit agreement with Olivetti, Olivetti may, among 
other remedies, avail itself of any remedy in effect 
now or at the time of default under the Uniform 
Commercial Code or any similar statute. ... (R. 8; A. 106). 
Docutel-Olivetti attempts to overlook the mandatory 
langugage of paragraph 12 in its attempt to depend upon the 
permissive language of paragraph 10. Moreover, paragraph 12 
specifically provides that any remedy obtained in a court of 
law, prior to or in the course of an arbitration, is 
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subservient to the results of arbitration. Docutel-Olivetti 
ignores the fact that UCC disputes can be and are competent-
ly resolved in arbitration. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, does not consider 
language similar to that chosen by Docutel-Olivetti to be in 
conflict with itself nor does the Court view such as 
providing the drafter of the agreement [Docutel-Olivetti 
here] with the right to elect between arbitration and 
litigation. In Lindon City v. Engineers Construction 
Company, 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah, 1981), the Court said: 
The contract provisions ... are reproduced as 
follows: 
"Section 30.1. All claims, disputes and other 
matters in question arising out of, or relating to, 
the CONTRACT DOCUMENTS or the breach thereof, except 
for claims which have been waived by making and 
acceptance of the final payment ... shall be decided 
by arbitration ...." 
... the "disputes" mentioned above are particular-
ly suited and designed for determination by arbitra-
tion by the very provisions insisted upon by the City 
for inclusion in the very contract it drafted and 
required as a condition .... If not so intended to be 
arbitrable, it is suggested that few, if any, 
situations or "disputes" would survive for arbitration 
under such a superficial conclusion. ... 
.... We are convinced that before the plaintiff 
filed this suit, it was bound by its promise, first, 
to seek arbitration, then to litigate, if it could 
under its contract, or under either the Arbitration 
Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Thus, the policy of this state is, under Lindon City: 
where a duty to arbitrate exists, doubt, if any, should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration. However, even where there 
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is some apparent qualification in the contract [e.g. "except 
for claims11], the requirement that "all ... disputes" be 
arbitrated avoids ambiguity. In this regard, the Lindon City 
Court said: 
There is nothing in the contract here that is 
unclear, ambiguous or vague, and even if there were, 
the parties have agreed to arbitrate such things 
first. There is nothing in the contract that an 
average, literate person would not be able to read and 
interpret such as to demand a judge's decision rather 
than a competant arbitrator. 
The law of Utah under Lindon City is consistent with 
applicable Federal policy and the 1985 UAA. 
Docutel-Olivetti also argues that the language of the 
Agreement, prepared by Docutel-Olivetti, is vague, ambiguous 
and not sufficiently specific to provide for arbitration 
[asserted under the prior statute]. Lindon City, analyzed 
above, disposes, unequivocally, of Docutel-Olivetti's 
"ambiguity" argument, independent of whether Lindon City is 
superimposed upon the pre-1985 Utah Arbtration Act or the 
198 5 UAA. 
The Utah Supreme Court not only found, in Lindon City, 
that the language quoted above was clear, unambiguous and in 
compliance with the statute, but found that the issue 
involving the apparent exception, i.e. waiver by reason of 
final payment, should be arbitrated as well. This is a broad 
interpretation and indicates how favorably the Utah Supreme 
Court views arbitration. In this case, the language chosen 
by Docutel-Olivetti provides no express "exception" and is 
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unambiguous, i.e.: 
All disputes arising under this Agreement or 
pertaining in any manner to the dealership created by 
this Agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. ... (R. 8). 
Furthermore, if there is any ambiguity in this 
Agreement as between paragraphs 10 and 12, it is to resolved 
against Docutel-Olivetti, the drafter of the contract. As 
stated in Park Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, 
Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah, 1982): 
It is also settled law that a contract will b.e 
construed against its drafter. 
Utah law, therefore, is clear, as is federal law, and 
favors arbitration of all issues in this case since all 
relate in some way to the dealership or the Dealership 
Agreement. Judge Wilkinson seriously and reversibly erred in 
applying Utah law. Remand together with an order that the 
parties proceed imiiiediately to arbitration on all issues and 
claims while the state law suit action is stayed is needed to 
comply with the the law and policy of Utah. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
NOT RESOLVING, IN THE FORM OF SUCCINCT FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND ADEQUATE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE ISSUE OF 
ARBITRATION AND STAY BEFORE IT. 
The 1985 UAA provides an "issue" oriented analysis for 
determining arbitration orders. That is, the statute 
requires that the trial court specifically identify 
arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues, and place arbitrable 
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issues in arbitration. U.C.A. 78-31a-4 states: 
7 8-3 la-4. Court order to arbitrate. (1) The 
courtf upon motion of any party showing the existence 
of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties 
to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall 
determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitra-
tion stays any action or proceeding involving an issue 
subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, 
if the issue is severable from the other issues in the 
action or proceeding, only the issue subject to 
arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an 
action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall 
include a stay of the action or proceeding. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, the 1985 UAA requires the trial court to 
"determine" or resolve "issues" (that is, to make succinct 
findings of fact and ample conclusions of law) and to make 
an order according to those determinations. 
Moreover, an order denying arbitration must identify 
all non-arbitrable "issues", as well as arbitrable issues. A 
cause of action can proceed in court only if all of the 
issues" involved in that cause of action are specifically 
found to be non-arbitrable. Only if an issue is clearly 
severable from arbitrable issues can the issue be retained 
in court and not stayed. 
The trial court's refusal to make this analysis and 
provide supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law 
is reversible error. (R. 199-201; A. 102-104). 
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For example, Docutel-Olivetti has conceded that 
Systems1 and Brady's defenses, set-offs and counterclaims 
are properly arbitrable. (R. 185-186). However, those 
defenses, set-offs and counterclaims clearly involve the 
"issues" of the Complaint, i.e. goods allegedly delivered, 
returned merchandise and the amount, if any, due and owing. 
It follows that if the defenses, set-offs and counterclaims 
are arbitrable and embrace the same "dealership" trans-
actions as does the Complaint, the claims of the Complaint 
are likewise arbitrable. 
In any event, the amount owed, if any, is an 
arbitrable issue in each of Docutel-Olivetti's four causes 
of action because Docutel-Olivetti admits the amount owed 
pertains to the Dealership [See the Complaint, paragraphs 
8,9]. (R. 2-3). The "issue" of liability is arbitrable for 
the same reason. 
A motion for arbitration under the 1985 UAA, as here, 
requests injunctive relief in the form of a stay of 
proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Injunctive 
relief falls under Rule 52(a) U.R.Civ.P., which requires 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, the 
June 10, 1985 Order of Judge Wilkinson is a final anti-
arbitration order, for which findings of fact and con-
clusions of law are mandatory. 
This is emphasized in Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85, 
86-87 (Utah, 1982), where it is stated: 
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Written findings and conclusions setting out the 
basis upon which a court's decision rests are vital to 
the proper information of the parties and to the 
proper functioning of courts. Findings and conclusions 
aid the trial court in rational decision making, ... 
and aid the appellate court in the exercise of the 
discretion it enjoys to review, and if necessary, to 
adjust the financial and property interests of the 
parties. (Citations omitted.) 
The trial courtfs absolute express refusal to provide 
findings and conclusions as required by the 1985 Utah 
Arbitration Act and Rule 52(a) is reversible error. 
(R. 199-201; A. 102-104) . 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT SUSTAINING THE OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO 
CLARIFY THE JUNE 10, 1985 ANTI-ARBITRATION ORDER. 
In their Objection and Motion to Clarify the June 10, 
1985 Order (R. 102-104), Systems and Brady validly but 
unsuccessfully requested, in summary, the following relief: 
(1) that the trial court specify that the issues contained 
in the defenses, counterclaims and set-offs of Systems and 
Brady earlier placed in arbitration were stayed; (2) that 
the trial court acknowledge that any relief granted in court 
would be provisional only and subject to an award in 
arbitration as specified in paragraph 12 of the Agreement; 
(3) that the trial court should clearly identify the legal 
basis for its decision; (4) that the trial court should 
acknowledge the factual basis upon which its decision was 
made; and (5) the Order should acknowledge that the FAA §4 
issue was reserved for the Federal Court. 
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As pointed out in Point VI, above, the trial court 
should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
specifically identifying arbitrable and non-arbitrable 
"issues", if any. The trial court expressly refused to do 
so. (R. 199,200; A. 102, 103) . 
It is the responsibility of a trial court to make such 
determinations, and to clearly and completely set forth the 
factual and legal support for its order. It was, therefore, 
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to clarify 
its decision as specified in Systems1 and Brady's Objection 
to Proposed Order and Motion to Clarify Decision. Only when 
the trial court completely performs its responsibilities can 
an intelligible appeal be made to the Utah Supreme Court. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPROVING THE 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS OF SYSTEMS AND BRADY. 
In connection with this appeal, Systems and Brady 
presented to the trial court a statement of proceedings in 
accordance with Rule 11(g) U.R.A.P. The Statement of 
Proceedings in this case was ultimately verified by John R. 
Merkling, co-counsel for Systems and Brady. It was prepared 
in accordance with the Rule, from the best available means, 
which included detailed notes of the argument prepared prior 
to the proceedings, and used extensively by counsel for 
Systems and Brady at the hearings. 
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While the matter is before this Court by reason of the 
uncontroverted Affidavit, Rule 11(g) does not permit a trial 
court to refuse to create a statement of proceedings. The 
language of Rule 11(g) is mandatory and binding on the trial 
court. Rule 11(g) provides: 
Thereupon, the statement and any objections or 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district 
court for settlement and approval and as settled and 
approved shall be included by the clerk of the 
district court in the record on appeal. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The language of Rule 11(g) is, therefore, mandatory. 
It is the obligation of the trial court to provide a record 
or the best substitute. The trial court can not hinder the 
work of the Supreme Court by failing to provide a record. If 
the trial court avoids, by its rules, the availability of a 
transcript, it can not also avoid the above-mentioned burden 
imposed by Rule 11(g), U.R.A.P. It was, therefore, error for 
the district court to refuse, absolutely, to meritoriously 
evaluate, settle and approve a statement of proceedings, 
particularly one possessing a high degree of reliability, as 
here. 
IX. BRADY IS ENTITLED TO ARBITRATION OF ALL DISPUTES 
ARISING UNDER THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT JUST AS IS SYSTEMS. 
Docutel-Olivetti argues that, even if it is required 
to submit the issue of the liability of Systems to 
arbitration, it can proceed directly against Brady in a 
different forum [State Court] on its disputed claim, risking 
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inconsistent results. This position is erroneous for five 
reasons. 
First, Brady is a beneficiary of the Agreement and 
entitled to the benefit of the Arbitration Clause. 
Second, Systems is entitled to require that "all 
disputes" relating to the dealership or Dealership Agreement 
be submitted to arbitration, and Brady, as guarantor, has no 
liability until, if at all, the arbitration tribunal 
determines that Systems has liability. 
Third, Docutel-Olivetti asserts, in paragraph 15 of 
the State Court Complaint,that Brady and Systems are one and 
the same and, therefore, Brady is himself a signatory to the 
Dealership Agreement. 
Fourth, the language of paragraph 12 of the Agreement 
does not speak in terms of the parties, it speaks in terms 
of the issues, that is, disputes. The 1985 UAA also requires 
that issues be submitted to arbitration. If the issue of 
liability is submitted to arbitration, the same issue does 
not remain for concurrent pursuit in litigation. Equity 
requires that the issue of liability of Brady either be 
arbitrated in the same forum as the issues related to 
Systems or stayed pending the results of arbitration. 
This Court should not condone a race to judgment or 
deprive Brady of the defenses, set-offs and counterclaims of 
him and Systems or require that the defenses, set-offs and 
counterclaims be presented by Brady in Court and also by 
Systems in arbitration. The liability of Brady is deriva-
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tive, and he is only liable if Systems is liable. The issue 
of the liability of Systems should be determined in 
arbitration. Brady is willing to submit to that arbitration 
or await the outcome thereof while litigation is stayed. 
Fifth, the Federal Court has determined that Brady is 
entitled to arbitration, as is Systems, under §4 of FAA and 
that decision is res judicata here. Under §3 FAA this Court 
must stay State Court litigation against Brady, as against 
Systems, based on Judge Greenefs August 8, 1985 arbitration 
Order. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
UNDER THE 1985 UTAH ARBITRATION ACT, IN NOT CONSOLIDAT-
ING INTO A SINGLE FORUM THE ISSUES OF THE COMPLAINT 
IN STATE COURT, AND THE COUNTERCLAIM, SET-OFF AND 
DEFENSE ISSUES OF BRADY AND SYSTEMS, PLACED EARLIER 
IN ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT. 
When Docutel-Olivetti commenced this action against 
Systems and Brady in State Court, Systems and Brady promptly 
demanded arbitration by Docutel-Olivetti and forthwith 
placed in arbitration their counterclaims, set-offs and 
defenses related directly to the claims of Docutel-Olivetti 
in this action. The claims of Systems and Brady involve the 
same property and arise out of the same nexus of operative 
facts as the claims of Olivetti. For instance, Systems and 
Brady have alleged in arbitration that Olivetti made certain 
promises to Systems and Brady in connection with the purchase 
of the goods by Systems and Brady. These include certain 
credits, referrals as to government contracts and other 
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advantages which were to form part of the consideration for 
an order by Systems. Docutel-Olivetti has admitted that 
these claims of Systems and Brady are properly arbitrable 
but incredibly contend that their related "dealership" 
claims are not. The claims of both parties are collectively 
and individually clearly part and parcel of the issue of the 
liability between the parties. 
When this matter came on for hearing before the trial 
court on May 24, 1985, Olivetti had already admitted that 
these core issues, at least, were arbitrable. Accordingly, 
under the 1985 UAA, the trial court was required to submit 
all issues to arbitration. Only if the court specifically 
found that certain well identified issues were separable 
from the arbitrable issues could an issue be retained in 
litigation before the trial court. The trial court 
specifically refused to apply an issue-by-issue analysis. 
This was reversible error. 
Even if the Court had performed an issue-by-issue 
analysis, it is clear that Docutel-Olivetti's claims cannot 
be severed from the counterclaims, set-offs and defenses of 
Systems and Brady. Both clearly address the fundamental 
issue of what amount, if any, is owed by Olivetti to Systems 
and Brady, or by Systems and Brady to Olivetti. The trial 
court, therefore, committed reversible error in not 
consolidating the proceedings on these common issues into a 
single forum. That forum, by statutory mandate, is 
arbitration. 
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ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Docutel-Olivetti has reputiated its own arbitation 
contract requiring arbitration of "all disputes". It has 
abused process to the tune of more than $30,000.00 per side 
on the procedural issue of what is arbitrable, when a fair 
reading of the contract answers the inquiry unequivocally. 
The State and Federal policies of quick and inexpensive 
arbitration, even when some doubt exists, have been trampled 
in the dust of procedural litigation by Docutel-Olivetti. 
What better basis for a large award of attorney's fees could 
exist under U.R.A.P. 33(a)? 
CONCLUSION 
If this Court were to accept the Docutel-Olivetti 
thesis and establish a U.C.C. exception to arbitration 
[where the Agreement does not do so expressly], it would 
defeat well established State and Federal policy. There 
would be little, if any, arbitration between commercial 
entities, where arbitration should be encouraged. For these 
and the other reasons contained herein, the Order of the 
trial court should be reversed, litigation below should be 
stayed and arbitration of "all disputes" ordered on remand. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendants - Appellants, postage prepaid, 
to Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84117, on this 1st day of November, 1985. 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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State Bar #2180 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 'c<,7TCT\ 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of The Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
REPLY TO PETITION 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Civil No. C85-280J 
Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Respondent" hereinafter) res-
pectfully replies to the Petition To Compel Arbitration filed herein 
by Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ("DBSI" hereinafter) as follows: 
1. Respondent does not dispute the allegations of paragraphs 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Petition. 
2. Replying to paragraphs 6 7 a i id 8 i)£ the Petition, 
Respondent attaches hereto and incorporates herein by reference a 
complete copy of the Olivetti Corporation Dealer Agreement between 
Respondent 2nd DBSI which speaks for itself with respect to the 
matters contained therein. 
3. Replying to paragraph 9 of the Petition and the State 
Court action referred to therei respondent contends that the State 
Court Complaint is a simple collection matter. Respondent alleges 
therein that it sold goods to DBSI and DBSI has failed and refused 
to pay for those goods , a 1 t hough c,J ea rly requ ir ed to do s< : in ider 
paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Dealer Agreement. There is and cannot 
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1 I arbitrable and has in fact commenced by way of the preliminary 
2 J reply letter (Exhibit "C") to participate in those arbitration 
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proceedings. Respondent contends however that purely collection 
issues and Respondent's rights under the Uniform Commercial Code to 
protect its security interest in goods sold and the payment of 
debts owed, is not a dispute under the Agreement and was not in-
tended to be the subject of arbitration under the Agreement. 
WHEREFOR, Respondent moves the Court for an order: 
(1) That the issues raised in the State Court action are not 
arbitrable issues under the Agreement; 
(2) that arbitration, if any, of other issues shall be held 
;! at the regional office of ihe American Arbitration Association 
closest to Dallas, Texas; 
(3) that the parties are compelled to select arbitrators as 
set forth in the Agreement; 
(4) that Richard Brady has no standing under the Agreement to 
require arbitration; 
(5) that if the Court does require arbitration of the State 
Court issues as to DBSI, Respondent may continue its State Court 
action against Richard Brady personally; 
(6) that in the event the Court orders arbitration of the State 
Court issues, the Court appoint a receiver to obtain and protect 
all collateral in which Respondent has a security interest under the 
Agreement, or such other orders as protect Respondent as a secured 
jparty under the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of Utah; and 
(7) for costs and such other and further relief as the Court 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Qoc\ytel-OLive.tt.i Cor^ora^iosv 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply to Petition, etc. to the 
Petitioner herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to Petitioner's attorney of 
record as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
John R. Merkling 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
this 5th day of April, 1985. 
/ - / -
LYNN G. FOSTER 
JOHN R. MERKLING 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of The Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondant. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Civil No. C85-506 
TO: The Respondant Docutel Olivetti Corporation and its Attorney 
Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr.: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU will please take notice that the 
Petitioner will bring on for hearing the Petition to Compel 
Arbitration on file herein before the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins on 
the 2nd day of May, 1985, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this JO day of April, 1985. 
MERKLING 
''Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Hearing, postage prepaid, to Gordon R. 
McDowell, Jr. at 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84117, on this / • day of April, 1985. 
—;, HcL if. frA'&i<r) 
A5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
B e f o r e t h e Honorable Bruce F. J«nk ina 
U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Judge 
# * # 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN DICK BRACT SYSTEMS, INC. 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Case No. C 85-280 
Hearing on rtot ion 
* * * 
May ?, 1^05 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
A P P F A R A N C E S 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f t LYNN FTfTEP, E^O. 
For t h e Defendant* GORDON R. McPOWELL!., ESC. 
25 A6 
1 u n t i l such t ime as t h i s matter has been a r b i t r a t e d . 
2 MR. POSTER! We've done t h a t . Your Honor, but t h a t 
3 d o e s n ' t preclude «—• 
4 THE COURTt What did the JUdge do when you did that? 
5 MR, POSTER: We Tiaven't had i t heard. 
6 THE COURTi Have you brought i t up? 
7 MR. FOSTERi We f i l e d a mot ion . 
8 THE COURTt Have you c a l l e d i t up for hearing? 
9 MR. FOSTERi I have n o t . 
10 THE COURTt Cal l i t up for hearing and come on back 
11 and see me in t h r e e weeks. I ' l l cont inue the matter for three 
12 weeks. Cal l i t up for hearing before that s t a t e judge. I 
13 d o n ' t want t o do h i s work for him, and I don' t want t o 
14 i n t e r f e r e with what he has to do . Let me g i v e you a date and 
15 I ' l l cont inue i t . Why don' t we look at i t on the 3lBt o f Kay 
16 at l i 3 0 . I'm simply I ' l l s imply continue t h i s matter for 
17 further c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
18 MR. FOSTERi Your Honor, what was the t ime on t h a t , 
19 p l e a s e ? 
20 THE COURT* It 30. 
21 MR. FOSTERi Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 MR. McDCWELLt One matter I 'd l i k e to mention. I 
23 don' t know whether the present s i t u a t i o n of the court calendar 
24 i s in the t h i r d d i s t r i c t , but we may have to request a 
25 cont inuance i f we c a n ' t f i t i n t o t h e i r - -
8 
1 THE COURT* They'l l give you a special s e t t i n g . 
2 They've got individual calendars over there now and i f you've 
3 got a judge assigned, t e l l liim you've got a problem and 
4 t h e y ' l l g ive you an individual s e t t i n g . 
5 (This hearing was concluded.) 
6 I * * * 
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1 C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 
3 STATE QF UATH ) 
4 I 88 
5 COUNTY OP SALT IAKE ) 
6 
7 I# NED A. GREEHIG, do hereby c e r t i f y tha t I am an 
8 O f f i c i a l Court Reporter for the United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t 
9 Court for the D i s t r i c t of Utah; 
10 That as such Reporter I attended the hearing of the 
11 foregoing matter and t h e r e a t reported in Stenotype a l l of the 
12 test imony and proceedings had, and caused sa id notes 
13 t o be transcr ibed i n t o typewr i t ing ; and the foregoing pages 
14 numbered from 2 t o 8 c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l , t rue and c o r r e c t 
15 report o f the same. 
16 DATED a t Bait Lake Ci ty , Utah t h i s 9 th day of 
17 I June, 1985. 
18 
19 
20 ^ 6 tl. S ^ 
21 I Ned A. Greenig, RPlf 
22 
23 
24 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
F.O.tOX » t 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 04110 
PAUL L. iADOIR 
CLERK 
May 24, J985 
**: c 85-280 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS v. DOCUTEL OLIVEITI CORP. 
Please be advised that the above referenced acticai has now been reassigned 
to Hon. J. Thomas Greene. Please see that your records reflect this change 
as the case number will now be c 85-Q280C • 
ALL PENDING SETTINGS AND DA1ES ARE VACATED, TO BE RESCHEDULED AT A STATUS 
AND 9CHEDUUNG CONFERENCE WHICH WILL BE NOTICED. 
IJ^. Lynn G. Foster, Esq. 
JOhn R. Merkling, Esq. 
Gordeon R. McDowell, Jr., Es.q 
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NOTICE OF D. C. Form No. 18 (Rev. Sept. 1953) 
Buttrft Stairs Sistrtrt Court 
FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
In the Matterof the Arbitration 
between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS and 
RICHARD BRAD*. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION 
No. C-S5-0280G 
TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been set for *HEARING 
S a l t Lake C i t y , on Thursday , May 30 , 1 9 3 5 , at 1 1 : 0 0 a .m. b e f o r e t h 
Hon. J . Thomas G r e e n e , Rm. 2 2 0 , U . S . Courthouse & P. 0 . B l d g . , 350 So.Mad 
* HEARING IS SET FOR STATUS & SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Date May 24 . 1985 PAUL L. BADGER 
By .^ ..^ m Clerk. 
Deputy Clerk. 
To Lynn G. Foster 
John R. Merkling 
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr. 
^ J * 
RECEIVED V 
>93 / W 2 , 
A1 1 
Gordon R. M c D owe ll.Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
4609 Sowik 2300 EasiSmte KM 
Salt Lake G^.Utik 84117 
(801)272-0309 
May 28, 1985 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Docutel Olivetti Corp. vs. 
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. et al, 
Civil No. C85-506 
Dear Judge Wilkinson: 
Pursuant to the local rules I am enclosing herewith a 
proposed Order in the above-referenced matter, a copy of 
which has been sent this date to Mr. Foster's office for 
their review and action. 
Very) trply/^ou^s ,J / 
GRM/gc 
Enclosure 
cc: Lynn Foster 
John R. Merkling 
Gordon R. \ic EfowellV J r . 
-J , , , ^ 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
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In The Matter of the 
Arbitration DICK BRADY 
SYSTEMS, INC., et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORP., 
Defendant. 
Docket Mo. C 85-280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 30, 1985 
11:15 O'clock A.M. 
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For the Defendant: 
FOSTER, DAVIS & CUTLER 
BY: LYNN G. FOSTER 
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4609 South 2300 East #104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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THE COURT: Well, let me get your statement, then 
Mr. Foster and then let's talk about it. 
Go ahead. 
MR. FOSTER: There is a preliminary matter, Your 
Honor, and let me address that first. 
Our position in respect to the assertions of 
opposing counsel is that Judge Jenkins did not defer 
substantive issues to the state court. 
Upon being advised that there was a motion to 
dismiss or stay in state court which we filed in behalf of 
the petitioners to avoid answering and to gain time to come 
to this Court for adjudication under the federal arbitration 
act he said, well, go to state court first and then come back 
here on the 31st of May. There is absolutely nothing in what 
the judge says to the best of my recollection, and I make 
this representation to the Court, that would indicate that 
the substance of the matter was referred to state court. But 
back to the preliminary matter. 
We are in a position, Your Honor, to argue the 
petition today. That is the only matter that is before this 
Court and upon this Court's decision in respect to the 
petition this Court will have disposed vt the matter. 
We took the liberty, since, we were scheduled 
before Judge Jenkins for tomorrow of noticing on Monday, 
after receiving notice of this hearing on Saturday, the 
A14 
1 issue was arbitrable. Our position wa3, all along, that it 
2 was not arbitrable and that is why we are here. 
3 The petitioners then filed a motion in the federal 
4 court under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
5 That matter was brought before Bruce Jenkins, and 
6 it was argued, preliminary, as Mr. Foster said. Neither one 
7 of us went through our full presentation. But the Court 
8 being apprised that, in fact, there was a state court 
9 proceeding and being further apprised that there was a motion 
10 to stay or dismissed based upon the argument, said this is --
11 go to the state court. 
12 Now, you can place whatever interpretation you want 
13 on that. But my interpretation was that the Federal 
14 Arbitration Act is a procedural act. We are in court because 
15 it is diversity jurisdiction. That is the only reason we are 
16 here. We are diversity because of the interstate commerce 
17 clause and the fact that Docutel Olivetti is a corporation 
18 organized in a state other than in Utah. The jurisdiction 
19 of — 
20 THE COURT: Are you saying by that, Mr. McDowell, 
21 that if this matter were argued on the petition that is 
22 before this Court and the Court were to rule that, indeed, 
23 there should be an arbitration that really that is not within 
24 the cognizance of this Court to do that. 
25 MR. MCDOWELL: No, Your Honor. 
A15 
1 Now, what he wanted to know, it seems to me, is 
2 what did the state court say with respect to Utah law with 
3 respect to this contract. And that was the issue that wa^ 
41 argued brfrre Judge Wilkir-cr last Friday. A^d JM l^i 
5 hearing Judge Wilkinson ruled, as a matter of state court law, 
6 that an agreement between these parties does not provide for 
7 arbitration of the particular dispute that is before thp 
8 Cour* in 'hicn is tne subject matter of the petition, 
9 Now, if indeed, it is diversity jurisdiction m a , 
10 indeed, it is a substantive state law, the state -- the law 
11 of the state of Utah with respect to this case is that this 
12 contract as to the collection matters raised is not 
13 arbitrable. Therefore, this Court applying state substantive 
14 law would have to rule as a matter of law, it seems to me, 
15 that the issue is not arbitrable and, therefore, this 
16 petition would have to be dismissed • 
17 Now, there are other issues that are arbitrable and, 
18 in fact, we are participating in arbitration in those 
19 proceedings. There is some issues respecting interpretation 
20 of territories and those sorts of things, 
21 THE COURT: Well, we need to hear argument on this 
22 very matter, don't we? 
23 MR. MCDOWELL: I think the --
24 THE COURT: I can't rule on it right now. But, I 
25 am just trying to get a feel for it. 
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It seems to me that I need to see a transcript of 
what happened before Judge Jenkins. And it may be helpful to 
see a transcript of what was argued before Judge Wilkinson if 
the court reporter was there. 
MR. FOSTER: We will take care of that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And then I think we ought to have a 
time set for filing of briefs in this matter and let's set it 
down for argument and I will hear you both on what you think 
ought to be done. 
MR. MCDOWELL: That is fine, Your Honor. 
MR. FOSTER: That is agreeable. 
MR. McDOWELL: The question, I suppose, that needs 
to be addressed as we have said — I don't know the 
preliminary question is whether or not -- I guess, basically, 
whether Judge Wilkinson's decision is dispositive. If it is 
then we don't need to get into the merits with respect to 
whether or not this Court should make same or different --
THE COURT: Well, you are not asking me to rule on 
that right now, are you? 
MR. McDOWELL: No, Your Honor. I am not. I am 
just merely suggesting how we go about it. 
THE COURT: Yes. Well, I think you should define 
what you consider to be the matter that needs to be ruled 
upon by this Court. And it may be that you have slightly 
different conceptions of the issues themselves. But, I think 
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into arguing the entire merits again, it may — I think it 
would be a more difficult burden because of the possibility 
of affidavits and so on. If we are going to have essentially 
an evidentiary hearing as to whether or not this matter is 
arbitrable. 
MR. i.ooit;R: I don't contemplate evidentiary 
hearing. Your Honor, and I don't contemplate, at this point 
of time, filing additional affidavits. 
We might have to be responsive to anything that Mr. 
McDowell files. But we do not, in our own right, contemplate 
further submissions or factual representations. 
We believe the facts are clear and also believe the 
law is clear. 
THE COURT: Well, if you can get whatever you are 
going to file in earlier than what you said, Mr. Fostei., say 
by the fifth of June. 
MR. FOSTER: Yes, will do that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then we can set this for special 
setting on the last day of that week. That is June 27th. 
That will give Mr. McDowell an opportunity to, under the 
rules, file whatever you are going to file. And then we will 
hear your motions unless you both indicate to the Court that 
you are willing to submit it on the briefs in which case we 
will vacate the setting. But, I will set it for hearing at 
3:00 o'clock on Thursday the 27th of June. 
A18 
1 MR. FOSTER: Thank you* 
2 MR. MCDOWELL: Your Honor, for clarification on 
3 that again, are we, at that particular hearing, is this going 
4 to be a full-blown hearing on everything or is the Court 
5 limiting that to the question of the — whether the 
6 substantive law of Utah applies and whether Judge Wilkinson 
7 had that — 
8 THE COURT: Well, I understand what I have before 
9 me. And I presume, unless there is another motion filed, it 
10 is the petition which has already been briefed in large part. 
11 But, 1 think you are going to give me some supplementory. 
12 The petition to compel arbitration, that has never been ruled 
13 upon and that is what would be before the Court. And we are 
14 inviting wnatever supplemental briefs, affidavits, whatever 
15 you want to file on that subject. 
16 MR. FOSTER: All right. 
17 THE COURT: You have already done it. I thought 
18 maybe we were talking about doing it on the basis of what is 
19 already before the Court. But I can see what has nappenec 
20 betore Judge Wilkinson is very pertinent. So we better do 
21 what we are saying and Mr. Foster can get his in by the fifth, 
22 You get yours in — within the time limit prescribed by the 
23 rule. And we will have the hearing on 3:00 o'clock on the 
24 27th. 
251 How much time do you think you will need for that 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 
2 
3 1/ Ellis E. Christensen, Official Court Reporter 
4 for the United States District Court, District of Utah, do 
5 hereby certify that I reported, in my official capacity, the 
6 proceedings had upon the hearing in the case of IN THE MATTER 
7 OF THE ARBITRATON DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., et al., VS. 
8 DOCUTELL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, Civil Number C 85-280, in said 
9 Court, on the 30th day of May 1985. 
10 I further certify that the foregoing 24 pages 
11 constitute the official transcript of said proceedings, as 
12 taken from my machine shorthand notes. 
13 In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my 
14 name this 12th day of May 1985. 
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NOTICE OF. 
-m :*P 
S JyForn No. IB (Rev. Sept. 1953) 
Un\i?6 States Btsirfri Court 
FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DTVTSTOJ 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC 
V. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION No. 
C 85-0280G 
TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been set for motion for arbitration at 
Salt Lake City » o n Thursday, June 27 , 1 9
 8 5 » a t 3 * 0 0 P-m- before the 
Honorable J. Thomas Greene, Rn. 225, U.S. Courthouse & P.O. Bldg, 350 So. Main 
Date June 14 » 19 85 
By 
PAUL L. BADGER 
/*\ Clerk. 
SASfltoLLLW 
(Dftjpwty Clerk. 
To 
Lynn G. Foster, ESq. 
JOhn R. Merkling, Esq. 
602 East Third South 
SLC, UT 84102 
Gordeon R. McDowell, Jr., eSq. 
4609 So, 2300 East 
Suite 104 
SLC, UT 84117 
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GORDON R. MC DOWELL, JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
4609 South 2300 East, *104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
State Bar No. 2180 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In The Matter of the Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM RE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT AND 
STATE COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. C85-0280G 
Hearing Date: 
June 27, 1985 
Time: 3:00 P.M. 
Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Docutel" hereafter) 
files the within Memorandum in reply to Petitioners Dick Brady 
Systems, Inc. ("DBS" hereafter) and Richard Brady's ("Brady" 
hereafter) Memorandum in Support of Petition dated May 31, 1985 
and in reply to Petitioners' motion to compel Docutel to submit 
its credit collection claim against them to arbitration. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Petitioners briny this action under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq. ("The Act" hereafter) and ask for an order 
of this Court pursuant to §4 thereof to compel Docutel to assert 
in arbitration its credit collection claims which Docutel has 
filed in State Court in Utah. 
As set forth in Appendix A to this Memorandum, Petitioners 
have asserted claims against Docutel and demanded arbitration 
A22 
3 
ill hi 
" 144 « 3 
P 
- 2 »-
o g 2 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 1 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
against Docutel, which Docutel denies, does not in any way turn . 
Docutel's right for payment for goods sold and delivered into a 
"dispute" subject to arbitration under The Act or the Agreement 
between the parties. 
Having set forth the law concerning The Act as it relates 
to the matter before this Court, Docutel now turns to the specific 
issues before the Court. 
II. 
THE EFFECT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE 
COURT AND THE COURT'S RULING THEREIN THAT 
DOCUTEL'S COLLECTION CLAIM AGAINST 
DBS AND BRADY IS NOT ARBITRABLE 
The State Court had Dcforc It Both 
the Federal and State Court Questions 
of Arbitrabilitv of Docutel's Claim. 
On May 24, 1985 Judge Homer F. Wilkinson ruled pursuant to i 
i 
DBS and Brady's Motion For Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings ! 
Pending Arbitration (See Exhibits "A" and "B" of the Mc Dowell j 
Affidavit, Appendix A hereof for copies of the Motion and 
Petitioners' Memorandum In Support of Motion for Dismissal or Stay) 
that Docutel's claim asserted in that Court was not arbitrable-. 
Petitioners herein in their May 31, 1985 Memorandum (see 
page 18 et seq of Petitioners Memorandum) argue that they did not 
present the claims under The Act to the State Court but rather went 
to State Court solely for determination of State issues. The 
-7-
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Petitioners state: 
"Judge Jenkins required the resolution of the 
state issues prior to the determination of 
Petitioners' federal claims. In state court, 
Petitioner informed the court of the federal 
claims and did not litigate those claims in 
the state court..." 
Petitioners' Memorandum In Support of Petition, 
p. 22. 
Notwithstanding Petitioners' assertion to the contrary the 
federal issue was before the State Court. Petitioners' Motion for 
Dismissal of Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration filed in the 
State Court action at page 2 states: 
"This Motion is based on the United States 
Arbitration Act, (9 U.S.C. 1 et jseg) ..." 
Further at pages 3 through 5 of its Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion in the State Court, Petitioners argued at length concerning 
applicability of The Act in the State Court proceedings. 
In light of the foregoing record it is not only probable but 
in fact without doubt that when Judge Wilkinson ruled on the 
arbitrability of Docutel's cLaim against DBS and Brady the Court 
had before it and must be deemed to have considered Petitioners' 
Federal Arbitration Act claims. 
b. 
The State Court Had Concurrent Jurisdiction 
to Consider the Petitioners' Federal 
Arbitration Act ClaimsL Was Competent 
to do so and Must be Presumed 
to Have Ruled Thereon. 
As set forth in Section I of this Memorandum, the State Court 
-8-
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under Southland Corp. v. Keating, supra, was obligated to apply 
The Act in matters brought before it. When Judge Bruce S. Jenkins 
of this Court was advised that on May 2, 1985 that Petitioners had 
previously filed a motion in the State Court to dismiss or enjoin 
those proceedings the Court directed the parties to bring up 
for hearing that motion. With respect thereto the following 
colloquy took place at the hearing before Judge Jenkins on May 2, 
1985. 
"THE COURT: I'm really wondering why you're 
here because while you say we have junsdic-
tion over in state court, that's where you're 
being sued. If you're being sued in state 
court involving money, isn't your defense over 
there, hey, Judge, this is the kind of thing 
that ought to be subject to arbitration. 
All means all. 
MR. FOSTER: Well, Your Honor, coming to the 
federal court, we do not come on the merits 
of our claim. We came on the question of 
federal jurisdiction and which torum is appro-
priatc. 
THE COURT: Well, if you go into the state 
court ]udgo and say, hey, ]udge, all means all 
and please stay this until such time as this 
matter has been arbitrated. 
MR. FOSTER: We've done that, Your Honor, but 
that doesn't preclude — 
THE COURT: What did the Judge do when you 
did that? 
MR. FOSTER: We haven't heard. 
THE COURT: Have you brought it up? 
MR. FOSTER: We filed a motion. 
THE COURT: Have you called it up for hearing? 
MR. FOSTER: I have not. 
-9-
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THE COURT: Call it up for hearing and come 
on back and see me in three weeks. I'll 
continue the matter for three weeks. Call 
it up for hearing before that state judge. 
I don't want to do his work for him, and I 
don't want to interfere with what he has to 
do. Let me give you a date and I'll continue 
it. Why don't we look at it on the 31st of 
May at 1:30. I'm simply I'll simply continue 
this matter for further consideration." 
Transcript of Proceedings, May 2, 1985, 
p. 6 11 14-25, p. 7 11 1-17. 
Judge Jenkins was entirely consistent with this Court's role 
vis a vis a State Court's concurrent jurisdiction rights created 
under federal law. As said in Ultracashmere HouseLtd. v. Meyer 
supra, 664 F.2d 1176: 
"It is thus clear that, while Congress 
considered the policies favoring arbitration 
agreements sufficiently important to over-
ride state law barriers to their enforce-
ment, it nonetheless viewed state courts 
as fully capable of effectuating those 
policies; the Act evidences no hint of a 
concern by Congress that state tribunals 
would be less competent or lesb willing 
than the federal courts to give effect to 
its substantive provisions." 
Id at 1180. 
It must be presumed that both the Federal and State Court 
judges were aware of the substantive application of The Act to 
both Federal and State Courts. It must be further presumed that 
the State Court was not derelict in its duty to consider the 
Federal claims when it ruled that Docutel's claim was not 
arbitrable under the Agreement. 
-10-
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c. 
A Final Ruling of a State Court on Federal 
Issues Over Which It has Jurisdiction is 
Binding on Federal Courts Considering 
the Same Issue, 
The United States Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983) 
in affirming the reversal of a federal district court stay of its 
proceedings pending resolution of a state court action concerning 
arbitrability stated: 
"That issue of arbitrability was the only 
substantive issue present in the federal 
suit. Hence, a stay of the federal suit 
pending resolution of the state suit meant 
that there would be no further litigation 
in the federal forum; the state court's 
judgment on the issue would be res judicata." 
Id at 934. Emphasis added. 
In support of the above proposition the court cited 
Ultracashmere House Ltd. v. Meyer, supra, 665 F.2d 1176, and 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenncr ^ Smith, Inc. v. Hayden 637 F.2d 391 
(CA5 1981). In both Ultracashmere and Merrill Lynch the issue of 
the affect of a state court determination of arbitrability 
under federal law was before the courts. Ultracashmere stated the 
rule: 
"Thus, where the parties and the cause of 
action are the same, a judgment rendered by 
a state court if it would by operation 
of res judicata preclude a subsequent suit 
in state court must similarly be treated 
as conclusive by federal courts, and parties 
may not relitigate such a claim even where 
a federal question is comprised within the 
dispute." 
Ultracashmere House Ltd. v. Meyer, supra 
at 1183. 
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d. 
The State Court's Decision Concerning 
Arbitrability of Docutel's Claim Against 
DBS and Brady is not Interlocutory. 
Petitioners cite Bernard v Attebury 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981) 
and that court's analysis of Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for the proposition that Judge Wilkinson's May 24, 1985 
Order denying arbitrability of Docutel's claim is interlocutory 
and therefore not entitled to res judicata effect in this Court. 
Whatever else the May 24, 1985 State Court decision is it is 
clear that it is not interlocutory. 
Rule 54(a) U.R.C.P. provides: 
M(a) Definition; Form. •Judgment" as used in 
these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies." 
Section 78-31a-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act, a copy of which 
is appended hereto as Appendix "C", provides: 
"78-31a-19. An appeal may bo taken by 
any aggrieved party as provided by law 
for appeals in civil actions from any court 
order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbi-
tration. " 
Judge Wilkinson's May 24, 1985 Order is appealable under 
§78-31a-19 U.C.A. and is not interlocutory. Rule 54(b) and 
Bernard v. Attebury are not applicable. Rule 54(b) relates to* 
multiple parties and claims for relief. Here there is only one 
claim for relief, i.e. a demand for arbitration. Judge Wilkinson's 
Order disposed completely of those claims as to all parties, is 
appealable and is not therefore sub]ect to Rule 54 (b). 
-12-
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e. 
This Court May Defer to the State Court 
Where the State Court Action was Pending 
Prior to Petitioners' §4 Motion; 
Petitioners Have Failed to Timely Remove 
the Case to Federal Court; the State Court 
Proceedings are Well in Advance of the 
Federal Proceedings and Petitioners1 
Federal Rights can be Adequately 
Addressed in State Court, 
In Ultracashmere House Ltd. v. Meyer, supra, 664 F.2d 1176 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a refusal to grant a §4 request for 
an order compelling.arbitration where a state suit was pending. 
The court said: 
"We agree with the district court that the 
Arbitration Act does not unconditionally 
entitle a party to relief in federal court. 
Rather, federalism and judicial efficiency 
require that the conduct of the parties, 
in particular the timeliness of their actions 
and the status of state court litigation 
between the same parties, be considered by 
federal courts in deciding whether to grant 
such reliet." 
19 
Id at 1178. 
II 
One of the factors persuasive to the circuit court in 
20 Ultracashmere was the petitioners failure to remove the state 
21 | court action to federal court when it was filed. 
i 
22 \ Although Docutel does not claim that Petitioners here were 
23 as neglectful of asserting their claims in federal court as the 
2 4 I petitioners in Ultracashmcre the facts arc that Docutcl filed its 
25 ' state Court Complaint on January 25, 1985 and effected service on 
26 the Petitioners the next day, January 26, 1985. Petitioners filed 
27 28 
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their Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitra-
tion on February 12, 1985 bringing before the State Court its 
Federal Arbitration Act claims. It was not until March 8, 1985 
that Petitioners filed their petition herein. Subsequently, and 
for whatever reason, the Petitioners argued their State Court 
Motion to Dismiss or Stay the State Court proceedings. That Motion 
was heard and decided on May 24, 1985 adversely to Petitioners. 
Petitioners now return to this Court in an effort to start all over 
|i once again. This is clearly a proper case for this Court to defer 
to the State Court in these proceedings. 
At first reading, the case of Moses H. Cone Hospital v. 
Mercury Corporation, supra, 103 S. Ct. 927 would seem to stand for 
the proposition that a district court may not defer to the state 
court the question of arbitrability under The Act. However, that 
15 | would be too broad a reading of Cone. 
1g }i The Supreme Court formulated the issue as follows: 
!! 
17 ,| 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 ' 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
"[T]he decision whether to dismiss a federal 
action because ut para LieL state-court 
litigation does not rest on a mechanical 
checklist, but on a careful balancing of 
the important factors as they apply in a 
given case, with the balance heavily weighted 
in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. 
The weight to be given to any one factor 
may vary greatly from case to case, depending 
on the particular setting of the case," 
Id at 937. 
The Supreme Court reviewed several factors justifying the 
I district courts deferral to the state court, including the priority 
of filing of the actions; the extent to which proceedings had 
already taken place; whether piecemeal litigation would result; 
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the fact that federal substantive law was at stake; and a very 
persuasive consideration of the probable inadequacy of the state 
court proceedings in protecting the petitioners' federal claim. 
With respect to the proceedings factor, the court found: 
"Here, the opposite was true. It was the 
state-court suit in which no substantial 
proceedings (excepting only the abortive 
temporary injunction) had taken place at the 
time of the decision to stay. In the federal 
suit, by contrast, the parties had taken 
most of the steps necessary to resolution of 
the arbitrability issue. In realistic terms, 
the federal suit was running well ahead of 
the state suit at the very time that the 
District Court decided to refuse to adjudi-
cate the case." 
^d at 940. 
In this case unlike Cone not only have the parties taken 
most of the steps necessary to a resolution of the arbitrability 
issue in State Court, they have in fact obtained a determination 
of that very issue. This case therefore, unlike Cone, is running 
substantially ahead of the proceedings before this Court. 
Apparently the most persuasive tactor in Cone militating against 
deferral to the State Court, was the Court's conclusion that the 
Petitioners could not obtain appropriate relief from the State 
Court. 
"Finally, in this case an important reason 
against allowing a stay is the probable in-
adequacy of the state-court proceeding to 
protect Mercury's rights. We are -not to 
be understood to impeach the competence or 
procedures of the North Carolina courts. 
Moreover, state courts, as much as federal 
courts, are obliged to grant stays of litiga-
tion under §3 of the Arbitration Act. It is 
less clear, however, whether the same is 
-15-
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I 
true of an order to compel arbitration under 
§4 of the Act. We need not resolve that 
question here; it suffices to say that there 
was, at a minimum, substantial room for 
doubt that Mercury could obtain from the 
state court an order compelling the Hospital 
to arbitrate. In many cases, no doubt, a 
§3 stay is quite adequate to protect the 
right to arbitration. But in a case such as 
this, where the party opposing arbitration 
is the one from whom payment or performance 
is sought, a stay of litigation alone is not 
enough. It leaves the recalcitrant party 
free to sit and do nothing—neither to liti-
gate nor to arbitrate. If the state court 
stayed litigation pending arbitration but 
declined to compel the Hospital to arbitrate, 
Mercury would have no sure way to proceed 
with its claims except to return to federal 
court to obtain a §4 order—a pointless and 
wasteful burden on the supposedly summary and 
speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitra-
tion act. 
Id at 942-943. Emphasis added. 
The status of the parties before this Court is exactly opposite 
to that of the parties in Cone. Here it is Petitioners from whom 
payment is sought who demand arbitration. Clearly a §3 stay issued 
by the State Court would completely protect Petitioners1 right to 
arbitrate. j 
Docutel filed its suit in State Court first. Petitioners 
have never attempted to remove that action to Federal Court. 
Substantial steps have been taken to resolve the arditrability 
issue in State Court including a determination of that issue. 
Finally, the State Court has before it the very federal issues of 
arbitrability asserted herein and by issuing a stay of the State 
Court proceedings, had the full and adequate power to protect 
Petitioners arbitration rights if any had been found. For all of 
-16-
A3 2 
j these reasons, deferral by this Court to the State Court is not 
precluded by Cone and indeed is supported by that decision. 
3 f. 
4 I Whether the State Court's Ruling is Binding 
on this Court or Not Its Decision and Proceedings 
Therein are Worthy of this Court's Consideration. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 , 
13 ' 
The Utah Arbitration Act, §78-31a-l et seq U.C.A. is in sub-
stance virtually identical to the Federal Arbitration Act. Further 
the policy of liberally construing agreements to include arbitra-
tion of issues has been expressed by the Utah Supreme Court as 
the policy of the State in Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 
636 P.2d 1070 (UT. 1981). 
For all practical purposes the substantive law of arbitration 
| of Utah and the United States are identical. The State Court had 
14 j, 
, before it The Act in its deliberations. Whether it applied 
15 
federal or state law is of no consequence, the iaw being the same. 16 , 
The Court's decision therefore that Docutel's claim against DBS 
', and Brady is not subject to arbitration is entitled to serious 
18 
| consideration by this Court if the Court determines to make its 
• j/ 
own independent decision thereon. 
20 
It is Docutel's view that either the State Court has disposed 
21 
22 \ 
23 
24 ' 
25 
i 
i 
26 
27 
28 
of the arbitration issue or that this Court should defer to the 
substantial proceedings already under way in the State Court. 
The substantive issue of whether the interpretation of the Agree-
ment between the parties and whether that Agreement compels that 
Docutel's claim be asserted; if at all, in arbitration, has been 
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addressed previously in memoranda filed with this Court and will 
not be repeated here- Two major issues remain for discussion. 
They are whether in fact a dispute exists between Docutel and 
DBS concerning Docutel1s claim, and the appropriate forum 
of the arbitration of that issue. Because Docutel believes 
Brady's claim for arbitration is precluded by The Act, only a 
brief comment will be made concerning that issue. 
III. 
THE TRIABLE ISSUES 
a. 
In Fact There is no Dispute Existing Between 
Docutel and DBS in Connection with Docutel*s 
Claim Against It for Payment 
of Goods Sold and Delivered 
Under The Act, for this Court to either enjoin proceedings 
pending arbitration or to order the parties to arbitrate it must 
first find that the parties agreed in writing to arbitrate the 
particular dispute. Preliminarily the Court must know what the 
dispute is before it can decide whether an agreement exists to 
arbitrate it. If there is no dispute, the nexus for an agreement 
to arbitrate does not exist. 
The claim before this Court is Docutel's demard for payment 
for goods sold and delivered to DBS. Paragraph 4 of the Dealer-
ship Agreement provides 
"Olivetti will sell and Dealer will purchase, 
the Products in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the Agreement. Olivetti 
will give Dealer Thirty (30) days prior 
notice of the increase in prices." 
-18-
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should either 
defer to the State Court proceedings, or find that there is no 
dispute between the parties. If the Court does not defer to the 
State Court and finds a dispute concerning Docutelfs claim, it 
should find, like the State Court, that the parties expressly ex-
cluded those claims from arbitration. If the Court determines that 
Docutel's credit claim is arbitrable, it should enter an order 
under §3 of The Act enjoining assertion by Docutel of its claim 
in litigation pending arbitration. The Court should not compel 
Docutel to assert its claim if it choses not to do so. Nor should 
the Court enter its order compelling arbitration in a specific 
location, particularly with respect to the presently existing 
arbitration proceedings. Finally, the Count should find that there 
is no written agreement to compel Docutel to arbitrate its claim 
against Brady under his personal guarantee, and should deny Brady's 
motion to compel arbitration of that claim. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 4th day of June, 1985. 
i \ 
)Vt/,y'• / ' r j , / 
Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she hand-delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Re Federal 
Arbitration, etc. and all Appendices and Exhibits thereto to the 
Petitioners herein, by delivering such to the Petitioners* attorney 
ol record ^t ^ ^ iollo^i^ a&dx^ss*. 
Lynn G. Foster 
John R. Merkling 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
this 24tft day of June, 1985. 
7* 
Gayla R. Casper, Secretary 
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RENEWAL OF NOTICE TO DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORP. 
TO ARBITRATE CLAIMS 
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. (Systems) and Richard Brady (Brady) 
hereby reiterate and renew their notice and demand to Docutel-
Olivetti Corp. (Olivetti) as follows: 
WHEREAS, Systems and Brady have repeatedly and without 
exception at all times relevant notified and demanded of Olivetti 
arbitration of any and all claims Olivetti believes it has against 
Systems and Brady or either of them; 
WHEREAS, Systems' and Brady's notifications and demands 
mentioned above have been repeatedly made orally and in writing and 
in open State and Federal Court and before the American Arbitration 
Association to Olivetti and Olivetti's legal counsel; 
WHEREAS, Olivetti and Olivetti's legal counsel continue to 
erroneously assert that Systems and Brady no longer require 
arbitration of Olivetti's claims; 
NOW, THEREFORE, Systems and Brady hereby reiterate and 
renew, with finality, their notices and demands that Olivetti 
submit to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, 
pursuant to the Dealership Agreement and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, any and all claims Olivetti believes it has against Systems 
and Brady or either of them. 
-1-
DATED this 25th day of June, 1985. 
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. 
and Richard Brady 
cc$ American Arbitration Association 
Honorable J. Thomas Greene 
-2-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Renewal of Notice to Docutel-Olivetti Corp. to 
Arbitrate Claims to Gordon H. McDowell, Jr., Attorney for 
Respondent, 4609 South 2100 East, JH04, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84117, on thi5 25th day of June, 1985. 
J>fr>ltfj/ fl . / /jMd.0-^ 
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LYNN G. FOSTER 
JOHN R. MERKLING 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondent, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN R. MERKLING 
Civil No, C85-0280G 
Hearing Date: 
June 27, 1985 
Time: 3:00 p.m. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
John R. Merkling, having been first duly sworn deposes and 
says: 
1. I am an attorney for the Petitioners in the above-
entitled matter. 
2. On the 30th of May, 1985, I was present at a status and 
scheduling conference in the above-entitled matter before Judge J. 
Thomas Greene. 
3. At that status and scheduling conference, Judge Greene 
requested, inter alia, a transcript of the proceedings which had 
been had in State Court before Judge Homer Wilkinson in the Third 
Judicial District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
-1-
4. Consistent with the Court's request, I attempted to 
obtain a transcript and contacted Judge Wilkinson1s reporter, Allen 
Smith, for that purpose. 
5. I discovered, however, that, consistent with recently 
established practice in the Third Judicial District Court, no 
record had been made of the hearing in question. Consequently, a 
transcript could not be obtained. 
6. In preparation for the hearing before Judge Wilkinson, I 
had prepared extensive notes comprising proposed argument for Mr. 
Foster, 
7. I was present at the hearing before Judge Wilkinson on 
the 24th of May, 1985, and I recognized that Mr. Foster, in making 
his argument to Judge Wilkinson, substantially followed the notes 
which I had prepared and which he had edited, at times reading 
extensively from them. 
8. As a consequence, therefore, and to comply insofar as 
was possible with the request of this Court, I prepared a Statement 
of Proceedings under Rule 11(g) of the new Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which provides for a substitute record, using the 
aforementioned notes. 
9. The aforesaid statement of proceedings is accurate to 
the best of my knowledge and recollection. 
10. The Statement of Proceedings was presented to Judge 
Wilkinson and a hearing on a Motion of Dick Brady Systems and 
Richard Brady to approve the Statement of Proceedigns was had on 
the 21st of June, 1984. 
-2-
11. The Motion to Approve the Statement of Proceedings was 
opposed by Respondent, through its counsel, Mr. McDowell. Judge 
Wilkinson felt that the Motion to Approve the Statement of 
Proceedings was premature, since no appeal was filed in the State 
Court action, and refused, therefore, to consider the Statement of 
Proceedings at that time. 
12. By reason of the foregoing, no transcript of the 
proceedings before Judge Wilkinson on the 24th of May, 1984, nor 
any substitute record thereof are presently available for 
presentation to this Court. 
13. I was present at the hearing on May 24, 1985, in State 
Court and I recall Mr. Foster stating to Judge Wilkinson that 
proceedings were before the Federal District Court on the Federal 
Arbitration issues and that those matters would be heard by Judge 
Jenkins on the 31st of May, 1985, and that the Federal issues would 
be resolved before the Federal Court, 
14. I was also present at the hearing before Judge 
Wilkinson on the 21st of June, 1985 (the second State Court 
hearing). 
15. At the second State Court hearing, Mr. Foster 
specifically asked Judge Wilkinson if the Judge's ruling was based 
on state law. Judge Wilkinson responded "yes". 
16. Mr. McDowell objected to the Court's statement and 
suggested to Judge Wilkinson that Mr. Foster "slipping something 
by" the judge, and that Judge Wilkinson should state that his 
ruling based on both State and Federal law. 
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17. In response to Mr. McDowell's objection, the Court 
unequivocally stated that his ruling was based on his reading of 
the contract and on the Utah Arbitration Act, as amended. The Judge 
went on to say that if the Federal Court wanted to take the matter 
away from him, that would be "just fine". 
18. It was clear from Judge Wilkinson's statements from the 
bench that his ruling was based on principles of Utah State law, 
and not the application of Federal Statutes or Federal law. 
19. Judge Wilkinson was clearly informed and aware of the 
pendancy of Federal proceedings as to the Federal Arbitration Act. 
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught. 
JCfHN R. MERKLING 
fo Subsc r ibed and sworn t o be fo re me on t h i s 22? —flay of J u n e , 
1985, 
,- /NOW. 
[SEALj^ \ piiBi:: 
C^ip i i^Bion/Expi res : {^/&i£$<G> i 
"r i./ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of John R. Merkling to Gordon R. McDowell, 
Jr., Attorney for Respondent, 4609 South 2300 East, #104, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117, on this p^ ifflday of June, 1985. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI, 
DEFENDANT. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. C85-280 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS GREENE 
JUNE 27, 1935 
5253 PINEMONT DRIVE. MURRAY UTAH 84107 
OUR FILE NO. 6 2 7 - 8 5 
REPORTED BY 
PATTI WALKER, CSR, RPR 
*f»*<*JV\ Certified Shorthand Reporters • 
€©PY 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
263 1396 
WE DON'T KNOW -- BOTH ISSUES ARE NEBULOUS. BOTH ISSUES 
WE WOULD RESERVE IN THE EVENT THAT'S WHAT INDEED THEY'RE 
ASKING. 
WHAT WE'RE REALLY DEALING WITH IN THIS PROCEEDING 
IS ONLY ONE CLAIM. THE CREDIT CLAIM THAT MY CLIENT HAS 
BROUGHT AGAINST THEM FOR GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED. IT 
IS A CREDIT ACTION, A PURE COLLECTION MATTER. 
THE COURT: YOU SAY THAT'S THE ONLY ISSUE WE'RE 
DEALING WITH HERE? 
MR. MCDOWELL: HERE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS, YOUR HONOR, 
WE ARE NOT REFUSING TO ARBITRATE. 
THE COURT: THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT ALL OF THE ISSUES 
THAT I GUESS ARE SET FORTH IN THE DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION. 
MR. MCDOWELL: ALL OF THOSE ISSUES ARE BEING 
ARBITRATED. THE DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION DOES NOT DEMAND 
ARBITRATION OF THE CREDIT COLLECTION MATTER. WHAT 
THEY'VE ASKED FOR AND INDEED WHAT THE RESTATEMENT IS IS 
AN ORDER -- IF WE'RE GOING TO ASSERT THE CLAIMS, THEN 
WE MUST ASSERT THEM IN ARBITRATION. THAT BRINGS, 
YOUR HONOR, THE REAL PROBLEMS OF THESE PROCEEDINGS. THESE 
.PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT UNDER SECTION FOUR 
OF THE ARBITRATION ACT. THEY'RE APPROPRIATELY BROUGHT 
UNDER SECTION THREE, WHICH IS THAT SECTION PROVIDING 
FOR INJUNCTION FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT -- WHAT THEY'RE 
TRYING TO DO HERE, YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE A CLAIM AGAINST 
26 
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WE DID EXACTLY WHAT WAS DONE IN CONE. WE WERE SUED IN 
STATE COURT. WE DEMANDED ARBITRATION OF ALL ISSUES. 
WE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY PROCEEDINGS IN 
STATE COURT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF NOT DEFAULTING, 
AND WE WENT SIMULTANEOUSLY TO FEDERAL COURT AND FILED 
OUR PETITION. AND WE DID NOT NOTICE THE MATTER IN STATE 
COURT. WE NOTICED THE MATTER IN FEDERAL COURT RECOGNIZING 
THE FEDERAL COURT WAS THE PLACE TO BE. WE HAVE AT NO 
TIME WAIVED OUR RIGHT TO BE HEARD. IF YOU INTERPRET THE 
ARGUMENT OF MR. MCDOWELL IN DEPTH AS REALLY SAYING THE 
FEDERAL COURT -CAN DEFER TO THE STATE COURT, WE WOULD 
SUBMIT THAT CONE STATES OTHERWISE. WE WERE HERE FIRST. 
WE WERE ENTITLED TO A RULING. WE INFORMED JUDGE WILKINSON 
AT ALL TIMES THERE WAS A HEARING SCHEDULED IN FEDERAL 
COURT AND AT THAT HEARING THE FEDERAL ISSUES WOULD BE 
DECIDED. WE INTERPRETING JUDGE WILKINSON AT THE HEARING 
LAST FRIDAY, YOUR HONOR, AS THE BASIS OF HIS DECISIONS, 
THE BASIS OF THAT DECISION IS VERY CLEARLY SET FORTH IN 
MR. MERKLING'S AFFIDAVIT ON FILE, PARAGRAPH 13. 
"I WAS PRESENT AT THE HEARING ON MAY 24, 
1985 IN STATE COURT. YOU RECALL MR. FOSTER 
STATING JUDGE WILKINSON THAT PROCEEDING ON 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ETC." 
PARAGRAPH 14; 
"I WAS PRESENT AT THE JUNE 21 HEARING." 
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1 THE COURT: THANK YOU. DO THE PARTIES SUBMIT THE 
CASE? 
MR. MCDOWELL: I'LL SUBMIT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FOSTER: YES, WE DO. 
THE COURT: IT'S MY JUDGMENT THAT THE ARBITRATION 
THAT IS GOING FORWARD MUST GO FORWARD IN THE DISTRICT 
OF UTAH, AND IT IS TRANSFERRED HERE. IT IS FURTHER 
MY VIEW THAT PARAGRAPH 12 TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE 
AGREEMENT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT, AND THAT PARAGRAPH 10 
CONTEMPLATES A PROCEEDING UNDER A SECURITY INTEREST 
SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR, AND THAT ACTION OF THE STATE 
COURT AS TO THAT MATTER MAY GO FORWARD. 
AS I READ THE COMPLAINT, THAT MATTER IS 
EMBRACED ONLY IN THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION. SO THE 
FIRST THREE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE STATE COURT PROCEEDING 
ARE ENJOINED, AND IT MAY GO FORWARD ON THE FOURTH CAUSE 
OF ACTION HAVING TO DO WITH THE PROCEEDING UNDER PARAGRAPH 
10 RELATIVE TO POSSESSION OF THE COLLATERAL, THE JUDGMENT 
DEFICIENCIES AS MAY BE ATTEMPTED. I THINK THAT 
PROCEEDING HERE IS UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 
WHICH DOES IN MANDATORY LANGUAGE REQUIRE THAT THE 
MATTER SHALL BE WITHIN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH THE PETITION 
FOR ORDER WHICH THE ARBITRATION IS FILED, WHICH IS THIS 
DISTRICT. 
IN TERMS OF MR. BRADY, HE IS A PARTY TO PARAGRAPH 
49 
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10 THAT IS THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE STATE COURT 
PROCEEDING, AND TO THAT EXTENT HE MAY BE PROCEEDED 
AGAINST. IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS ACTION AGAINST HIM IS 
STAYED. 
THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING OUGHT 
TO INCLUDE ALL DISPUTES ARISING UNDER THE DEALERSHIP 
AGREEMENT, EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN THE FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION IN THE STATE COURT WHICH WILL GO FORWARD. I DON'T 
REGARD ATTORNEY'S FEES MATTER TO BE SUCH THAT IT WOULD 
BE ANY RIGHT TO AN AWARD ON IT. 
MR. FOSTER, WILL YOU PREPARE AN ORDER TO THIS 
EFFECT? 
MR. FOSTER: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. FOSTER: NOT BEFORE THE COURT. WE WOULD LIKE 
THAT A TRANSCRIPT BE PREPARED IF WE MAY DO SO AT THIS 
TIME. 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. FOSTER: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED AT 4:33 P.M.) 
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1 STATE Or UTAH ) 
2 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
3 
4 I, PATTI WALKER, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, 
5 REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER, AND NOTARY PUBLIC 
6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTv OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UT?E, 
7 DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
8 THAT THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS HERE TAKEN BEFORE 
9 ME AT THE TIME AND nLACE SET FORTH HEREIN, AND WAS 
10 TAKEN DOWN BY ME IN SHORTHAND AND THEREAFTER TRANSCRIBED 
11 INTO TYPEWRITING UNDER .MY DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION. 
12 THAT THE FOREGOING *>AGES CONTAIN A TRUE AND 
13 CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF Mv SAID SHORTHAND NOTES SO 
14 I TAKEN. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 I £/7# A',///-
PATTI WALKER 
21 | CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REDOFTER 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL 
22 | REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC. 
23 
24 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
Between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Petitioners, ORDER 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, Civil No. C85-280G 
Respondent. 
The Respondent's Motion under Rule 59 and Motion for a 
Stay in the above entitled matter came before the Court on the 
9th day of September 1985, at the hour of 1:00 p.m.; Lynn G. 
Foster and John R. Merkling appeared for Petitioners and Gordon 
R. McDowell appeared for Respondent; the Court considered the 
memoranda and documents filed by the parties and heard extensive 
argument of counsel, after which the matter was submitted to the 
Court for decision. 
In addition to the heretofore stated Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that (1) Docutel-Olivetti 
brought an action in the Salt Lake County District Court and 
proceeded to litigate matters and things arising from a 
dealership agreement, and certain credit documents between itself 
and defendants, as well as other matters, including asserted 
liability under an alter ego theory; (2) Docutel-Olivetti as 
plaintiff in the state court proceedings voluntarily submitted to 
A51 
^ 
cth 
'•' 'g$ 
.c-"°f/? 
the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah the full scope of matters 
set forth in its Complaint, consisting of some matters which this 
Court has held to be arbitrable, as well as other matters which 
this court has held are of a non-arbitrable nature and the proper 
subject of litigation; (3) Docutel-Olivetti has submitted itself 
to the jurisdiction of this Court for a determination on the 
merits of the applicability of 9 U.S.C. Section 4 to the claims 
between the parties, and has availed itself of the jurisdiction 
of this Court by seeking affirmative relief in proceedings 
herein; and (4) the American Arbitration Association has 
indicated that there would be no substantial cost differential in 
arbitrating the arbitrable claims of the parties in Utah as 
opposed to Texas or elsewhere. The Court finds and rules that 
the above stated facts and circumstances constitute compelling 
and countervailing reasons for ordering arbitration of the 
pending arbitrable claims which have been asserted in Utah forums 
to take place in the District of Utah. The Court also finds that 
for reasons of judicial economy as well as the other compelling 
and countervailing reasons set forth herein, other pending 
arbitrable claims which have been commenced elsewhere should be 
transferred to Utah and combined with proceedings in the District 
of Utah. In view of the foregoing, the Court, being fully 
advised, and having made and reached the foregoing findings, 
enters the following Order: 
1. Respondent's Motion under Rule 59 to amend or 
alter the Court's Order of August 8, 1985, is denied. 
2. Respondent's Motion for a Stay is denied. 
DATED: September / *f , 1985. 
PHOMAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies to: Lynn G. Foster 
Gordeon R. McDowell 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
-oOo-
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
between DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corp., and RICHARD BRADY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C85-280 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Date: September 9, 1985 
Time: 1:00 P.M. 
(Motion to Alter or Amend) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE J. THOMAS GREENE 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL! 
For the Plaintiff: 
For Defendant; 
LYNN G. FOSTER, ESQ. and 
JOHN R. MERKLING, ESQ. 
602 E. 300 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
GORDON R. MCDOWELL, JR., ESQ. 
4609 S.^2300 E., #104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Court Reporter: REEVE M. BUTLER 
Official Court Reporter 
Rm. 224 Post Office Bldg. 
350 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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MR. MCDOWELL: That's fine, Your Honor* I appreciat4 
the opportunity to discuss the case* I think itfs very 
interesting, even outside the kind of heated debate we have 
going on here. In any event, as I said, I think that under 
the arbitration agreement, the forum selection clause in this 
particular agreement, the regional office for the hearing has 
got to be either Denver or Dallas, Texas, not Utah. 
The second point I want to emphasize is that the 
State Courts have jurisdiction in these proceedings. The 
petitioners have suggested that only the Federal Court can 
vindicate their Federal arbitration act claims but this, 
however, is not the law* State Courts are required to apply 
the act to proceedings before them and are competent to rule 
on Federal arbitration act issues. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in the 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital case at Page 941, "State Courtej 
as much as Federal Courts are obliged to grant stays of 
iitigation under Section 3 of the Arbitration Act.M The 
significance of this State Court jurisdiction will be developed) 
later in my presentation. 
The final point that I wish to emphasize is Section 
3 of the act, the Arbitration Act, does not give this Court 
independent jurisdiction as argued in the briefs to impose in-
junctions on State Court proceedings. That's been argued and 
the cases have been cited. I think the only comment I have on 
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won't tell me because they won't give any discovery from the 
State Court proceedings, but that's a different issue, but 
anyway, going back to the State Court proceeding under Section 
3(a), the Court knows that Judge Wilkinson ruled that they 
wouldn't grant a stay in those proceedings, however the 
defendants or petitioners in thi3 matter have now appealed 
ithe ruling and the Utah Supreme Court granted an immediate 
ippeal which ha3 effectively blocked the trial court proceed-
ing in that credit claim anyway. 
THE COU7VT: The Court has granted an interlocutory 
appeal? 
MR. McDOWELL: Well, I don't know whether they did 
or not. That's an issue I want to clarify later on, but they 
did, in fact,t grant an appeal. Mr. Foster claimed an appeal 
as a matter of riaht under Rule 3. X argued that it wasn't 
l^ and the Court didn't agree with me. It granted an appeal. 
The appeal is now pending and — 
THE COURT: We'll hear from Mr. Foster when he has 
his turn. 
MR. McDOWELL: Thank you. In any event, if the 
petitioners don't prevail before the Utah Supreme Court, Your 
Honor, they still have the right to petition the United States 
Supreme Court for review, as the parties, in fact, did in 
Southland Corporation vs. Keating. As the Court may recall in 
that case, that was a case that went through the California 
AS6 
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systems up to the California Supreme Court and the petitioners 
in that case then took their argument that arbitration should 
be allowed on a petition to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court crranted a writ on that case and 
/Lmled that Section 3 aoolied to the states as well as to the 
Federal Courts and that basically invalidated Federal or State 
law that seemed to be in conflict, but in any event, the 
procedure that's been elected by petitioners has fully and 
adequately protected their rights to a full judicial review of 
their claim that Docutel's credit collection claim is the 
subject of arbitration. 
If they prevail on that appeal before the Utah 
Supreme Court, then obviously, Docutel's credit collection 
claim is going to be stayed, if they do not prevail, on the 
other hand, they will have had their day in court on the issues! 
There is no reason for this Court to interfere in those oro-
ceedings. They have obtained everything they're entitled to. 
THE COURT: Well, die Court hasn't interfered with 
the credit collection aspect of it, has it? 
MR. MCDOWELLJ Well, one could argue that it hasn't. 
THE COURT: What you're doing is going forward, at 
least under order of this Court, going forward under whatever 
riahts and remedies you raiqht hav* under Section 10 of that 
arbitration agreement. 
MR. McDOWELL: That may be the subject of a 
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that. There is an nexus between the State Court proceedings 
and credit collection. 
How to define it in terms of pleadings I guess is an 
issue still open. The point of issue before this Court as 
well as the issue that is now pending before the Utah Supreme 
Court is the same, is the credit collection claim arbitrable 
and that is, in my view, that it should be resolved over in 
that forum• 
They have the opportunity to do that. The Utah 
Supreme Court is going to review that situation. As I said, 
if they rule against us, we're stayed and if they don't, they 
have certainly had their day in court, and what they are not 
entitled to, Your Honor, is to encr*<n* 4r> forum shopping and — 
THE COURT: Well, I have held, just so we clearly 
understand each other in this matter that credit collection 
matters under Section 10 of the arbitration agreement are not 
subject to arbitration, so that matter is not being addressed 
here. That may he up on appeal over there, but it isn't beincj' 
addressed here* 
MR. McDOWELL: Well, if that's the case, I don't 
know what the Court's order of arbitration in Utah is. That's 
a problem I've got because I think what you've done then is — 
THE COURT: No, I think I said it nretty clearly in 
tne order that everything that isn't a credit collection matte^ 
hi? subject to arbft^Hoix, and specifically the third cause of 
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Pag« Number 2 8 
action that is set forth in your complaint and those portions 
of the first and second that don't have to do with or arise 
out of Section 10 of the arbitration agreement, that was my 
intent. 
MR. MCDOWELL: Well — 
THE COURT: At least I want to be sure you understand) 
MR. McDOWELL: I understand what you're saying, 
Your Honor, ana I'm submitting *-b«»i-» reallv isn't any differ-
ence. I mean again if we somehow o^ erst-flf-ed the complaint in 
the State Court, then perhaps it was inappropriate. What I 
meant is that the real nexus — I mean, this is after all 
notice pleadings and not the old, you know, formal pleadings 
and the basic case below, you didn't pay for goods received. 
That*8 what we asked for in State Court. 
Now every other issue that's been raised is in 
arbitration, it's already being arbitrated and that's the 
whole point we tried to make before* We haven't refused to 
arbitrate the issues. 
The only thing we haven't agreed to arbitrate is the 
credit collection matter and that's the whole issue. Now that 
issue again is being decided bv the Utah Supreme Court. They'zje 
going to look at it. They're going to say "No, we disagree 
with Judge Wilkinsonj we disagree with Judge Jenkins or I'm 
sorry, Judge Greene. There has been a lot of judges in that 
case and in that case they are going to get not only what 
Pag* Number. 
should not be permitted to engage in what I consider to be 
blatant forum shopping and particularly where they themselves 
initiated a Section 3 claim in State Court. 
I don't think that this Court should interject 
itself in State Court proceedings. Tnere is no reason for it 
to do so. Petitioner is fully protected in their rights and 
particularly ~ 
THE COURT: Did you SJ^' *M • *^a initiated in a 
State Court proceeding? 
MR. McDOWELL: They initiated the Section.^* As I 
view their petition, it was a Section 3 Motion to Stay. 
THE COURT: Well, initially it was a State Court 
proceeding? 
MR. McDOWELL: Yeah. 1 filed that# yes. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. McDOWELL: But they came before the State Court 
process was — I filed a complaint and they filed a Motion to 
Dismiss alleging both the Utah Arbitration Act and Section — 
well, the Federal Arbitration Act, Sect*^* * trough 15, so 
what Ifm saying is they submitted that *ssue to the State 
Court and when Judge Wilkinson ruled against them and the 
matter was transferred to this Court, they came back in -*** 
then again reengaaed th<*« ^ rmuaent that Section 4 applied. 
I think the Court shouldn't interject itself because 
of necessity, you see, by going on Section 4 and this Court 
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Page Number 31 
being restricted under Section 4 to enter orders only in its 
own jurisdiction, if the Court proceeds under Section 4, it's 
got to enter an order to arbitrate in this forum and that 
violates the arbitration agreement and violates the provisions 
of Section 4 and Section 3 which requires this Court to enter 
orders in accordance with the agreement of the parties* 
Now all the othex Courts that have dealt with that_ 
issue have said with very few exceptions that if you file a 
petition in the wrong forum, you got to dismiss it* 
Now Continental was one case which ruled for arbi-
tration in its own forum, but in that case as the Court recallsj, 
Continental itself asked the District Court in Oregon for a 
Section 4 order and so really, there is nothing surprising 
in that case because in a sense, the Court analyzed it by 
saying they knew the Court limitation was its jurisdiction 
and therefore by doing that, they essentially agreed to 
arbitrate in Oregon and since the other party also wanted to 
arbitrate in Oregon which basically was a general contract 
provision, that people, regardless of the forum selection 
clause, can agree to arbitrate in a different forum. 
The other case which ordered arbitration not in its 
own district interesting enough, th£ Dupuy case, Fifth Circui|t 
case. In that case, Your Honor, the District Court in that 
particular case ordered arbitration, not in its own district 
but in the district of the forum selected in the arbitration 
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can compel arbitration in violation of the Federal forum 
selection clause of the agreement. What the case stands for, 
where appellant himself has filed a Section 4 petition to 
compel arbitration in a District Court which is not the forum 
selected, he has essentially agreed then to accept that forum 
as the arbitration site, whereas to comment that we knew they 
could have asserted counterclaims in Utah and therefore we 
would have to bring personnel and records here, fine, if they 
want to do it, but that is in protection of a full-blown juris-} 
diction proceeding and arguments with respect to arbitration 
are valid and I think if the parties did not want to have 
arbitration in Utah or wherever they wanted it, the Court is 
required, it seems to me, to honor that agreement. 
I don't think there has been any showing whatsoever 
in this Court that there are compelling reasons, and compelling 
I think needs to be underscored, why this Court should disre-
gard that forum selection clause. I would submit- 1*. Your 
Honor• 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ifm impressed by the fact* 
that Docutel brought an action in the State of Utah, submitted 
itself to the jurisdiction of this state and proceeded to 
litigate matters and things which we have held here were sub-
ject to arbitration as well as matters and things which are not) 
subject to arbitration. Therefore, at least for some purposes,] 
it looks to me like Docutel was willing to come to Utah and 
Pag« Number ^4 
have litigated here the alter ego question in the third cause 
of action and all of the matters and things in the first and 
second cause of action which don't arise out of Section 10 of 
the Arbitration Agreement. 
Having submitted itself to this jurisdiction for 
that purpose, I think itfs hard for Docutel to say that Utah 
isn't the appropriate place to be, having come to this Court 
and asserted affirmative relief and further knowing that the 
American Arbitration Association has held there is no cost 
differential or reason to select one forum over the other. I 
do regard those as compelling and countervailing reasons that 
the forum selection clause should not be enforced in this case,) 
The Motion to Stay is denied. The Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Judgment is denied. You will prepare an order to 
that effect? 
MR. FOSTER: Would you like me to do that, Your 
Honor? 
MR. MCDOWELL: I'll prepare the order. It was ray 
motion, I suppose. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. FOSTER: Whichever the Court prefers. It matter^ 
not to us. 
THE COURT: Well, if Mr. Foster, being the prevailing 
party, would prepare the order and submit it to counsel. 
MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
I, REEVE BUTLER, do hereby certify that I am 
an Official Court Reporter for the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah; 
That as such Reporter I attended the hearing of 
the foregoing matter on^PUZ^^ cf (*?%£*, and thereat 
reported in Stenotype all of the testimony and proceedings 
had, and caused said notes to be transcribed into typewriting; 
and the foregoing pages numbered from c>j to i j 
constitute a full, true and correct report of the same. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this of 
, 1985. 
&^J7^_ 
REEVE BUTLER, OCR 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH C 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC.f 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD BRADY, 
and DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and RICHARD BRADY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Cross-Appellee* 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 
In accordance with 10th Cir. R. 9(e) and Fed. R. App. P. 
34(a), these appeals came on for consideration on the briefs and 
record on appeal. 
This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from an order of the 
district court which, inter alia, enjoined certain litigation 
between the parties, directed the parties to proceed to 
arbitration of certain disputes, and directed that arbitration 
proceedings elsewhere be transferred to the District of Utah. 
„ P I L E D 
•enthCircuil 
OCT 07 1985 
HOWARD J. PHILLIPS 
Clerk 
Nos. 85-2349 & 
85-2460 
(D.C. No. C85-0280G) 
(D. Utah) 
A65 
The district court's order was entered August 8f 1985. 
Twenty-nine days later, on September 6, 1985jr the defendant-
appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the August 8 order. 
That motion was denied by a bench ruling on September 9, 1985, and 
later by a written order entered September 19, 1985. Defendant's 
notice of appeal was filed September 12f 1985r and plaintiffs' 
notice of cross-appeal was filed September 27, 1985. 
It is clear that all parties challenge the August 8 order. 
The threshold question is whether this court has appellate 
jurisdiction. It is well settled that a notice of appeal filed 
within the time period prescribed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) and 
28 U.S.C. § 2107 is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. 
Director, 111. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); Gooch v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th Cir.), £££i. denied/ 419 U.S. 
997 (1974). Further, a motion of the type set out in 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), if timely, tolls the running of the 
appeal period. Here, however, the post-judgment motion filed 
September 6 was not timely and consequently had no tolling effect. 
Because the appeal period expired on September 7 and the 
notice of appeal was not filed until September 12, we conclude 
that it was untimely and insufficient to confer appellate 
jurisdiction. A proper cross-appeal must be filed within fourteen 
days of a timely notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3). 
Consequently, the notice of cross-appeal was also untimely. For 
these reasons, the appeal and cross-appeal must be dismissed. 
It is further ordered that defendant-appellant's application 
for an emergency stay of the district court's order is denied. 
See 10th Cir. R. 17(b). 
The appeal and cross-appeal are both DISMISSED. 
The mandate shall issue forthwith. 
HOWARD K. PHILLIPS, Clerk / 
LYNN G, FOSTER, #1105 
JOHN R. MERKLING, #2239 
Attorneys for Defendants 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 102 
Telephone: (801 ) 364-5633 
IN THE SUPRKMK COURT OF Tilt 
STATK Ol' UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants-Appellants 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD BRADY 
Docket No. 20835 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Richard Brady, having been first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a named Defendant in the above-entitled matter and 
I an also president of Dick Brady Systems, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Systems"). 
2. I am familiar with the books and records of Systems and 
with the financial condition of Systems. 
3. Systems is not insolvent and is able to meet its debts 
Incurred in the ordinary course of business. 
4. I do not believe that a judgment will be awarded in 
favor of Olivetti, nor do I believe that Olivetti is entitled to a 
judgment, but in the event that a judgment is awarded, on the order 
-1-
of the amount claimed in the Complaint on file herein, Systems 
would be able to pay such an amount, 
5. Prior* to the filing of this lawsuit, Systems did 
business with Olivetti on the order of $25,000.00 to $50,000.00 and 
more per month. 
6. On normal margins, this means that Olivetti h?s foregone 
sales to Systems during the pendancy of this action which would 
nave generated profits on the order of $100,000.00. 
7. In addition, Olivetti has forced Systems to incur legal 
fees on I: he order of $2'>,000.00 representing procedural matters 
only and it appears likely that Olivetti has a]so incurred legal 
fees on the same order or higher in connection with the claim whi":h 
Olivetti values at only $40,500.00. 
8. The aforementioned legal fees have been accumulated 
solely with respect to Oli/etti's refusal to arbitrate the 
differences between the parties. 
9. I am familiar with an Order of Judge J. Thomas Greene, 
of the U.S. Federal District Court, ordering arbitration in the 
State of Utah. A copy of this Onler is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit "B^-l". 
10. I am familiar with an Order of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, dismissing Olivetti's Appeal, a 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 
HBA-2" by reference. 
11. There are no separate credit agreement between Olivetti 
and Systems which would fall within the exception of Judge Greene's 
Order. Consequently, all disputes between the parties require 
-2-
resolution by arbitration. 
12. Olivetti is not a secured creditor of Systems. 
13. The mentioned fai'ure to arbitrate, which has been 
coupled with procedural manueverings, has been a form of economic 
coercion imposed by Olivetti and has pined a clear and significant 
burden on the business of Systems. The burden placed on Systems, 
however, is the res alt of Olivetti's actions. It seems to me 
inequitable for Olivetti to claim that they are entitled to some 
special benefit because of the burdens that they arc imposing upon 
the, business of Systems. 
FU3THHR Affiant sayeth naught. 
1 
RICHARD BKADY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 
October, 1985. 
day of 
NOTAJW PUtfLIL 
My-'Co'iimi ss ion E x p i r e s : / " ' p SfC 
- 3 -
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
thtf foregoing Affidavit of Richard Brady, postage prepaid, to 
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117 on this
 A' //,. day of Ortober, 1985. 
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ARBITRATION ACT 78-31-18 
CHAPTER 31 
AKMTRATION 
78-31-1. Written agreement for, etc. 
Compiler's Notes. Municipal corporation*. 
Thin chapter may he superseded hy the Ahsent a statutory prohibition, a munici 
Utah Arbitration Act adopted hy Laws U»sf), pal corporation has the power to xuhmil to 
rh. 225. See 7S31a-l et scu, arbitration any claim asserted hy or against 
it, the application of this section to permit 
Constitutionality.
 x a I i l | a m | ,.nfnl,.,.a),|,. ;^ !Vemenls for future 
The amendment of this section to permit disputes where one party was a municipal 
valid and enforeeahle averments for arhi- corporation did not violate Art. VI, $ 2N of 
tration of future disputes does not violate the state Constitution. Lindon City v. Kngi-
Art. I, §11, Art. I. $7. nor Art. VI. § 2S of neers Constr. Co (1!*K1) o\% P 2d 1070. 
the state Constitution. Lindon Cit\ \ K\\\i\ 
neers Constr. Co. 1li»M \ M\\ P 2d 1070 I « w Reviews. 
Alternatives lo thi' Tort Svslem for the 
Nonmedical Professions: Can Thev Do the 
Job', W l It V L I, Rev. :»7. 
78-31 -15. Confirmation or modification by court on motion. 
Motions to vacate or modify award after haired once the court has entered a judtf-
award confirmed. ment confirming the award under this sce-
The filin« of motions under 7s LI hi and '»<"> Robinson & Wells, PC v Warren i \\)KU 
78-13-17 to vacate or modifv an award is hhi* P 2d ML 
78-31-16. Vacating by court — Grounds. 
Judgment confirming award. harred once the court has entered a judg-
The filing of motions under this section '"«'»» »'onfinninu the award under 7S-:U-Lr> 
and 78-31-17 to vacate or modify an award is Robinson & Wells, PC. v. Warren il!>83) l i e 
P2dML 
78-31-17. Modification by court — Grounds. 
Judgment confirming award. barred once the court has entered a judtf-
The filing of motions under 7S-.U-lb and n u ' n l wnfirmin* I he award under 7K-31-l.r>. 
this section to vacate or modifv an award is Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren (19*3) Mi!) 
I1 2d Ml. 
78-31-18. Notice of motion Stay. 
Time for filing motions, and not a guaranteed minimum time (hat 
This section's provision that motions lo permits the filing of such motions after the 
vacate, modify, or correct shall be served urantinn of a motion to confirm the award, 
within three months establishes a statutory Robinson £ Wells. P.C. v. Warren (19K3) \W.) 
maximum time in which to file such motions', P 2d Ml. 
CHAPTER 31a 
ARRITRATION ACT 
Section 
78-31a-l. Short title 
78-31a-2. Definitions 
145 
A72 
78-31a- l JUDICIAL COOK 
78-31a-3. Arbitration agreement 
7S-.5Ia 1 Court order to arbitrate. 
78-31 a-5. Appointment of arbitrators. 
78-31a-ti Conference prior to arbitration hearing 
78-31a-7. Arbitration hearing — Procedure. 
78-31a-8 Arbitration hearing Powers of arbitrators. 
78-31 a-9. Arbitration hearing — Joinder of parties. 
78-3 la-10. Arbitration award. 
78-31a-ll. Costs. 
78-3la-12. (Confirmation of award. 
TS-31 a-l.'L Modification of award by arbitrators. 
78-31 a-M. Vacation of the award by court. 
78-3 la-15. Modification of award by court. 
78-31a-lt>. Award as judgment. 
78-31 a-17 Motions. 
78-31a-l8. Location for arbitration. 
78-31a-P>. Appeals 
7h-;Ua-2(>. Scope of chapter 
7 8 - 3 U - 1 . vShort title. This act shall be known as the "tTtah Arbitration Act." 
History: C. 1!>">3, 78-31a-l. enacted by L. Kaacts: Chapter 31a. Title 78. 
11)8"), ch. 22.'), § 1. « , .,., ,„, 
Separability C lause. 
Title of Act. Section 2 of Laws PJ85, ch. 225 provided: 
"If anv provision of this act, or the applica-
An act relating to the Judicial ( ode, pro-
 t i ( )n o f a n v pr0vis»ion to any person or cir-
vidmg a revised procedure for the enforce-
 a ,mstance, is held invalid, the remainder of 
ment of written arbitration agreements. - this act is given effect without the invalid 
Laws P.185, ch. 225. provision or application." 
78-31 a-2. Definitions. (1) "Arbi trators" means one or more arbitrators as 
appointed by the court or agreed upon by the parties. 
(2) "Court" means any state district court in I'tah. 
History: C. li).r>3, 78-31 a-2. enacted by L. 
ll>8f>, ch. 225. § 1 
78 -3U-3 . Arbitration agreement . A written agreement to submit any existing 
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except 
upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud 
is alleged as provided in the Ctah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
His to ry : ( \ 1!»53, 78-31a-3. enacted by L. 
P>85. ch. 22"), § 1 
78-3!a-L Court order to arbitrate. (1) The court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbi-
trate. If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement 
or the scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine 
those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement 
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction 
to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Oth-
erwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceed-
ing involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the 
issue is severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue 
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subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, 
the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim that 
an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim 
have not been shown. 
History: C. 1953. 78-:tla-i. enacted hv L 
1985, ch. 225, §1. 
78-3U-5. Appointment of arbitrators. (1) If the arbitration agreement speci-
fies a procedure for appointment of arbitrators, it shall be followed. 
(2) If no procedure is specified, or if the agreed method fails or cannot be fol-
lowed for any reason, or if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party to 
the arbitration agreement may move the court to appoint one or more arbitrators, 
as necessary. 
(3) The motion shall state: 
(a) the issues to be arbitrated; 
(b) any arbitrators the party may propose for appointment; and 
(c) the qualifications of any proposed arbitrators. 
(4) Upon this motion, the court shall appoint the necessary arbitrators, whom 
the court shall find qualified to arbitrate the issues stated in the motion. 
History: (\ l%;{, 7,v;Uu-5, enacted in I.. 
i!>K5, ch. 225, § 1. 
78-3la-6. Conference prior to arbitration hearing. (1) The arbitrators either 
in their discretion, or at the request of any party, may conduct a conference prior 
to the arbitration hearing. The conference shall be held no fewer than ten days 
before the arbitration hearing. Not ire of the conference shall be made by certified 
mail to all parties to the arbitration hearing, and no fewer than ten days before 
the conference. 
(2) The subpoena powers provided in Section T.^ -.'Ua-S apply to conferences con-
ducted under this section. 
(3) The conference shall allow the parties to consider any matters which may 
aid in the disposition of the arbitration hearing, including, but not limited to: 
(a) identifying and clarifying the issues; 
(b) determining the scope ami scheduling of discovery of evidence under Section 
78-31a-7; 
(c) stipulating to the admission of facts and documents; 
(d) identity of witnesses. 
(4) The arbitrators shall make a written record of action taken at the confer-
ence, including a finding of any agreements made between the parties regarding 
matters discussed. This finding controls at the arbitration hearing, unless the arbi-
trators find that a modification at the hearing is necessary to prevent a manifest 
injustice. 
History: (\ 1!>53. 78-31a-l». enaftetl hv L 
15W5. ch. 225, §1. 
78-3U-7. Arbitration hearing — Procedure. (1) The arbitrators shall appoint 
a time and place for the arbitration hearing and serve each party to the proceeding 
with notice of the time and place, personally or by certified mail. Notice shall be 
served not fewer than 30 days before the date of hearing, unless both parties stipu-
late to a waiver or modification of this notice requirement. Appearance at the hear-
ing waives the notice required by this section. The arbitrators may adjourn the 
hearing from time to time as necessary, and on request of a party or upon their 
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own motion may postpone the hearing to a date not later than the date fixed by 
the arbitration agreement for making the award, unless the parties consent to a 
later date. The arbitrators shall hear and determine the controversy upon the evi-
dence produced, notwithstanding that a party duly notified fails to appear. The 
court upon motion may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the hearing 
and determination of the controversy. 
(2) Kach party to the arbitration proceeding is entitled, in person or through 
counsel, to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. 
(.'{> The hearing shall be recorded in a manner agreed upon by the parties. Costs 
of making a record shall he apportioned as directed by the arbitrators. 
(t) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators, but a simple majority 
of them may determine any questions and render a final award. If during the 
course of the hearing an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining 
arbitrator or arbitrators may continue the hearing and determination of the con-
troversy, or additional arbitrators may be appointed as provided in Section 
TS-.'Ua-iY 
(!*>) I'nless otherwise provided by the arbitration agreement or by law, the pow-
ers of the arbitrators are exercised by majority vote 
History: (' 1 :».*»:;. 7X ;Ua-7, martini by L. 
IMS'I. rh •.::,*». $ t 
7.H-.'UH-N. Arbitration hearing Power** of arbitrators. (!) Arbitrators may 
administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the pro-
duction of books, records, documents, and other evidence. Subpoenas shall be 
served, and upon motion to the court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced as 
provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas in civil actions. 
(2) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at the request of any party, 
may order: 
(a) a party to provide any other party with information which is determined 
by the arbitrator to be relevant to the determination of the issues to be arbitrated; 
or 
(b) the use of requests for discovery as provided in the Ctah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, except that the time a party has to respond to any discovery request shall 
be determined by the arbitrators in their discretion. 
[IV) Any law compelling a person under subpoena to testify is applicable to this 
chapter. 
I 1} The same fees prescribed for the attendance of witnesses in civil actions 
shall be paid to witnesses subpoenaed in arbitratio-n proceedings. 
H i N i o r y : C 1!»:"»:{. 7.x .Uu s, r n a e t r d l»v I. 
!!»>>•>, eh . Zll>. $ 1. 
78-3U-9. Arbitration hearing - - Joinder of parties. (1) Cpon motion to the 
arbitration panel by any party, a person who is subject to service of process for 
the subject matter of the arbitration, and who is a party to the arbitration agree-
ment, shall be joined as a party in the action if: (a) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those who are already parties; or (b) he claims or the 
motion alleges he lias an interest relating to the subject of the action and the dispo-
sition of the action in his absence impedes his ability to protect that interest, or 
subjects any of the persons already parties to a substantial risk of incurred multi-
ple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reasons of his claimed interest. 
(2) Any person joined as a party to the arbitration has the same time to answer 
as was given to the initial defendant in the case. 
Hitttory: (V l%;i. TS-iUa-i). enacted by L 
P.WiS.rh. 22f>. $ 1. 
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78-3Ia-lO. Arbilrution award. (1) The arbitration award shall be in writing 
and signed by the arbitrators who join in the award. A copy of the award shall 
be served upon each party personally, or by certified mail, or as otherwise provided 
by the arbitration agreement. 
(2) An arbitration award shall be made within the time set by the agreement, 
or if a time is not set. within a time the court orders pursuant to the motion of 
any party to the arbitration proceeding. The parties may at any time, by written 
agreement, extend the time for award. A party to an arbitration proceeding waives 
any objection based on the ground that the award was not timely rendered unless 
the arbitrators are notified of the objection before service of the award. 
History: (\ 195;}, TS-:Ua-K». enacted hy L 
1985, ch. 225. §1. 
78-31a-ll. Costs. The expenses, fees, and other costs of the arbitrators, exclu-
sive of attorney's fees, shall be paid as provided in the award, unless another provi-
sion for the payment of fees is made in the arbitration agreement. 
History: C. 195.{. 7s-;ila-ll, enacted h> I, 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
78-31a-12. Confirmation of award. Upon motion to the court by any party to 
the arbitration proceeding for the confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice 
to all parties,the court shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to 
vacate or modify the award. 
Hintory: (' P.C>."{. 78 :Ua-12. enacted hy L 
1985, ch. 225. § 1. 
78-31a-13. Modification of award by arbitrators. (I) Upon motion of any 
party to the arbitrators or upon order of the court pursuant to a motion, the arbi-
trators may modify the award if: 
(a) there is an evident miscalculation of figures or description of a person or 
property referred to in the award; 
(b) the award is imperfect as to form; or 
(c) necessary to clarify any part of the award. 
(2) A motion to the arbitrators for modification of an award shall be made 
within 20 days after service of the award upon the moving party. Written notice 
that a motion has been made shall be promptly served personally or by certified 
mail upon all other parties to the proceeding The notice of motion for modification 
shall contain a statement that objections to the motion be served upon the moving 
party within ten days after receipt of the notice. Any award modified by the arbi-
trators is subject to the provisions of Sections ?S-lUa-l 1. 7S-:Ua-12, and 78-.'Ua-M. 
HlHtorv: (' 1!>:>.'I. 7S .11,i l.i. n u c l r d h\ I. 
li>Kf». ch . 22.">. >i t 
78-31a-M. Vacation of the award by court. (1) Upon motion to the court by 
any party to the arbitration proceeding for vacation of the award, the court shall 
vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured hy corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator 
was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, 
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the 
hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a party; or 
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(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days after 
a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, or if predicated upon corrup-
tion, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days after the grounds are known 
or should have been known. 
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than in Subsection (1) (e), the court 
may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbitration 
agreement or by the court. Arbitrators chosen by the court shall be found qualified 
to arbitrate the issues involved. The time for making an award, if specified in the 
arbitration agreement, is applicable to a rearbitration proceeding. If not specified, 
the court shall order the award upon rearbitration to be made within a reasonable 
time. The time for making an award under a rearbitration proceeding commences 
on the date of the court's order for rearbitration. 
M) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the 
award is pending, the court shall confirm the award. 
Hbtory: t\ 195:J, V.s-.'Ua-l I. enacted by L 
1985, ch. 225, SI. 
78-31a-15. Modification of award by court. (1) Upon motion made within 20 
days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, the court shall 
modify or correct the award if it appears: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the 
description of any person or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the 
award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the issues 
submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
(2) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award and 
confirm it as modified and corrected. Otherwise, the court shall deny the motion 
and confirm the award of the arbitrators. 
(3) A motion to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative 
with a motion to vacate the award. 
HlMtory: l\ 195.1, Ts-illu15, enacted hv L 
1985, ch. 225, §1. 
7H-3la-16. Award as judgment. An award which is confirmed, modified, or 
corrected by the court shall be treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment. 
Costs incurred incident to any motion authorized by this chapter, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be 
awarded by the court. 
History: C. 195:*, 78-31 a-16, enacted by L 
I9K5, eh. 225, § 1, 
78-3Ia-17. Motions. (1) Notice of an initial motion for an order of arbitration 
shall be served as provided by law for the service of a summons, unless otherwise 
specified by the parties in the arbitration agreement. 
(2) A motion to the court or the arbitrators shall be made and heard as pro-
vided by law for motions in civil actions, except as otherwise specified in this chap-
ter. 
(3) Notice in writing of the motion shall be served on the adverse party as pro-
vided by law for civil actions. 
History: ('. 1953, 78-3la-17, enacted bv L. 
1985, ch. 225, §1. 
150 
A77 
CONTKMPT 78-32-2 
78-31a-l8. Location for arbitration. If an arbitration agreement provides that 
arbitration be held in a specified county, the district court of that county has juris-
diction to hear the initial motion for arbitration. If no provision is made, hearing 
on the initial motion for arbitration shall be before the district court of the county 
where the adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if the adverse party 
has no resilience or place of business in this state, in the county in which the 
adverse party is served. I'nlcss the court with jurisdiction otherwise orders, all sub-
sequent motions or hearings incident to the arbitration proceeding shall be heard 
by the court hearing the initial motion. 
History: C. lid:?, 7N ;Ua-l \ marled by L 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
78-31 a-19. Appeals. An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as pro-
vided by law for appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
Hiatory: C. 1WW, 7S-:Ua-l!*. enacted hv L 
1985.cn. 22ft. §1. 
78-31a-20. Scope of chapter. This chapter is not intended to provide a means 
of arbitration exclusive of those sanctioned under common law. 
History: C. 1953. 78-31 a-20. enacted bv L. 
1985, ch. 225. § 1. 
CHAPTER 32 
CONTKMPT 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions const i tut ing contempt. 
Cross-References. Findings of fact required. 
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt To justify a finding of contempt and the 
based on failure of convicted defendant to imposition of a jail sentence, there must he 
pay, 77-32a-7 lo 77-32a-12. made wri t ten findings of fact and judgment 
supported hv clear and convincing proof that 
Disobedience of district court order by
 t h | l p ; i r ( v k m , w w h a t w a s m j u m , ( 1 o f nim% 
city court.
 ; i m j h a v i l ^ fh l. ; i h i , i ! y t o ( .o m p |V ( willfully 
City court judge was not in contempt for and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
failing to comply with a judgment of the dis- Thomas v. Thomas (H)77) 56!) 1* 2d 1 lit), 
trict court where that order was not served Finding of contempt and the imposition of 
U|M>n him by writ, but was returned to the a jail sentence must he supported by clear 
city court together with other papers in the and convincing proof that defendant knew 
file on order of remand. State v. t'.iles il!»7M W h:it was required, that he had the ability to 
576 P 2d 876. comply, and that he willfully and knowingly 
failed and refused to do so. Coleman v. 
Coleman (11)8:1)66-1 P 2d 1155. 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real property. 
Separate mortgages foreclosed in single in the same action with judgment being 
action. awarded for a combined amount, and the evi-
Where two parcels of realty, subject to sep- dence established that one of the parcels was 
arate mortgages executed by the same mort- offered and sold separately at the foreclosure 
gagor to the same mortgagee, were foreclosed sale and that the other parrel remained 
1M 
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UTAH ARBITRATION ACT 
1985 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
S. B. No. 62 By Dale E. Stratford 
Terry Williams 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; PROVIDING A REVISED 
PROCEDURE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF WRITTEN ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS 
FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
CHAPTER 31a, TITLE 78, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
REPEALS: 
CHAPTER 31, TITLE 78, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Chapter 31a, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, is enacted to read. 
78-31a-l. This act shall be known as the_ _.!Lytah 
Arbitrati on_Ac•tmL^  
78
 : 3_la- 2^ jj) " Arb_it r a to rs" _ means one or more 
arbitrators_as appointed by the court or agreed upon by the 
parties. 
(2) "Court" means any state distnct_ court in Utah. 
78*3 la-3. A w ri t_t e n_ a <j re em en t _t o s
 u bjn 11 any ex l s t^ i ng or 
future _c_qn trove rs y _t o jujb l tr a ^ i_on l s_ _ y a 1 1 ^ enfo r ce abj. e ^  and 
kU*yj*S*b\*.i except upon giounds existing at lav or equity to 
set aside the agleement, or when fraud is alleged as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78-31a-4. (1) The court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement^ shall order 
the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
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(',]) Whether the proposed Foster parent, or parents, is or are financially 
able and morally tit to have the care, supervision, and training of such 
child; 
(4) The physical and also the mental condition of such child in so far 
as this can he determined, and any other facts and circumstances deemed 
advisable and necessary by said department to be investigated concerning 
said child and its welfare. Upon the day so appointed the court shall 
proceed to full hearing of the petition ami the examination of the parties 
in interest, under oath, with the right of adjourning the hearing and 
examination fnnu time to time as the nature of the ease may require. If 
the report of the division of Family services, or its duly authorized agents, 
as provided herein, disapprove of the adoption of the child, the court may 
dismiss the petition. Xo petition for adoption shall he granted until the 
child shall have lived for six months in the home of the adopting parents 
except, that when the adopting parent is the spouse of one of the natural 
parents, no petition for adoption shall be granted until the child shall have 
lived for one year in the home of the adopting parent. 
History: R. S. 19W, 14-4-14, added by truce which provided: «\Vo petition for 
L. 1041, ch. 17, §1; C. l«)4;i. 141-11; L. adoption shrill be granted until the child 
PJGf>, ch. 170, §1; PJ7f>, ch. IKt, §1. shall have lixrd tor one year in tbe homo 
of the adopting parents"; and made minor 
Compiler'* Note*, .h,,^.-, in phraseology, punctuation nnri 
Tin* l'.M'i.'i amendment ins.-it , .I item de^- *f\ le. 
igu.-ition "(^n)" and "or < l» \ the pe t i t ioner 
i.> m,t the .spMu.sc of the natucil parent of Cross-References. 
the child named in the pe t i t i on" in the I»i\i>ion of family service*, :">-">-1 f>I>-f>. 
tir.st sentence . t 'hild p lacing agencies . f)f>-.Sa-l et seq. 
The li>7."> amendment subs t i tu t ed refcr-
,.,ue, t„ the .lui-dmi ..f lannli *r,xuv. Collateral References. 
of the 1'tah depa r tmen t of social service* Adopt i o n C ^ ; . 
for references to the s t a te depar tmen t J »..).S. Adoption of Persona § 1 9 . 
of public well 'nie; rewrote the la»! *« •„ - Am. .1 nr. Jd *!»!, Adopt ion § ;>i>. 
78-30-15. Petition and report to be scaled and filed.—The court shall 
order that the petition, the written report provided for in section 73-30-14, 
above, or any other doeiunents tiled in <<»mieetion with the hearing, shall 
be sealed and shall not be open to inspection or copy [ except) upon 
order of the court expressly permittinir sueh inspection or copy after good 
cause therefor has been shown. 
History: R. S. 19:U, 14 4-lf», added by Collateral References. 
L. 1941, ch. 17, § 1 ; C. 194K. 14-4-15. Adopt iouCs.'J. 
.. ,
 >T . - ( M . S . Adoption of Persons 8 49. 
Compiler s Notes. • x 
The b racke ted word " e x c e p t " na> in 
sorted by the compiler to eorn-ct an el i d 
in spel l ing. 
ci[AITKIN ;:i 
AKIUTKATIOX 
Section TSi' . l-l . W r i t ten ac>i cement for Kn forcrable l imited ritfht to revoke. 
76-31-2. Conten t s . 
7S-:U-:i. " C o u r t " defined. 
7S :i 1 4. A r b i t i a t o i s Appoin tment by finiit on appl ica t ion . 
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7S ;i|.."i. A|»|»li. ulioit lii be HI U I «iui^. 
7 8 - 3 l b . Hearings--- T i m e - Not i •••# - — I'o.si | I«»II«* iti i%n f. 
7H-iU-7. Fa i lu re of par ly to appea l . 
78-31-8. Award—Tiim» for making . 
78-31-9. Represen ta t ion of pa r t i e s Hy a t to rney . 
78-31-10. Wi tnesses—Subpoena Fees - Contempt . 
78-31-11. Deposi t ions . 
78 .'U-lL\ Conserva t ion of proper ly pendente l i te. 
78-31-13. S u b m i t t i n g law ques t ions to court . 
78-31-14. A w a r d — F o r m . 
78-3115. Confirmation or moditieat ion l>y roui t on motion. 
78-31-lf). V a c a t i n g by court - C r o u m K 
78-31-17. Modification by court --C> rounds. 
78-31-18. Not ice of motion - S tay . 
78 31-19. Decree of court . 
78-31-20. Record to be filed with clerk of court-- -Kntry of j u d g m e n t . 
78-31-21. J u d g m e n t —Force and effect. 
78-31-22. Appea l s . 
78-31-1. Written agreement for—Enforceable limited right to revoke.— 
Two or more parties may a^rcc in -writinj; to submit to arbitration, in 
conformity with the provisions of this rhaptcr, any m u t r o w r s y existing 
betweeti them at the time of tin* agreement to submit, or they may njrm» 
to submit to arbitration any rontroversy which may arise in the future. 
Such an agreement shall be valid ami enfoiveahle, ami no party shall have 
the power to revoke the submission without the consent of the other 
parties to the submission, exeept upon sueh grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the rescission or revocation of any contract. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 11H3, Policy I lint work terms and condi t ions 
Supp., 104-31-1; L. 1977, ch. 142, § 1. should result from vo lun tn rv ag reemen t , 
3 1 '.Mi |. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is ident ica l to former see- ll-i 'o. 't 
tion 104-;UV1 (Code l'.Mi'n winch was re 
pealed by Laws U».r)l, eh. .">S, $ ,'i. 
Tho 1077 (intendment added "or they 
may agree to submit to a rb i t r a t i on any F u t u r e d i spu tes , 
cont roversy which may arise in the fu 
t u r e " to the first sen tence . 
Public t rans i t d is t r ic t labor d i spu tes . 
Water disputes , informal a rb i t r a t i on by 
st a te engineer , "."• - lb. 
Comparable Provisions. 
This chap te r is based on the 11*25 Uni-
form Arb i t r a t i on Act vv Iiit-h has been 
w i t h d r a w n bv the Na t i ona l Conference 
An agreement to a l b i l r a f e a fu ture (lis 
pule is inval id and unenforceable . Shu-
maker v. l ' t e \ K\ ploial ion Co., 1;""»7 F. 
Supp. .KS. 
l ' l ov i s i iu^ of bylaw i of nil pom t ion for 
the appi a i s eunn l of values of capi ta l stock 
Of Commissioner* on V n i f o n n S t a t e Laws " f ^»« 'kholder des i r ing to sell or t rans fe r 
as superseded bv the liKni I ' m f o r m Arl.i , l Vx* " , . , , / " ' ; , - f i V r ' u , , , a f ° ' ' l , H '1 a r l M * 
*: A • * t ra t ion ot fu ture d isputes . S h u m a k e r v. 
t r a
" "
n A
' ' ' ' n , . x Kx,.loti n ( V , |.'.7 K. K,.,.,.. IM. 
CroSS-References. Whether an agreement is one to arbi-
Aui rmat ive defense, a r b i t r a t i o n and , , ; l h ' fu ture d e p u t e s should depend upon 
award as , Rules of Civil P rocedure , Rule i ts prospect ive opera t ion at time, of .agree-
g(*\ iiient and not upon whether in l ight of 
Board of labor, conci l ia t ion and a rb i t r a - subsequent deve lopments it l a te r appea r s 
tion, Const. Ar t . X V i , § 2. "*' v i t- '» l i»»Po r f t o t l , , > P i t i e s . S h u m a k e r 
Fees as full compensa t ion for s t a t u t o r y v- t ' t ex Kxpbuat ion Co., lf>7 F. Supp . ti«. 
boards of a r b i t r a t i o n , Const . Ar t . X X I , § - . This section provides for a r b i t r a t i o n of 
Fire f ighters ' nego t i a t ions , ;U-'j0a-7 to d isputes ex is t ing at the t ime the agree 
34-20a-9. ment to a r b i t r a t e is made which sliall be 
Indus t r i a l commission to promote volun b ind ing «ui the p a r l i e s ; it does not apply 
tarv a rb i t r a t i on of labor d isputes , 3f>-l-lt>. u» ag reemen t s to a r b i t r a t e fu ture d i spu tes ; 
Pa r tne r sh ip , hingle p a r t n e r may not sub *m-h a^ ieemei i l s do not oust the r o u t t s 
mit to a r b i t r a t i o n , 18-1-0, o( jui isdict ion. Juhnson v. Jiriukcrhoft", 
:iG.r> 
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S!> P . .V.n, :»7 P. 2d 1132, cons t ru ing R. S. 
P.KU, § 104 3»; i . 
In absence of s t a t u t e to tin- c o n t r a r y , an 
agreement to a r b i t r a t e fu ture d i sputes 
a r i s ing under a contrac t dors not bar an 
ac t ion on tin* cont rac t involv ing such 
d e p u t e * L a t t e r v. Holsum Bread Co., 
1US P . 3f>4, 100 P. 2d 421. See concur r ing 
opinion of J u s t i c e Wolfe, commen t ing on 
R. s. \\m, § KM-at; l. 
In su rance policy provision requ i r ing 
compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n and se t t lement of 
any d i spu te as to insured 's r ight to re-
e o \ e r under un insured -motorist clause was 
void, and insured 's refusal to submit to 
a r b i t r a t i o n did not preclude recourse to 
cour ts . Ilartiliart v. Civil Service I'm 
ployees Ins. Co., Hi I ' . (2*1) ~'->;{. : ; i > s l>-
2d *S73, d i s t inguished in 28 I ' . (2d) 112, 
4iW P. 2d 124/ 
Judicial review. 
Ordinar i ly a court ha* no a u t h o r i t y to 
review the act ion of a r b i t r a t o r s or to 
s u b s t i t u t e its conclusion for that of arbi-
t r a t o r s a c t i n g honestly and wi thin scope 
of the i r a u t h o r i t y , n r h i t i a t i o n being fa-
vored in the law as a speedy and inexpen-
sive method of a d j u d i c a t i n g differences by 
a t r i buna l whose nwaid is tinal and persons 
be ing encouraged to resort to it. ( i ian-
nopulos v. Pappas , M» I ' . 442, If) I'. 2d 
.153, a p p l y i n g Laws 1 i»—7, eh. t)2, § L 
Plaintiff who submi t t ed issue of wrong-
ful d i scharge to a r b i t r a t i o n pursuan t to 
his employment con t rac t , but d isagreed 
with deciMon of a r b i t r a t o r s , was not en-
t i t led to judic ia l review. Vos v. I ML 
Pre igh t , Inc., 53 1 P. 2d Sti5. ( Ju s t i ce 
Crocket t concur r ing specially and reaf-
firming views he .set foi th in Harnhar t 
v. Civil Service Pmplovees Ins. Co., 10 
v. (LM) 22:1, ;u>s P . 2d s73.) 
Col la tera l References . 
Arb i t r a t ion and AwardC~>5 10. 
ti C.J.S. Arb i t r a t ion $ 11 et seip 
5 Am. J u r . 'Jd 522 et seq.. Arb i t r a t ion 
and Award § 0 et sei|. 
A b a n d o n m e n t by mutual consent of 
award under a r b i t r a t i o n , 32 A. L. R. 13«>5. 
Agreement to a r b i t r a t e fu ture contro-
versies as b ind ing upon in fan t s , "S A. L. 
H. 2.1 1292. 
Appea lab i l i ty of order or decree com-
pell ing or refus ing to » empel a r b i t r a t i o n , 
1M A. L. U. I'd 1071. 
Arb i t r a t ion agreement made pending 
act ion, 42 A. L. R. 727. 
A r b i t r a t i o n of d i spu tes wi th in close 
corpora t ions , (II A. L. K. 2d l»43. 
Arb i t r a t i on of issues or tjiiestions per 
t a i n iug to p roba te ma t t e r s , 104 A. L. R. 
35D. 
A i b i t t a t i o u provis ions of con t r ac t as 
a \ a i l a b l e to or agains t ass ignee, 142 A. 
L. R. I<'!>2. 
A\ .nlabiiity and scopo of declaratory 
j udgment ac t ions in d e t e r m i n i n g r igh t s 
of par t i es , or powers mid excrctso thereof 
by a r b i t r a t o r s , under a r b i t r a t i o n agree-
ments , 12 A. L. R. 3d 854. 
Preach or r epud ia t ion of col lect ive labor 
cont rac t as subject to, or as affect ing r igh t 
to enforce , a r b i t r a t i o n provis ion in con-
t rac t , 2i> A. L. R. 3d t>88. 
Preach or repudia t ion of con t r ac t as af-
fect ing right to enforce a r b i t r a t i o n clause 
there in , .'52 A. L. U. 3d 377. 
Claim of fraud in inducement of con-
tract as subject to compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n 
clause conta ined in con t rac t , 01 A. L. H. 
2d !>3ti. 
Cons t i t u t iona l i t y of a r b i t r a t i o n s t a t u t e s , 
55 A. L. R. 2d 132. 
Contract p rov id ing t h a t i t is governed 
b \ or subject to rule* or r egu la t ions of 
a pa r t i cu la r t r ade , business , or associa-
tion as incorpora t ing a g r e e m e n t to arbi-
t r a t e , 0 A. L. R. 2d 872. 
Con! t ac tua l provision for d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
by a r b i t r a t o r s of the price to be pa id for 
proper ty , or amount of damages for 
b ieach , as c o n t e m p l a t i n g formal a r b i t r a -
t ion, or the ind iv idua l j u d g m e n t of the 
a r b i t r a t o r s , 157 A. L. R. 1286. 
Covenant in lease to a r b i t r a t e , or to 
submit to appra i sa l , as r u n n i n g wi th the 
leasehold so as to bind ass ignee , 81 A. 
L. R. 2d 804. 
h e a t h of pa r ty to a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t 
before award as revocat ion or t e r m i n a t i o n 
• •I" submission, 03 A. L. R. 2d 754. 
Delay in a s se r t ing con t r ac tua l r ight to 
a r b i t r a t i o n as p rec lud ing enforcement 
thereof, 25 A. L. R. 3d 1171. 
D< mnnd for or submission to a r b i t r a t i o n 
as affecting enforcement of mechanics ' 
lien. 73 A. L. R. 3d 1042. 
Dissolved corpora t ion ' s power to par-
t i c ipa te in a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings , 71 A. 
L. R. 2d 1121. 
La forcemeat of con t r ac tua l a r b i t r a t i o n 
d a i i s r MS affected by exp i ra t ion of con-
t ract pr ior to demand for a r b i t r a t i o n , 5 
A. L R. 3d 1008. 
Pi l ing of mechanics ' lien or proceeding 
for its enforcement as affecting r igh t to 
a r b i t r a t i o n , 73 A. L. R. 3d 1060. 
Laches or s t a t u t e of l imi ta t ions as b a r 
to arl.it ra t ion under ag reemen t , 37 A. L. R. 
2d 1125. 
Municipal corpora t ion ' s power to submi t 
to a r b i t r a t i o n , 2<» A. L. R. 3d 5(i9. 
Pa r t i c ipa t ion in a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings 
as waiver of objec t ions to a r b i t r a b i l i t y , 
33 A. L. R. 3d 1242. 
Power of pres ident of corpora t ion to 
commence or to car ry on a r b i t r a t i o n pro-
ceedings , o5 A. L. R. 2d 1321. 
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Privileged nature of rutntniinicatinnfi Validity :in«I enforceability of provision 
made in course of grievance or nrbitra* for binding nrl.it ration, and waiver there-
tion procedure provided for by collective of, 2 1 A. L. K. '.U\ Li2.r>. 
bargaining agreement, t>0 A. L. U. \U\ SR"». Validity of agreements to arbitrnto dis-
State court's power tu consolidate inbi- putcs generally a* a condition precedent 
tration proceedings, t'»4 A. I,. K. ,U\ f»2N. to the bringing of an action, 2b' A. L. K. 
Validity and construction of provision h»77. 
for arbitration of di*putc* as to alimony Validity of agiernwnt to submit all fn 
or support payments, or child visitation or t.i.re questions to arbitration, J35 A. L. 
custody matters, 18 A. L. K. 3d 12(>t. K. 7i>. 
Validity and effect, and remedy in re Waiver of arbitration provision in con-
spect, of "contractual stipulation to submit tract. 117 A. L. K. 1101, 101 A. L. K. M2G. 
disputes to arbitraliun in another juris-
diction, 12 A. L. R. 3d S<)2. 
DECISIONS UNDKR FOKMKU LAW 
Construction. liberally construed. Kichnrds v. Smith, 33 
Submissions to arbitration were to be IT. S, JM* T. iiS3. npplyinjj K. H. 1H98, § 3223. 
78-31-2. Contents.—The arbitration agreement must state the question 
or questions in controversy with sufficient defmiteness to present one or 
more issues or questions upon which an award may he based. 
History: L. 1051, ch. 58, §1; 0. 11)43, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-2. Arbitration and AwnrUOG. 
Compiler's Notes. !! 7 s - ?rM,r; ,1 , i ,^J , \ p | . P ; . 
r
 a Am. dur. 2d f»27, Arbitration nnd 
This section is identical to former see- \ w a r d S U 
tion 104-36-2 (Code 1<M3) which was re-
pealed by Laws li>51, ch. 5S, §3. 
78-31-3. "Court" defined.—The term "court" when used in this chapter 
means a district court having jurisdiction of the parties nnd of the subject 
matter. 
History: L. 1951, ch. f>8( § 1 ; C. 1043, Compiler's Notes. 
Slippy 104-31-3. 'j'his see tion i»» identical to former sec-
tion HH ;H» 3 H\H\C llM.'t) which was re 
praled by Laws lH.'.l, ch. ;.S, §3 . 
78-31-4. Arbitrators—Appointment by court on application.—Upon the 
application in writing of any party to the arbitration agreement, and 
upon notice to the other parties thereto, the. court shall appoint an 
arbitrator or arbi trators in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the arbitration agreement docs not prescribe a method for 
the appointment of arbitrators, in whieh case the arbitration shall be 
by three arbitrators. 
(2) When the arbitration agreement does prescribe a method for the 
appointment of arbitrators, and the arbitrators or any of them have not 
been appointed and the time within which they should have been appointed 
has expired. 
(3) When any arbitrator fails or is otherwise unable to act, and his 
successor has not been appointed in the manner in which lie was appointed. 
Arbitrators appointed by the court shall have the same powers as if 
their appointment had been made in accordance with the agreement to 
arbitrate. 
367 
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Hifltory: L. 1051, ch. f>8, § 1 ; C. 1943, I ' M ' J S . Arb i t r a t i on § 00. 
Supp., 104-31-4. -
 A m j u r 5 8 4 A r b i t r a t i o n and Award 
S Mr.. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is ident ica l to former sec V ; , l i , l i i v and effort of a r b i t r a t i o n agrec-
turn KM JUS 4 (Code I1M3) which was re „ i r n ( provision t h a t , upon one p a r t y ' s 
pealed by Laws PJ.11, ch. M, § 3 . fai lure to appoin t a r b i t r a t o r , con t roversy 
may he de te rmined by a r b i t r a t o r a p p o i n t e d 
Collateral References. 
A r b i t r a t i o n and A w a r d C - ^ d 
by other p a r t y , 17 A. L. K. 2d 1340. 
78-31-5. Application to be in writing.—Any application made under 
authority of this chapter shall be made in writing and heard in a summary 
way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rules of court 
for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly 
provided. 
H i s t o r y : L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 19-13, Civil P rocedure , Kules 6 ( b ) , (&), ( c ) , 
Supp. , 104-31-5. ' 7 ( b ) , 13(e) . 
Compiler's Notos. Collateral References. 
This srr t ioi i is ident ical to former sec- Arb i t r a t ion ami A w a r d C ^ G . 
tion HM-3b ,1 (Code PJ43) which was re- d ( M . S . A r b i t r a t i o n § <>0. 
pealed by Laws PJ.11, ch. 5**, § 3 . .1 Am. J u r . I'd f»S4, A r b i t r a t i o n and 
Cross-Refcrence. 
Motions and orders genera l ly , Kules of 
Award § St). 
78-31-6. Hearings — Time — Notice — Postponement. — The arbi-
trators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and notify the parties 
thereof, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time if necessary, and, 
on application of either party and for good! cause, may postpone the 
hearing to a time not extendinir beyond the date fixed for making the 
award. 
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, on their proofs, and it is the du ty of 
Supp., 104 31-6. a i b i h a t i . r * to hear all the evidence nut-
t r i m I to the m a t t e r in con t rove r s v. ( i ian-
Compiler ' s Notos . n„pub,s v. Pappas , so I ' . 442, 1*5 P. I'd 
This section is ident ica l to former sec- 3.V., app ly ing Laws PJ27, ch. 02. 
tion MM .".»; f. (Code l'.M.H which was re 
pealed by Laws 11)51, ch. ,1M, § 3 . Col la te ra l References . 
Admiss ion of not ice . 
Arb i t r a t ion and AwanlC^. 'U, 32. 
«'» ( M . S . Arb i t r a t ion § 79 et s c p 
It is sufiieicnt if pa r t i e s admit in the i r ." Am. J u r . 2d blM, A r b i t r a t i o n and 
p leadings not ice of mee t ing of board of Award §§114 l i b . 
a r b i t r a t o r s . Ciiannopulos v. P a p p a s , SO V 
4 12. J . I P. 2d 353, app ly ing Laws 1927, Insu rance : necessi ty and suflieiency of 
oh. t>2. notice of and hea r ing in p roceed ings before 
appra i se r s and a r b i t r a t o r s appo in ted to 
R i g h t to produce ev idence a n d be hea rd . de te rmine amoun t of loss, 25 A. L. K. 3d 
The pa r t i e s have a right to be heard f»S0. 
D I V I S I O N S P N h K K P o K M K R LAW 
Fa i lu r e to file submission before hear ing , acqu i r ing jurisdict ion unti l filed, and did 
1'nder K. S. IS9S, §3223 , the effect of not affeet right of a r b i t r a t o r s to proceed 
fai lure to lib* submission in court before to hear ing . Richards v. Smi th , 33 lT. 8, 
hea r ing was only to permit pa r t i es to !>1 P. f>s;t. 
revoke submission and prevent court from 
;*G8 
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78-31-7. Failure of party to appear.—If any party neglects to appear 
before the arbitrators after reasonable not ire, the arbitrators may never-
theless proceed to hear and del ermine the controversy upon the evidence 
which is produced before them. 
History: L. 1001, ch. 58, §1; C. 11)43, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-7. Arb i t r a t ion ;ni<l A\vardC=>31. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Th'iH section is ident ica l to former sec-
tion 104 ar>-7 (Code liM3) which was 
repented by Laws li»r»l, ch. ">S, § 3. 
«» <.'..).S. At h i t i a t ion § s J. 
."» Am. .lur. L'd On 7, Arbit rat ion and 
Award § IIS. 
78-31-8. Award—Time for making.—If the time within which the 
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration agreement, the award 
must be made within sixty days from the time of the appointment of the 
arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of sixty days shall have 
no legal effect, unless the parties extend the time in which Haiti award 
may be made, which extension, or any ratification, shall be in writing. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, ('» C..J.K. Arbit rat ion § 97. 
Supp., 104-31-8. f> Am. ,inr. LM 015, Arb i t r a t i on and 
Compiler's Notes. 
Award § l'J 
Thin section i* ident ical to former *<*<• Const ruct ion ami eflYct of con t r ac tua l 
tion 104-30 8 (Code P.M.'I) which was re <>i s t a tu to ry piovi.sionM fixing t ime within 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. ">s, § 3 . which a i l u t r a t i o n award must, be made, f>0 
A. I.. K. 3d Sl.r>. 
Collateral References. 
Arb i t r a t ion ami A\vardC=>f>0. 
78-31-9. Representation of parties—By attorney.—No one other than 
a party to the arbitration, or a person regularly employed by such party 
for other purposes, or a practicing attorney <tt law, shall be permitted by 
the arbitrator or arbitrators to represent before him or them any party 
to the arbitration. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Col la teral References . 
Supp., 104-31-9. ' Arb i t ra t ion and A \ v a n l 0 3 1 . 
., , „ .
 m 0 C..J.S. Arbit tat ion S HI. 
Compilers Notes. .
 A m l u r ^ J^ A r l ) i t r u t i o n a m l 
Thin section is ident ica l to former sec \ w i n l ^ 11,! 
tion UN-Mi) (( 'ode 1013) u h i e h was re ' S 
pealed by Laws l!»,r.|, ch. T.S, $ 3. 
78-31-10. Witnesses—Subpoena—Fees—Contempt.—The arbitrator or 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, may require any person to attend 
before him or them as a witness, and to bring with him any book or writing 
or other evidence. The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the 
fees of witnesses in courts of general jurisdiction. A subpoena shall issue 
in the name of the arbi t rator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and 
shall be signed by the arbi trator or arbitrators, or a 'major i ty of them, 
shall be directed to the person and shall be served in the same manner 
as a subpoena to testify before a district court. Tf any person so sum-
moned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey such subpoena, the eourt 
may, upon petition, compel the attendance of such person before the 
arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person for contempt in the same 
.%9 
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manner as is provided lor the attendance of witnesses or the punishment 
for their failure to attend district courts. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, Subpoenas, Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Supp., 104-31-10. Kulc 45. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Witnesses* fees, 21-5-4. 
Collateral References. 
This section is identical to former sec- . , - . . . , . ,^-, r t r t *, 
tiun 11H-3II-10 (Code I1M3) whk-h wn* '}[1"™U"'\ "Bl« Awnr.|«=»20, 31. 
repealed bv Law* 11.51. ch. 58, §3 . ft C.T.b. Arl„tration § 87. 
1
 ' ' * ;> Am. Jur. 2d b()9, Arbitration and 
Cross-References. i w n r i ^ ** 
Contempt generally, 78 32 I et acq. Liability of parties to arbitration for 
Contempt of process of nonjudicial ofli- costs, fees, and expenses, 57 A. L. R. 3d 
ecr, 78 31! 15. 033. 
78-31-11. Depositions.—Depositions may be taken with or without a 
commission in the same manner and for the same reasons as provided 
by law for the taking of depositions. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-11. Arbitration and A\»nrdC=»31. 
Compiler's Notes. ,; C.J.N. Arbitration §87. 
Except for the deletion of "in actions r> Am. Jur. 2d 002, Arbitration and 
pending in the district court*" from the. Award § lit). 
end, this section is identical to former 
noction KM 30 11 (Code P.MiH which was . . . . , , .. ,.
 nrfx 
. . . , , , .-. , r . , ., IhNcoverv in aid of arbitration pro-
repealed bv Laws 191)1, en. f>\ $ 3. ,. 'u v r „ „ , 1 0 ,~ * r
 • • J» ceedings, 98 A. L. K. 2d 124/. 
Cross-Rofcrcnce. 
Depositions and discovery generally, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Kulcs 20 to 37. 
78-31-12. Conservation of property pendente lite.—At any time before 
final determination of the arbitration the court may, upon application of 
a party to the submission, make such order or decree or take such pro-
ceedings as it may deem necessary for the preservation of the property 
or for securing satisfaction of the award. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104 3112. Arbitration and A\vardC=>31. 
_ .. , ._ . 0 C..J.S. Arbitration S 09. 
Compiler s Notes. - . , ,,, , A . , ., .. „ „ .* 
~ .» Am. .lur. 2d >>Xit Arbitration ana 
This wet ion is ideulical to ("miner MM1 
tion 104-30-12 (Code 1943) which was r< 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 5S, § 3. 
Award § 90  
78-31-13. Submitting law questions to court.—The arbitrators may on 
their own motion, and shall by request of a party to the arbi t ra t ion: 
(1) At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law 
arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion of the court, stating 
the facts upon which the (jucstion arises, and such opinion when given 
shall bind the arbitrators in the making of their award. 
(2) State their final award, in the form of findings of fact, for the 
opinion of the court on the questions of taw arising on the hearing. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Supp., 104-31-13. This section is identical to former sec-
370 
A 8 6 
A R M T R A T I O N 78-31-15 
t ion 104-3G-13 (Code 1043) which was re Necessi ty tlint a r b i t r a t o r s , in m a k i n g 
pentad by Laws 1051, ch. f»H, § 3 . HWHIIIK, make specific or deta i led (ladings 
of f;»i*t or conclusions of law, 82 A. L. R. 
Collateral Roferencea. ^\ <H;<| 
A r b i t r a t i o n and A w n r d C ^ U . Waiver , or estoppel to asser t , subs tan-
6 C.J.S. A r b i t r a t i o n and Award §§ wf*, l ive right or r ight to a r b i t r a t e as quest ion 
120. Vl for court or a r b i t r a t o r , 2(> A. I,. R. 3d 604. 
5 Am. J u r . 2d 021, A r b i t r a t i o n and 
Award § 140. 
78-31-14. Award—Form.—The award of the arbitrators, or of a ma-
jority of them, shall be drawn up in writing and signed by the arbitrators, 
or a majority of them. The award shall definitely deal with all matters 
of difference in the submission requiring settlement, but the arbitrators 
may, in their diseretion, first make a partial award, whieh shall be enforce-
able in the same manner as the final award. Upon the making of an 
award the arbitrators shall deliver a true copy thereof to each of the 
parties thereto, or their attorneys, without delay. 
History: L. 1061, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0 . 1943, sum of money is due, such (hiding or 
Supp., 104-31-14. award is an indicat ion of a full and com-
plete execut ion of the submission, (linn-
Oompiler's Notes . nopulos v. Pappas , 80 C. 442, 15 I \ 2d 3.13, 
Tins section is ident ica l to former sec- app ly ing Law s 1!>27, ch. (>2. 
tion 104 3<M4 (Code li>43) which was re-
pealed by L a w s 1951, ch. 58, § 3 . Col la tera l References . 
Arb i t r a t i on and AwardC= 3 5l . 
Effect and conclusiveness of award. „ , < ) J S Arbitration § !>r> et scq. 
The a w a r d of a r b i t r a t o r s , a c t i ng wi th in 5 Am. .lur. 2d 613, A r b i t r a t i o n and 
the scope of the i r a u t h o r i t y , de te rmines Award § 125. 
the r igh t s of the pa r t i e s to it as ellieientlv 
as a j udgmen t secured by legal procedure , Comment n o t e : d e t e r m i n a t i o n of va l id i ty 
and 19 b ind ing on the pa r t i e s unti l set of a rb i t r a t i on award under requ i rement 
aside or i ts va l id i ty is ques t ioned i» some that a r b i t r a t o r s shall pass on all m a t t e r s 
proper manner . Giannopulos v. Pappas , 80 submi t t ed , 3l> 'A. L. R. 3d G49. 
U. 442, 15 1*. 2d 353, app ly ing Laws 1927, Concurrence of all a r b i t r a t o r s as con-
ch. 62. ' ditioti of b ind ing award , 77 A. U. R. 838. 
Power of a r b i t r a t o r s to award injunc* 
partial award.
 t j o l l f 7o A. T , . T». O ( 1 1 0 5 5 
This section makes provision for a par- (Quotient a rb i t r a t i on award or appra i sa l , 
tial award , which shal l have the samo 20 A. I,. R. 2d i»5M. 
effect as a final a w a r d , and j udgmen t may Right of a r b i t r a t o r s to act on thei r own 
be entered for that par t thereof which is Knowledge of facts , or factors relevant, 
final. Giannopulos v. P a p p u s , 80 V. 442, to quest ions submi t t ed to them, in absence 
454, 15 P . 2d 353, a p p l y i n g Laws 1927, of evidence in that regard , 154 A. L. R. 
Ch. f>2. " 1210. 
Where a r b i t r a t o r s find tha t a ce r ta in 
78-31-15. Confirmation or modification by court on motion.—At any 
time within three months after the award is made, unless the parties 
shall extend the time in writing, any party to the arbitration may apply 
to the court for an order eon firming the award, and the eourt shall grant 
such an order, unless the award is vacated, modified or eorrceted as 
provided in the next two sueeeeding sections [7S-31-K), 78-31-17]. Notice 
in writing of the motion must be served upon the adverse party, or his 
attorney, five days before the hearing thereof. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
Suppt 104-31-15. This section is ident ical to former sec-
tion 1(» 1 ".«'» 1." (Code 1913) which was re-
pealed by Law- P.CI, ch. f.S, § 3. 
371 
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78-31-16 JUDICIAL COOK 
Colla tera l Reference*. A |»|»«-:i 1 :i 1 >iI * t y of judgment confirming or 
Arb i t r a t i on and AwardC=>72. M' thng aside a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d , 7 A. L. K. 
f. P..LN. Arb i t r a t i on § I'ja et se.j 3d f«as. 
"» Am. J u r . 2d L2f\ A rl.it rat ion and Turn' for i tn JM ach ing ail . i t rat ion award , 
Award § 145. s;> A. L. L\ 2d 779. 
78 31 16. Vacating by court—Grounds.—In any of the following cases 
the eourt shall, after notice and hearing, make an order vacating the 
award, upon the application of any party to the arbi t ra t ion: 
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other 
undue means. 
(12) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or cither of them. 
{'.\) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing upon sufficient, cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party ha \e been prejudiced. 
(1) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
Where an award is vacated, and the time within which the agreement 
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its 
discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 
H i s t o r y : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, F raud , bad fa i th or misconduct . 
Supp. , 104-31-16. Prnud. Lad fa i th , and pre judic ia l im-
_ , ,
 %r . posit inn will v i t i a t e a w a r d , even though 
Compiler s Notes . ' . ,. , • • • ,
 t U . *. 
r
 contrac t of submission provides t ha t such 
Tins section is ident ical t«» former sec-
 : i w . , r , | , s i I M | | i,M, : 1hsolutc and conclusive 
lion HM 3b Hi (Cod,. 1913) which was ami wit hoof appea l . HivariH v. P t n h Lake 
repealed by Laws P.».r.l, eh. 5S, § 3 . p . , , , ^
 W n t e r \ Power Po., 53 V. 601, 174 AdmiHHihility of nffldavit or t e s t imony of IV I ll'b, app ly ing P. L. 1907, § 322S. 
a r b i t r a t o r . " "M<> l , ; i r l V , " a r b i t r a t i o n ag reemen t 
requests one of three a r L i t r a t o r s for fur-
ther t ime to present cer ta in t es t imony, 
and is assured l>v a r b i t r a t o r t h a t he 
While an a r b i t r a t o r may not by affidavit 
or t e s t imony impeach hi* own award or 
sliow fraud or misconduct on the part of , . , » ,, 
., . .. ,. ,, , \ would In* 1'ivt'ii an oppor tun i ty before the the a r b i t r a t o r s „ r anv o| them. I t^ lnnci iy K » > • # l l f .o1„-
n . . • . i t i award w i s made to present .such fur ther or affidavit ot an a iL i t r a to r IN admisMble ' . 
, , , . , , , .. , , evidence, which promise the a r b i t r a t o r to es ta ld ish what m a t t e r s were presentee! ' 
, . i i i ,i i , , i «t«« ""* keep, MIHI did not even convey to and considered, bv the a r b i t r a t o r s , and . . ,i . •» , i • liiest to o ther a r b i t r a t o r s , such mis-
anv a r b i t r a t o r is a competent wi tness to 
es tabl ish sueli facts, ( l iannopulos v. Pap 
pas . Si) P . 4-1:.', !."• P. I'd ."..VI, app ly ing Laws 
1927, ch. i>2. 
behavior comes wi th in subd, (3 ) . Gian-
nopulos \ . Pappns , SO P . 442, 15 P. 2d 353, 
app ly ing Laws 1927, ch. 02. 
Hefore misconduct of a r L i t r a t o r s under 
D i s r ega rd of evidence . subd. (3) will afford ground for v a c a t i n g 
Refusal to review mater ia l tes t imony is award , it must appea r tha t " t h e r i gh t s of 
such misconduct as affords sufficient ;iM.v P : , r , v '»''ivc •»',,,» pre jud iced ." Oian-
ground for se t t ing aside the award . For nopulos v. Papas . SO P . 442, 15" I*. 2d 353, 
example , subs t an t i a l pre judice may be apply ing La ws 1927, ch. f>2. 
suffered by one of the par t ies bv the 
fai lure or" refusal of a r b i t r a t o r s to con- Mot ion to v a c a t e . 
sider i tems of expense properly admis Mater ia l and competen t s t a t e m e n t of 
.sible in ev idence , or lo consider a p u t facts con ta ined in motion to vaca te , and 
nership agreement between the par t ies .
 Ml the suppor t ing affidavits, if not denied, 
or to consider a lease. (i ia nimpulos v. must l e taheu as t rue . OinnnopuloR V. 
Pappa.M, MO P. I L \ |."i P. :M :;.*..{. app ly ing Pappa*. so P. | | 2 , 15 P. 2<l 353, apply ing 
Laws l!»J7. ch. til'. Laws 1P:»7. ch. n2. 
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ARBITRATION 78-31-17 
A plonking denomina ted :in . 'iiisurr may. Oidin u i l \ ;i nni r l has no an thn r i t y to 
in legal effect, be regarded as a motion re \ -cw tin- a n i o n of a r b i t r a t o r s to e o n e e t 
to vaca t e tlio award when* it aflirmat ivel\ error- »»r to >ul>sfitute its conclusion for 
Hot* out reasons why Much should be done. !hal ,.f the arbi t ra tor- , a c t i ng honestly 
and p rays that the award bo vaca ted an.I . 11 n I within I In- -cope oi' the i r au tho r i t y , 
that plaintiff t ake no th ing . 1 u other words, t. I.,I, n..|..;!,.>, \ . Papp.i*. sn 1". It; ', 1". P. LM 
the court may look at subs tance rathet ;'.'>.'.. a p p ! \ i u g Law* I'.cj;, ch. •'•'_'. 
thnr. the form of the d... urn. nt l . ro i 
uopulos v. l ' appas , so r . 4 I'J. i;. I \ Jd XV.. Col la tera l References, 
app ly ing L a w s 10-7, eh. 02. A i lot i at inti and A w a i .10 "^ 7*< s*j. 
li C.I .S. A rt.it rat ion § i t!» e? s»«|. 
S t a t u t o r y g rounds as exclus ive . :. Am. .lur. D«l fh3 ei se«p, Arb i t r a t ion 
No o ther g rounds for vaca t ing o; sett nig • "" ' Aw aid § 107 el so<p ^ 
aside an award than those specified in this ' 7 . ,
 A . . 
soetion r an he t aken a d N a u l a , , of (..;... *•»'«»••«»»•" .-O.IMUII,.! ....» with outs ider 
nopulos v. Pappus , SO l \ 44L\ 15 P. :M ;;;,;>, , , r ^"tst.U-r^ a , misconduct j u s t . t y i n g vaca-
npply ing Laws 1<VJ7, <h. fej. t , o : i u f a W : n ' 1 - , 7 A ; *'• K- "<] ]Ml~-
Arb i t r a to r ' s v iewing or v i s i t ing premises 
Vacation of awards in general. <»r property alone as misconduct justifying 
Award* will „.. | he d is turbed on account * • " • • ' " " " "»' < " ; ' " h -• A '•• »*• - I Uli.i. 
of i r r egu la r i t i e s or informal i t ics, o' he- Improper a t t empt by influencing -or by 
cause court does not agree with award . a M erupt iug ! o i u liuence dt CIMOII as gr otind 
so long as proceeding lias been fair and 1*«»»' revocat ion of ai hit rat ion, or for nvoid-
honest , and subs t an t i a l l igh ts ,.f par l ies ance ,.( aw ai d the reunder , H A. L. R. ]0S2. 
have lieen respeeted. L i \ a n > v. I tali l a k e S e t t i n g a-ide a rb i t r a t i on award on 
Laud. W a t e r A Power <'.» , .',;< !' iii)|, 17 1 , : i ,„, , ,d ..f . n t . - n s | ,,r bias «.f a i lot r a I or N 
J*. llL't), app ly ing ('. L. I«M#7. $ .'I'JJ^. :>n A. I. R. ,:d o«i7. 
78-31-17. Modification by court—Grounds.—In any of tin* following 
cases the court shall, after notice and hearing, make an order modifying 
or correcting the award upon the application of any party to tin* arbi-
trat ion: 
(1) Where there was an evident misralcnlat ion i>\' figures, or an 
evident mistake in the description of any person, tiling or property, 
referred to in the award. 
(2) Where the arbitrators II.INC awarded upon a matter not submitted 
to them. 
(in Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not aiTeetin<_r 
the merits of the controversy. 
The order must modify and correct the award so as to eilVet the intent 
thereof. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1043, or , lar ill. a t om. P e c a n s of ambigu i ty or 
Supp., 104-31-17. error in. or omission from, a rb i t r a t i on 
. i w a i d . i'7 \ . L. R. ad L'tMI. 
Compiler's Notes . his . jual i t ieat iou of a r b i t r a t o r hy court 
Thin section is ident ical to former see i.r *lay of a rb i t r a t i on pi ocerd ings prior 
tion 104-3G-17 (Code 1JM3) which was re- to award on ground of in teres t , Lias, preju-
pcnled hv Laws 1P51, ch. 5-S, § ,'t. dice, collusion o'- h a n d of a r t i l l a lo r s , li.i* 
A. L. R. iM Tar,. 
CoUtteraa Eeferences . Power of a - h i t r a t o r to r . , n«v t , or power 
Arb i t r a t ion anil AwnrdC=»72. of rnnrt ti» correct or resubmit , nonlahor 
6 C.J.S. Arb i t r a t i on §§ ir>4-l.r»<), H».S. a w a r d because of incompleteness or fai lure 
5 Am. .Lir. 'Id G'J'i, Arb i t r a t i on and In pass
 (Mi all m a t t e r s submi t ted , 'M> A. L. 
Award § 145. R. :u\ !»:e.». 
Q u o t i e n t a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d or a p p r a i s a l , 
Comment no t e : power of court to re -u\ A. L. R '.'d '.'.»s. 
suhmit inn t t r r to a r b i t r a t o r s for l o r r e d i o n 
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78-31-18 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-31-18. Notice of motion—Stay.—Notice of a motion to vacate, mod-
ify or correct an award shall be served upon the adverse par ty or his 
at torney, within three months after an award is filed or delivered, as 
prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in a civil action. For 
the purposes of the motion any jud^e who might make an order to stay 
the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an 
order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of 
the adverse party to enforce the award. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Cross-Reference. 
Bupp., 104-31-18. Service of notices, Kules of Civil Pro-
Compiler's Notes, ceilnre. Rule 6 ( d ) , ( e ) . 
Thin section is ident ical to former nee Collateral References, 
tion KM-Hfi-lH (( 'ode 11M3) which was Arbi t ra t ion and Award C=>77. 
repealed l,y Laws 1S»."»I. ch. fix, § it. f. C .!.S. Arbi t ra t ion §§147, 105. 
;"» Am. .Iur„ 2d 050, Arb i t r a t ion and 
Award § 1S5. 
78-31-19. Decree of court.—Ppon the <:rantiu£ of an order confirming, 
modifying, correcting or vacating an award, judgment or decree shall 
be entered in conformity therewith. 
HiHtory: L. 1051, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31 19. A r b i h a h o n and AwardC=>73 84. 
Comptler's Notes. <; ( ' - T S - Arbi t ra t ion § § 1 - 0 . 145 et «eq. 
r!Ml- „ , , : . • ; i »• i , ,• "' Am .IMI. 2d 012, Arb i t ra t ion nnd 
I his section i.s identical to former sec ' 
tion l e t .'HUD ( i \ . de 1013) which was Award & Ibo. 
repealed by Laws P.'51, el». f>K, § \\. 
78-31-20. Record to be filed with clerk of court—Entry of judgment.— 
The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, correcting or 
vacating an award shall, at the time such motion is tiled with the clerk, 
file, unless the same have theretofore been filed,- the following papers 
with the clerk : 
(1) The written contract, or a veriiied copy thereof, containing the 
agreement for the submission, the selection or appointment of the arbi-
t ra tor or arbitrators, and each written extension of the time, if any, 
within which to make the award. 
(2) The award. 
(o") Kvery notice, affidavit and other paper used upon an application 
to confirm, modify, correct or vacate the award, and each order made 
upon such application. The judgment or decree shall be entered and 
docketed as if it were rendered in a civil action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, §1; C. 1943, Purpose of section. 
Supp., 104-31-20. This section provides a method by which 
_ ., , . . . an award, made as provided bv this chap-
Compiler., Notes.
 u , r m ; i v w ^{>u ^ ^ ^ n n d ^ 
Tin* sert urn IM identical to former see-
 | | | | r i M j f)( j „ , ] k M m . l l t j , v nummary proceed-
tion H»4-:UPJ0 (Cede |«.u;h which was
 1 | lv:s i n t l u , n ; i ! l l r c ()*f ,ti motion (lied in 
repealed by Laws 1!»f>l. ch. f>S, § 3 except
 ( . o u r r (Viannopulos v. Pappas , 80 U. 442, 
that in the former s t a tu t e the last sen- ,- ,» .J(j . ^ applying Lawn 1927, ch. 62. 
tenco appeared as a separa te pa ragraph 
ra ther than nx part of auhd. (3) . Collateral References. 
A i hit rat ion and A v\ nrdO=73. 
0 C.I.S. Arbi t ra t ion § 14f>. 
S7-1 
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ARBITRATION 78-31-22 
DKCLSIONS IT.NPMK Ki>KM KK LAW 
Filing Of award. wi.shed award to have force and effect of 
Under U.S. 189S, §§ 32"J:i and S'JL'T, it judgment, file award with rlork. Richards 
wai not duty of arbitrators to tile their v. Smith, 33 V. M, «i| P. r.x.'l. 
award with clerk; parties could, if they 
78-31-21. Judgment—Force and effect.—-Tin* judgment'or decree so 
entered and docketed shall have the same force and effect in all respects 
as, and shall be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment 
or decree; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in the court 
in which it is entered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, §1; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-31-21. Arbitration and AwardC=>82. 
Compiler's Kotos. o" I'.J.S. Arbitral ion §§ 97, 148. 
Am. Jar. L\l 6lL\ Arbitration and 
This section is identical to former sec- \w;ird^KH> 
Hon 104-36-21 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 19M, ch. 58, § 3. Award or decision by arbitrators as 
precluding return of case to or its re-
consideration by them, 101 A. L. 1;. 710. 
78-31-22. Appeals.—An appeal may be taken from the final judgment 
or decree entered by the court. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1 ; C. 1943, ration, held final and appealable order 
SupPn 104-31-22. within C.L. P.M»7, §§3230 and 330<>. Hivann 
v. Ttah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 
Compiler's Notes. 53 p . col, 174 P. 1120. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-36-22 (Code 1943) which was re- Collateral References, 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3 . Arbitration and AwnrdC=>73. 
f» C..I.H. Arbitration § 161 et aoq. 
Order as appealable. 5
 A m a , u r LM (il»Gt Arbitration and 
Order of court in arbitration caHe, set- Award § 145. 
ting aside awurd and ordering new hear 
lag without order for resubmission but Appealability of judgment confirming or 
also affirmatively ordering plaint ids and setting aside arbitration award, 7 A. L. "R. 
interveners to present their claims for 3d 008. 
damage to receiver of defendant corpo-
CIIA1TKU .T2 
CONTEMPT 
Section 78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real propeity. 
78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; summary action--Without immediate 
presence; procedure. 
78-32-4. Warrant of arrest, commitment or order to show cause mav issue. 
78-32-5. Bail. 
78-32-6. Duty of sheriff. 
78-32-7. Bail bond—Form. 
78-32-8. Officer's return. 
78-32-9. Hearing. 
78-32-10. Judgment. 
78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved. 
78-32-12. Imprisonment to compel performance 
78-32-13. Procedure when party charged fails to appear. 
78-32*14. Kxcuse for nonappearance Unnecessary re*truint forbidden. 
78-32-15. Contempt of process of nonjudicial oflicer. 
78-32 10. Procedure. 
375 
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fUSCS I 3 A RBfT RATION 
f 3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitra-
tion 
If say suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement tn 
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable 
to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the 
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for 
the stay is not tn default in proceeding with such arbitration 
(July 30. 1947, ch 392. § I. 61 Stat 670) 
9 USCS 5 4 A*»IT*ATK>N 
$ 4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States 
court baring jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and 
service thereof; hearing and determination 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any 
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under Title 28 [28 USCS], tn a civil action or in admiralty of 
the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the 
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed tn the manner 
provided for in such agreement Five days' notice in writing of such 
application shall be served upon the party in default Service thereof shall 
be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
[USCS Rules of Civil Procedure] The court shall hear the parties. *r*d 
ttpon bong satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the 
failure to comply therewith ts not in issue, the court shall make an order 
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement The hearing and proceedings under such agreement, 
shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such 
arbitration is filed If the making of the arbitration agreement or the 
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall 
proceed summarily to the trial thereof If no jury trial be demanded by the 
party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is wi'htn 
admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue 
Where such an issue ts raised, the party alleged to be in default may, 
except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of 
application, demand a jury tnal of such issue, and upon such demand the 
court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury m the 
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [USCS Rules of 
Civil Procedure], or may specially call a jury for that purpose If the jury 
find that no ^rccment in writing for arbitration was made or that there is 
no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed If 
the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and 
that there ts a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an 
order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in 
accordance with the terms thereof 
(July 30. 1947, ch 392, $ 1, 61 Stat 671, Sept 3. l^M, ch 1263. § 19. 68 
Stat 1233) 
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APPLICATION OF §4 FAA AND RELATED FEDERAL 
STANDARDS TO THE PRESENT MATTER 
Federal standards for interpreting and enforcing 
arbiration agreements apply both to the motions for stays 
under 9 U.S.C. 3 and to petitions to compel arbitration 
under 9 U.S.C. 4. For the reasons mentioned in Point II of 
the attached Brieff Judge Wilkinson erred in failing to 
apply §3 FAA. 
If Judge Wilkinson had a duty to apply 9 U.S.C. 4 (as 
Docutel-Olivetti suggests), he erred in ruling only on state 
law. (R. 271). 
This matter involves a contract which was entered into 
through discussions in the State of Utah and involves 
modifications and agreements and transactions in the State 
of Utah. It involves third-party witnesses in the State of 
Utah. It involves a contract which was performed substan-
tially within the State of Utah concerning a dealership in 
this state. An action arising out of the dealership and 
under the Dealership Agreement was brought by Olivetti in 
the State of Utah (R. 15,62-64,85-89 ) . 
The United States Supreme Court has recently 
reiterated the standard to be applied in respect to 
arbitration in the case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 
927, 74 L.Ed. 2d 756 (1983), saying: 
A93 
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter 
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract langage itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability• 
To remove an issue from the arbitration provision of 
the present Agreement applying Federal standards, Olivetti 
was required to show not merely an ambiguity or implication, 
but a clearly expressed intent within the Agreement itself 
not to arbitrate. State Side Machinery Company v. Alperin, 
591 F.2d 234 (C.A. 3, 1979). To overcome the presumption in 
favor of arbitration, clear intent must be shown. Consumer 
Concept, Inc. v. Meqo Corp., 458 F. Supp. 534 (D.C. N.Y., 
1978) . 
Here, there is no negative statement whatever 
expressly negating arbitration as to any particular claim. 
Instead, paragraph 12 of the Agreement expresses unquivo-
cally the intent that "all disputes" are arbitrable. 
In light of the aforementioned overwhelming federal 
policy in favor of arbitration, which requires that an 
intent not to arbitrate be clearly, expressly and specific-
ally expressed, and the unequivocal expression of intent in 
the Agreement to arbitrate "all disputes", arbitration of 
all claims between the parties should be ordered. 
Under 9 U.S.C. 4, a court is required to order 
arbitration in Utah. The statute explicitly states, in 
pertinent part: 
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The court shall hear the parties, and upon being 
satisfied that the making of the Agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not 
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with 
the terms of the Agreement. The hearing and proceed-
ings, under such agreement, shall be within the 
district in which the petition for an order directing 
such arbitration is filed. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, by clear statutory mandate, a court must 
order arbitration in Utah, without regard for any other 
factor. This principle has been clearly and unequivocally 
established in Econo-car International, Inc. v. Antilles Car 
Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391 (C.A. 3, 1974). The Court ruled 
that the site established by the statute prevails over the 
site designated in the contract: 
The order compelling arbitration in this case, 
however, raises a different problem. Under the order's 
terms, the contemplated arbitration is to take place 
in New York City, as specifically provided in the 
Agreement between the parties. Section 4 of the Act 
permits a party to request an order requiring 
arbitration "in the manner provided for in such 
agreement" but section 4 also provides that the 
arbitration "shall be within the district in which the 
petition for an order directing such arbitration is 
filed."... 
While any directive in Section 4 that arbitration 
be conducted according to the terms of the Agreement 
is implicit at best, the requirement that arbitration 
take place in the district court (sic) where the 
petition is filed is clear and unequivocal. Certainly 
the savings of resources occasioned by the geographic 
concentration of all proceedings provides an 
appropriate legislative basis for this limitation on 
the district court's power. ... [W]e are inclined to 
heed the unambiguous statutory language limiting the 
district court!s power to order arbitration outside 
the district. We hold, therefore, that the district 
court erred in ordering arbitration to take place in 
New York City [outside the district]. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Therefore, under the clear command of the statute, and 
as specified by the Thrid Circuit Court of Appeals, 
arbitration must be ordered within the State of Utah. This 
result is not only in accordance with the command of the 
statute, but it is equitable because Docutel-Olivetti chose 
this forum to proceed with the resolution of the disputes. 
The issues pertain to geographic determinations involving 
Utah and involving a contract performed primarily in this 
forum. Third party witnesses are here and their presence 
could not be compelled except in Utah. (R. 15,62-64,85-89). 
Continental Grain Company v. Pant and Russell, Inc., 
118 F.2d 967 (C.A. 9, 1941), was cited and relied on by the 
Third Circuit in Econo-Car, above. Continental Grain, now 
law for 44 years, not only stands for the proposition that 
the location clause of 9 U.S.C. 4 is controlling, but also 
provides persausive insight into the legislative history and 
proper interpretation of this section. The Continental Grain 
Court said: 
The only point raised by the Appellant is that the 
order of arbitration which is requested should have 
provided for a hearing in New York. This point is not 
well taken. 
The statute expressly provides that the hearing 
and proceedings shall be within the district in which 
the petition for the order directing the arbitration 
is filed. In the statute (Act of February 12, 1925, 
chapter 213, section 4, 43.Stat.L, page 883, 884, 9 
U.S.C.A. Section 4) the clause under consideration 
with reference to the place of arbitration is in the 
form of a proviso reading as follows: "... the court 
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed 
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement: provided, that the hearing and proceedings 
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under such agreements shall be within the district in 
which the petition for an order directing such 
arbitration is filed." In the compilation of the act 
for the United States Code, the words "provided that" 
are omitted. We mention this distinction although 
there is no difference between the meaning of the 
section as printed in the statute and in the code. In 
both it is stated that the hearing and proceedings 
under the agreement shall be in the district in which 
the petition for an order directing such arbitration 
was filed. 
The appellant challenges the right of the court to 
order the arbitration within the district of Oregon 
because such an order does not conform to the 
agreement of the parties for an arbitration in New 
York. Prior to the enactment of the United States 
Arbitration Act (1925) such agreements could not be 
enforced in the courts of the United States. If there 
could be any doubt of the power of the legislature to 
limit the right of arbitration to one conducted within 
the jurisdiction of the district court ordering the 
arbitration, it must be dispelled by the consideration 
that Congress could attach any limitation it desired 
to the right to enforce arbitration in the federal 
courts, that it has made a condition that arbitration 
be held in the district where the court sits, that the 
contract in question was executed with the knowledge 
that Congress had so provided, and that the appellant 
had invoked the jurisdiction of a court other than 
that having jurisdiction in New York to enforce the 
agreement. The appellant, having invoked the 
jurisdiction of the United States District for Oregon 
is hardly in a position to complain that it has 
exercised that jurisdiction in accordance with the 
statute giving it jurisdiction. (Emphasis provided.) 
The Ninth Circuit has, therefore, pointed out that the 
bill as adopted in 1925 contained the words "provided that" 
between the manner clause and the location clause, thus 
clearly overriding the terms of any agreement between the 
parties. When the Federal Arbitration Act was codified, the 
words "provided that" were omitted. This appears to be a 
clerical error in the codification process. There is no 
reconsideration by Congress of the Bill as passed associated 
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with the codification. 
The Ninth Circuit in Continental Grain declared this 
to be a distinction without difference, as both the adopted 
bill and the codification thereof mean exactly the same 
thing, that is, that the location of the arbitration is 
specified by the Act, not by the agreement of the parties 
whenever recourse to court order is required. This 
interpretation is the only interpretation being presented to 
this Court which pre-dates the re-codification of Section 4 
in 1947 or the amendment [which modernized language refering 
to the courts and Rules of Civil Procedure] in 1954. If the 
Court is to construe Section 4, it must be presumed that 
Congress was well aware of the Continental Grain interpreta-
tion thereof and the failure of the Congress to interfere 
when the Continental Grain interpretation both in 1947 and 
in 1954 when the Act was amended. 
The Tenth Circuit has succinctly stated the rule 
applicable to the foregoing in Commissioner v. F.G. Bonfils 
Trust, 115 F.2d 788 (C.A. 10, 1940) as follows: 
The re-enactment of a statute substantially 
unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by 
the Congress of a prior judicial construction thereof. 
Thus, the Continental Grain interpretation applies 
within the Tenth Circuit as persuassive if not controlling 
authority. 
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Therefore, if Judge Wilkinson had a duty to apply 9 
U.S.C. §4, he erred in not ordering arbitration in the State 
of Utah in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, J r . 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
4609 South 2300 Eas t , Su i te 104 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
S t a t e Bar #218 0 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
10 1985 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF .UTAH 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-506 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. and Richard Brady's 
Motion for Dismissal or Stay of Proceeding Pending Arbitration 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. 
[Wilkinson on May 24, 198 5. Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiff Docutel Olivetti Corporation and Lynn G. 
Foster appeared on behalf of the defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc, 
ja Utah corporation and Richard Brady. 
The Court having reviewed and considered the memorandums 
in support and in opposition to the motion, the pleadings and 
[documents on file herein and having heard and considered the argu-
ments of counsel finds that paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the Agreement 
between the parties herein specifically provides that with respect 
\to the purchase and sale of goods and services and the collection 
bf the debts thereon, plaintiff has the right to avail itself of any 
temedy available to it including the remedy of litigation and that 
the specific provisions take precedence over the general arbitration 
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language of the Agreement and that the subject matter of plaintiff's 
Complaint herein is not therefore arbitrable. 
Based on the foregoing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. 
and Richard Brady's Motion for Dismissal of Proceedings Pending 
Arbitration is denied; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. 
and Richard Brady shall file its Answer to the Complaint herein by 
Friday, June 7, 1985. 
DATED this /& day of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
ATTfcST 
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CM J' ;? i : ,H i 
>-l-l-r • J r •»•— • Gordon R. Mc Dow«-l 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
4609 South 2300 E a s t , S u i t e 104 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84117 
Te lephone : (801) 272-0309 
S t a t e Bar No. 2180 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
JUL 19 1985 
Deputy ClerU 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC, 
et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-506 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
pursuant to Defendants1 Objection to Proposed Order and Motion to 
Clarify Decision and pursuant to Defendants1 Motion to Approve 
Statement of Proceedings, and further pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Enter Default and Motion to Strike Defendants1 Statement 
From the Record, Gordon R. McDowell, Jr. appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Lynn G. Foster appeared on behalf of Defendants Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation and Richard Brady. Having 
heard the argument of counsel for the parties; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Default, having been withdrawn, 
no order thereon is hereby made. 
2. Defendant may file an Amendment to their Answer and 
Counterclaim on or before the 2nd day of July, 1985, if Defendants 
so desire. 
3. The Court intentionally makes no findings of fact in 
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support-of its ruling on May 24, 1985, and makes no findings of 
fact in support of its rulings pursuant to the matters heard by 
the Court on the 21st day of June, 1985, none being required, in 
the view of the Court, under Rules 12(b and 52(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
it—5iie--Court s t r i k e s liae-s—-2-0- th rough 28 of page 1 and l i n o s 
] anH 2 n f P^g^ 7 -Qj? -tite—Ofder—signed~by-ther-Court—eft—the-
• day of June,—3:9Q5T-
5. Except as otherwise provided herein, Defendants' 
Objection to Proposed Order and Motion to Clarify is denied. 
6. Defendants' Motion to Approve Defendants' Statement of 
Proceedings is denied, aftd the- Statement of Proceedingo 'filed by 
defendants is not aoocpfced-by the CuuiT 
7. The Court makes no ruling concerning any defenses, counter-) 
claims or set-offs which may be raised in this litigation by 
defendants. Any issues related to such defenses, counterclaims or 
set-offs may be brought before the Court on motion. 
DATED this / J day of /VZ+^1 , 1985 
•f 
BY THE COURT 
/ J u d g e Homer F . Wi lk inson 
- 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed Order, postage prepaid, to Lynn G. Foster, 
Attorney for Defendants, 6 02 East 3rd South, Salt Lake City, UT . 
84102 this £(? day of June, 1985. 
Gayla R. Casper, Secretary 
-3-
A104 
201 
OLIVETTI CORPORATION DEALER AGREEMENT olivelli 
THIS AGREEMENT made the / v 7 day of r < * & , 19 $>, between 
OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 155 White Plains Road, Tarrytown, New York 10591 ("Olivetti") 
and DICK BRADY SYSTEMS 
IJ an individual • a partnership corporation 
(State of Incorporation! 
5^5. £ M n.rti w?iH SALT LAKE CITY UTAH (TV/pU. 
t addres« I (city and state) 
86/ S2/~ BW ("Dealer") 
(zip code) 
<telephone - including area code) 
1. 
Olivetti appoints Dealer as an authorized dealer for the 
sale, leasing, rental and servicing of the Olivetti ma-
chines set forth on the schedule(s) attached hereto and 
accessories, parts and supplies therefor (the "Prod-
ucts') in the geographic area set forth in the schedule(s) 
attached hereto (the "Territory") commencing on the 
date this Agreement is executed by Olivetti. The deal-
ershipcreated by this Agreement.shall continue in effect 
until terminated by Olivetti or Dealer in accordance 
with the terms of this Agreement. Olivetti and Dealer 
agree to act in a fair and equitable manner to each other 
and to end users of the Products. 
Olivetti shall 30 days prior to each anniversary of 
the commencement date assign Dealer a mutually ag-
reeable annual quota for purchase of Products from 
Olivetti during the succeeding year in order for Dealer 
to retain the dealership created by this Agreement. 
Such quota shall be set forth in a new schedule(s) which 
shall be part of this Agreement. Quotas for new Prod-
ucts will be established at the time of introduction of 
such Products. Fulfillment of quota is essential to this 
dealership. Failure of Dealer to achieve 409£ of its annual 
quota during any consecutive six month period may be 
treated by Olivetti as an event of default. Other sales 
goals or incentives will be established from time to time 
in connection with contests and sales achievement clubs-
Olivetti reserves the right to negotiate an agree-
ment with national or government accounts for the 
sale, lease, rental or service of the Products in the Ter-
ritory. Olivetti may assign to Dealer that portion of 
any account which provides for sale, lease, rental 
or service of the Products in the Territory. Dealer 
agrees to accept such assignment and to perform such 
contract. 
2. 
Dealer shall do everything possible actively and con-
tinually to promote and encourage the sale, leasing, 
rental and servicing of the Products in the Territory. 
In particular, Dealer shall establish and maintain an 
adequate number of service locations staffed with a 
reasonable number of competent, trained personnel 
and maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts to 
assure prompt service. Dealer shall perform any 
Olivetti warranty service applicable to the Products 
used in the Territory. If Dealer sells any Products which 
are used within the warranty period outside of the Ter-
ritory, Dealer shall comnensjrtp rh*» inctoiiino r\U\r*tti 
location in accordance with the current delivery and 
installation policy established by Olivetti for installa-
tion, training and warranty service. 
Olivetti will use its best efforts to maintain an 
adequate supply of spare parts for the Products, but 
shall not be responsible for events beyond its control. 
3. 
Dealer will conduct the dealership created by this 
Agreement for its own account. It is understood that 
Dealer has no authority to obligate Olivetti for any 
liability relating to the dealership or the Products. 
4. 
Olivetti will sell, and Dealer will purchase, the Prod-
ucts in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement. Olivetti will give Dealer thirty (30) 
days' prior notice of any increase in prices. 
5. 
OHvetti grants Dealer a license to use its registered 
trademark and trade name "Olivetti" in connection 
with the dealership created by this Agreement, but 
only in accordance with the guidelines and directions 
specifically set forth by Olivetti. Dealer shall not add 
to, obliterate, deface or remove anv brand, trademark 
or serial number carried on the machine or packaging 
thereof. Dealer acknowledges that the trademark and 
trade name "Olivetti" are extremely valuable assets of 
Olivetti and that such license grants Dealer access to 
Olivetti's valuable good will. Olivetti may at any time 
object to a specific application of any Olivetti trademark 
or trade name. In such an event, Dealer will cease mak-
ing such application of the trademark or trade name 
immediately. The license created by this paragraph shall 
terminate automatically at the same time as the termina-
tion of the dealership created by this Agreement. Dealer 
shall not acquire, and specifically disclaims, any other 
right in such trademark or trade name or any right in any 
other Olivetti trademark or trade name and shall not use 
any Olivetti trademark or trade name or part thereof as 
part of the business name of its company. 
6. 
Dealer may not assign or transfer, voluntarily or by 
operation of law, by means of merger, consolidation, 
sale of assets or transfer of control by transfer of 
shares or otherwise; all or any part of its interest in or 
obligations under this Agreement without the prior 
written consent of Olivetti and any such attempted 
assignment or delegation shall be null and void. Such 
Olivetti may, from tune to time, issue policy manuals, 
circular letters and service manuals and bulletins 
relating to various matters, including, but not lim-
ited to, new products, national accounts, government 
accounts, interterritorial transfers, servicing stan-
dards, prices, transfer of delivery and installation fees, 
use of trademarks, advertising (such as Yellow Pages) 
and the furnishing of general market information to 
Olivetti. It is understood and agreed that such manuals, 
letters and bulletins shall be part of this Agreement, and 
shall be returned to Olivetti upon termination of the 
dealership. 
8. 
Dealer agrees to use and abide by the terms and 
conditions of Olivetti purchase order forms and in-
voices when purchasing the Products. 
9. 
Dealer agrees that Olivetti retains the entire pro-
prietary rights and title to any software which it 
provides to Dealer. Olivetti merely conveys a non-ex-
clusive, non-transferrable license to Dealer and its 
customers to use such software in connection with the 
Products. That license does not include the right to 
publish or license such software to others or to use it 
for non-Olivetti hardware. 
10. 
Dealer hereby grants Olivetti a security interest in 
all Olivetti brand equipment and inventory which 
Dealer presently owns or may hereafter acquire and any 
additions or accessions thereto and the proceeds 
thereof. Dealer authorizes Olivetti to sign and file 
financing statements in favor of Olivetti. Upon request. 
Dealer agrees to execute such financing statement! s). If 
an event of default by Dealer occurs under any credit 
agreement with Olivetti, Olivetti may, among other rem-
edies, avail itself of any remedy in effect now or at the 
time of default under the Uniform Commercial Code or 
any similar statute. In the event Olivetti successfully 
brings legal action against Dealer for the collection of an 
unpaid account, Dealer agrees to pay all reasonable 
collect ion costs and legal expenses including reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
11. 
Either party may terminate the dealership created by 
this Agreement at any time for violation of the terms of 
this Agreement upon thirty (30) days' prior written 
notice sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
unless the violation is cured within such thirty-day 
period. 
12. 
All disputes arising under this Agreement or pertaining 
in any manner to the dealership created by this Agree-
ment shall be resolved by arbitration by an Appeal 
Board in accordance with the then-current Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion CA.A.A."). The Appeal Board shall consist of 
three members: one appointed by Olivetti, one which 
may be appointed by the National Office Machine 
Dealers Association, upon request of Dealer, and, if 
required, one appointed by the A.A.A. The arbitration 
hearing shall be conducted at the regional office of 
A.A.A. closest to the principal office of the party 
against whom arbittation is demanded, unless Olivetti 
and Dealer agree upon a different location. The fact that 
Olivetti or Dealer may obtain a provisional remedy from 
a court of law prior to, or during the course of, the 
arbitration hearing shall not be deemed a waiver of 
arbitration or deprive the Appeal Board of jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Judgment upon the award rendered by 
the Appeal Board may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. 
If the Appeal Board finds in favor of Olivetti, 
Dealer shall pay the fees and expenses of the Appeal 
Board. 
If the Appeal Board finds in favor of Dealer, 
Olivetti shall pay the fees and expenses of the Appeal 
Board. 
13. 
Olivetti shall not be liable to Dealer for failure to 
make delivery of the Products when due to any cause 
or event beyond Olivetti's reasonable control. In such 
event, Olivetti may cancel the order(s) or extend the 
period for performance to the extent of the delay 
occasioned therein'. Olivetti will notify Dealer of any 
cancellation of an order and use its best efforts to notify 
Dealer of any delay in delivery. 
14. 
This instrument and the accompanying schedule consti-
tute the entire Agreement between the parties and 
supersede all contemporaneous and previous agree-
ments related to the same subject matter. 
15. 
This agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to 
the benefit of, the respective heirs, beneficiaries, per-
sonal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
parties, except as otherwise herein provided. It may 
not be modified or amended except in writing, signed 
by a duly authorized representative of the party to be 
bound. Only the President, or a Vice President shall be 
deemed a duly authorized representative of Olivetti. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have 
caused thi3 Agreement to be executed as of 
the dayHar^Tabpve written. 
OLIVETTI CORPORATION 
Byj&!«? 
Date^U!^ 
\ 
DEALER Mick BP9dy Systems 
By 
Date 
C 
te./}.. &a< 
